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The term chiasmus and all its many variants describe a phenomenon 
of language, body and perception. As a syntactic-rhetorical device, the 
usage of which is culturally diffuse, chiasmus involves a re-ordering of 
elements in a sentence to produce an A-B-B-A pattern. An example of this is 
the well-known saying falsely attributed to Hippocrates: “Let thy food be thy 
medicine and medicine be thy food.” As a symbol, chiasmus describes a 
pattern with intersecting lines, the most simplistic form of which is the X. 
Chiasm, in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, refers to a phenomenon of 
body and mind. Insofar as it is used in the latter part of this work, chiasm 
refers to how the body and brain negotiate motor function, touch and 
perception: the right hemisphere of the brain corresponds with movement 
and function in the left side of the body, and the left hemisphere of the brain 
corresponds to movement and function in the right side of the body. All 
chiastic forms involve an intersection or crossing of the elements—whether 
syntactical or anatomical.  
 
The first chapter of the thesis is a literature review entitled, “Chiastic 
Studies and Typology,” which gives an overview of a few in-depth studies on 
chiasmus and of chiastic types that have been identified in semiotics and at 
the syntactical level. The second chapter of the thesis, “Chiastic Forms and 
Figures: Truths, Logic and Cross-Linguistic Usage” examines chiasmus as a 
semiotic and syntactic phenomenon. Part of the discussion considers 
whether and how chiasmus as a semiotic phenomenon is not only a symbol 
of self, but also a symbol of the person’s truthfulness or trustworthiness. 
Proceeding on, this section transitions into a broader reflection on how 
chiasmus overlaps with truth-functional logic and is an aspect of 
systematicity in language.  
 
Focusing specifically on a sub-type of chiasmus, antimetabole, this 
section highlights 80 different examples, in 28 different languages and family 
groups. Antimetabole is characterized by precise reversals of the sentence 
elements: “Let thy food be thy medicine and medicine be thy food” entails a 
repetition and reversal of the elements medicine and food. This phrase 
would still be chiastic if a synonym for food was used, but it would not be an 
example of antimetabole. The identified examples of antimetabole fit into 
eight types: 
 
1) Equalization: AB equates to or is the same as BA 
2) Part-whole: A is part of B, and B is part of A  
3) Exclusion: A excludes B, and B excludes A 
4) Dissociation: A dissociates from B, B dissociates from A  
5) Combination: A and B, B and A; the elements are grouped together  
6) Comparison: A and B are better than B and A; or A and B are worse than 









7) One Way Effects: A affects B, but B does not affect A; or A does not affect 
B, but B affects A 
8) Multiple Effects: A affects B, and B affects A; or A affects B and B affects 
A; 
can also include more elaborate reversals with repeating C, D, E elements 
 
 
The third chapter of the work, “Merleau-Ponty’s Chiasm: a Theory of 
Perception” concerns Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s text The Visible and the 
Invisible, in which he develops chiasm as a concept. This is an interpretation 
of his text that argues that the chiasm is a five-fold bodily relation, referring 
to:  
 
1) Its role in connecting the visible with the invisible – or the perceptual with 
mental phenomena  
2) The way the two eyes work together to produce one perceptual 
experience  
3) The experience of touch other things and touching oneself  
4) A linguistic and meaning-making process, in which meaning is constantly 
in flux 
5) The social dynamic, or interactivity between One and Other  
 
The fourth chapter, “Models of the Brain: Metaphors, Architectures 
and Chiastic Applications” argues that the chiasm has usefulness in 
describing perception and activities of the brain. Beginning with a criticism of 
metaphors of the brain which have been influential in defining approaches to 
artificial intelligence, this chapter reveals the shortcomings of calling the 
brain a hierarchy, and the related notion that the brain is either a top-down or 
bottom-up architecture. It also challenges presently held views on how 
information is stored in a brain. Each sub-section accomplishes this by 
examining a different approach, including:  
 
1) Representational Theory of Mind and its corresponding logic-based efforts 
to produce an artificially intelligent computer 
2) Connectionism and one of its promising descendants in deep learning, 
specifically the convolutional neural network underlying SPAUN (Semantic 
Pointer Architecture Unified Network); and  
3) Bayesian approaches to mind, which found momentum alongside linear 
predictive coding, and Hidden Markov models.  
 
To complete this analysis is a more intensive argument that the 
architecture of the biological human brain is chiastic, rather than strictly top-
down or bottom-up. The final part of this chapter draws on the philosophy of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, along with a body of research on the brain and 
bodily hemispheres. It demonstrates why scholars and engineers in artificial 









theories of perception, and when it comes to making practical design choices 
in building more humanlike artificial intelligence.  
 
The last chapter in the thesis “Embodied X Figures and Forms of 
Thought” is intended to be a companion piece or footnote to the first. It is a 
review of Pelkey’s 2017 book, The Semiotics of X: Chiasmus, Cognition, and 
Extreme Body Memory. This review was previously published in Semiotica 



































Chiasmus is a syntactic pattern, most frequently an A-B-B-A pattern, 
though the patterns may be more elaborate and include more elements. 
Before the main chapters, there is a literature review chapter, “Chiasmus 
Studies and Typology,” which introduces different types of chiasmus 
identified to date. The second chapter of the thesis “Chiastic Forms and 
Figures” concerns chiasmus as an aspect of language, but also of semiotics. 
Where it describes symbols, chiasmus refers to X — two lines that cross. I 
probe Pelkey’s (2017) thesis that X represents a spread posture of the 
human form, while also exploring X as a symbol of a “truth,” via its correlates 
in Western culture. The paper “Chiastic Forms and Figures” examines 
chiasmus as a tool with some similarities to truth-functional logic, and 
analyses 80 examples of chiasmus from 28 different language families and 
groups, in an effort to show some common cross-linguistic types. 
      The third chapter, “Merleau-Ponty’s Chiasm: A Theory of Perception” is 
an interpretation of The Visible and the Invisible by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
in which chiasm the structure that both links and separates the individual 
from the World and all other instances of ‘flesh’, a primal element which pre-
exists the material world. The chiasm also describes the relation and 
interaction between individuals, who are themselves part of flesh. For 
Merleau-Ponty, chiasm includes the optic chiasma, which connects the eyes 
and allows normal perception to occur, and it also encompasses how a 
person engages in touch and the experience of touching oneself. The other 
chiastic relation Merleau-Ponty defines is a linguistic one, pertaining to the 
exchange between two speakers and how they engage in the meaning-
making process. After closely examining these bodily relations, I propose a 
more robust theory of perception, social interaction and language in Merleau-
Ponty’s text. 
      The fourth chapter of the thesis, “Models of the Brain: Metaphors, 
Architectures and Chiastic Applications” reinforces how Merleau-Ponty’s 
concept of chiasm is useful in describing human perceptual processing. The 
dominant view is that the brain is hierarchical, and that information is 
conveyed through it in “bottom up” or “top down” manner: through the eyes 
and visual areas and up to the higher order areas of the brain, or with the 
higher order areas of the brain generating predictive content that is then 
shared with the lower, visual areas. I establish reasons why it is limiting to 
metaphorize the brain as a hierarchy, and explore other metaphors related to 
how the brain stores information, which hold considerable influence in 
cognitive science and artificial intelligence. This chapter also draws on the 
work of Merleau-Ponty and neuroscientific research on the brain and bodily 
hemispheres to propose that the chiasm is an important aspect of brain-body 
architecture. Considering the roles of the hemispheres and how they 
complement each other in the perceptual process may be beneficial in 










The final chapter of the thesis “Embodied X Figures and Forms of 
Thought” provides some additioal information about Embodied X and 
chiasmus. This reviews Pelkey’s 2017 book, The Semiotics of X: Chiasmus, 
Cognition, and Extreme Body Memory, and the paper was previously 
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Chiasmus: A Phenomenon of Language, Body and Perception 
 
Introduction 
As a phenomenon and concept, chiasm and its many derivatives have 
a little-recognized but widespread influence. The syntactic-rhetorical 
chiasmus involves reversing the elements in a sentence and rendering an A-
B-B-A pattern. These pithy phrases are memorable and are present across 
languages from diverse families and groups. One such example is the oft 
repeated axiom: “Winners never quit and quitters never win.” The term 
chiasm associates not only with this linguistic relation between these two 
opposite and interacting conditions (i.e. a situation in which there are either 
losers or winners), but through the late critical inquiries of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, it also develops a more expansive meaning. Although there are 
differing perspectives on Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm, it is defined in a general 
regard as reversibility. Each of the chapters making up this thesis 
investigates the chiasm from a different angle. “Chiastic Forms and Figures: 
Truths, Logic and Cross-Linguistic Usage” chiefly focuses on the cross-
linguistic prevalence of syntactic chiasmus, while “Merleau-Ponty’s Chiasm: 
A Theory of Perception” spotlights Merleau-Ponty’s contributions, and more 
thoroughly interprets the chiasm as a concept in his text The Visible and the 
Invisible. “Merleau-Ponty’s Chiasm” especially presents the case that chiasm 
is a bodily relation: it is linguistic, but it is also interpersonal, and bridges the 









the chiasm is shown to be a five-fold relation between human bodies, and 
within the body of the individual: 1) it refers to the human agent’s 
proprioceptive awareness and ability to touch his own body and to feel his 
touch. 2) The chiasm allows the human agent to experience a sense of 
wholeness and divergence from Other and world. 3) It is a part of the 
linguistic exchange between individuals and of how we engage in meaning-
making processes.  4) Most significantly, the term chiasm describes 
perception, and finds a literal referent with the optic chiasma, which is a 
midbrain structure that extends to the eyes. 5) For Merleau-Ponty, the 
chiasm is the force that defines the entire conscious experience of 
humankind, and differentiates each Being from flesh, or the primal and pre-
substantive element.1 Drawing on this, the chapter of the thesis entitled, 
“Models of the Brain: Metaphors, Architectures and Chiastic Applications” 
examines an issue in artificial intelligence: how researchers conceptualize 
and metaphorize the human brain and perceptual processes. Applying 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of chiasm to the issue, “Models of the Brain” argues 
for its usefulness in better describing perception. All of the chapters 
emphasize a central point: that the chiasm is an important aspect of human 
linguistic, social and perceptual experience.  
 Before the first chapter there is a literature review, with a special 
concentration on researchers who have applied their studies of chiasmus to 
a broad range of topics. This literature review also includes an overview of 
                                               









chiastic typology and the researchers who have noted different chiastic types 
to date. After going in depth on each typology, I briefly present my own in 
preparation for the discussion in the first paper. The chapter “Chiastic Forms 
and Figures” specifically concentrates on identifying chiasmus across a 
range of different languages, then proceeds into a discussion of its 
argumentative function. Chiasmus often joins together two divergent 
statements. It bears some similarities to truth-functional logic: chiastic 
phrasing can feature a proposition and negation, a logical disjunction and 
other combinative effects. In all instances, it is a meeting point or intersection 
of two possibilities. Lissner (2007) posits that chiasmus is an ingrained 
aspect of embodiment, and Pelkey (2017) proposes that chiastic structures 
are derived from the foundations of the human form —with outstretched 
limbs and a spread posture that can create an embodied X. Beginning with a 
discussion of the attributes of the semiotic correlate X, “Chiastic Forms and 
Figures” considers how “chi” coincides with the concept of truth in Western 
culture. This segues into a deeper consideration of logic as a truth-finding 
method and how it relates to the syntactical structures of chiasmus. 
Examples of chiasmus from twenty-nine different languages are brought 
together in a typology, in part inspired by the semiotic typology of Pelkey 
(2017) and the syntactic typology of Paul (2014). The new typology which I 
offer differs from Paul’s in that it is limited to A-B-B-A syntactical 
arrangements, rather than more extended chiastic patterns, such as A-B-C-









he recognizes only four types. With my strict focus on the A-B-B-A pattern, 
the sub-type commonly known as antimetabole, eight clear types emerge 
cross-linguistically. Notably, chiastic structures are systematic, in the sense 
in which Fodor defines systematicity – in that they are logical and readable 
permutations of elements in an organized system of language. The common 
example, “John loves Mary” and “Mary loves John” is chiastic, and yet a 
closer examination of the chiastic types will reveal a reason why it could be 
difficult to train an algorithm to recognize how semantics may drastically 
fluctuate even with such a restricted re-arrangement of sentence elements. 
The final remarks in “Chiastic Forms and Figures” focus on applications of 
the work for those in cognitive science and informatics, as the other two 
sections deal chiefly with those areas of interest.  
The third chapter of the work “Merleau-Ponty’s Chiasm: A Theory of 
Perception” interprets Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the chiasm. As noted in 
the introduction above, Merleau-Ponty’s usage is deeply complex and 
layered, referring to five different bodily relations: the relation between Being 
and flesh, between the two eyes of the perceiver, and within the reflexive 
aspect of touch. The chiastic relation also occurs as a social and linguistic 
one, between individuals each in possession of bodies that co-exist in a 
world. Each subsection covers these bodily relations, with the first exploring 
the extant literature on the concept of flesh and clarifying its definition. 
Another section revolves around vision and perception in The Visible and the 









expression. Merleau-Ponty’s notes for The Visible and the Invisible inform 
the diagram of the chiasm which I present in the third section of this chapter, 
which centers on the topic of touch and its relationship to language. The 
fourth section contends with the subjects of language and logic, and 
proposes that the chiasm is an alternative way of arriving at meaning — not 
through demanding restrictive categorization or definition, but through 
recognizing fluctuating circumstances and the connection between 
seemingly opposite conditions. Finally, the last section in “Merleau-Ponty’s 
Chiasm” treats the social aspects of the chiasm, the Me-Other exchange that 
occurs as each person both expresses his individuality and finds confluence 
with another. Merleau-Ponty explains there is a “fundamental narcissism to 
all vision,” not to assert a solipsistic attitude, but to point to the possibility that 
an individual can get caught up in his own reflection, at the risk of not only 
ignoring but also harming others.  
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and concept of the chiasm is 
also crucial to the fourth chapter, “Models of the Brain: Metaphors, 
Architectures and Chiastic Applications.” The fourth chapter strives to 
develop a frame for understanding how using metaphors can affect how 
theoreticians might conceive of a process, and also transfer unwanted 
associations from the metaphor’s source to the target. After reviewing how 
this occurs in a more general way, this chapter specifically investigates 
metaphors of the human brain that are influential in different theoretical 









viewed as a hierarchy with bottom-up and top-down processes, while the 
chiasmic, cross hemispheric or lateralized processes attract considerably 
less attention. Applying Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the chiasm as it relates 
to both perception and touch, the intent here is to show how it can be an 
indispensable descriptor of what the human brain does. The paper first 
assesses the impact of mind and brain metaphors on Representational 
Theory of Mind, Connectionism, encoding methods, and Bayesianism, then 
considers how Merleau-Ponty’s theories about the chiasm might augment or 
inform these approaches.  
The final part of the thesis is a review article on the subject of 
chiasmus “Embodied X Figures and Forms of Thought,” which is intended to 
be a helpful companion piece or footnote. In this article, which was published 
in Semiotica (Grausso 2018), I review in detail the recent book of Pelkey 
(2017). The article provides more details about Pelkey’s theory that the 
upright human posture, or the embodied X, has contributed to chiasmus 
being firmly ingrained in culture. Covering Pelkey’s chiastic semiotic typology 
more in depth, the article gives an overview of research important to the 
study of chiasmus as both a syntactical structure and symbol. According to 
Pelkey’s book, the upright human posture, the ability to compare between 
the hemispheres of the body, and chiasmus might all relate to how humans 
first developed language.  
While each of the chapters of the thesis branches in a different 









cross-linguistic, perceptual and social phenomenon worthy of greater notice. 
Chiasmus coincides in many ways with truth functional logic, but the chiastic 
form also extends beyond it — by defining two opposite conditions, and in 
other respects revealing how to transcend the dichotomization it features. As 
it pertains to Merleau-Ponty, the chiasm is a much richer concept than 
presently recognized. The chiasm describes the crossing optic nerve fibers 
of the brain, and the way that the right side of the body most often 
corresponds to the left hemisphere of the brain, and in turn the left side of 
the body corresponds to the right hemisphere of the brain. Chiasmic 
structures are deeply ingrained both in the human body and in the constructs 
that human beings use to make sense of the world. As such, it would be 
remiss to ignore its features when it comes to designing every aspect of an 

































Chiastic Studies and Typology 
 
ABSTRACT: This is a brief review of some important literature on chiasmus 
to date, including the contributions of Strecker and Lissner, along with a 
guide to Paul’s (2014) typology, Pelkey’s typology (2017) and Harris’ chiastic 
suite. These different tools are considered individually and then compared to 
the typology I introduce for the sake of showing their unique attributes and 
also how they can all intermesh to be used for future investigation of 
chiasmus cross-culturally.  
 
Chiasmus is a ubiquitous literary and rhetorical device. At the 
sentence level, it consists of a reversal of elements and often assumes an 
ABBA form, as seen in the following example from Evelyn Beatrice Hall, who 
wrote The Friends of Voltaire (1907): “The instinct of a man is to pursue (A) 
everything that flies (B) from him, and to fly (B) from all that pursues (A) 
him.” Antimetabole is a type of chiastic arrangement, in which the ABBA 
elements are repeated exactly, as in the quote from Alexandre Dumas’ The 
Three Musketeers, “One for all and all for one,” originally an old Latinate 
phrase. Within texts such as novels and epic poems, chiasmus is also 
discussed as a type of ring structure, which is characterized by a 
symmetrical pattern of recurring themes or events in the plot. John D. Niles is 
one of many scholars to study the ring structure in Beowulf, and his diagrams 
outline the repetitive sequence of events, especially in the fight scenes – 
where the approach and rejoicing of the odious Grendel chiastically 
transitions into Beowulf’s heroic rejoicing. James Joyce’s novels stand as yet 









the novel Ulysses.2 Mary Douglas also writes of ring structure in Thinking in 
Circles: An Essay on Ring Composition. At this level, the chiastic pattern can 
underscore the extreme differences between situations and how characters 
respond to those situations, or reinforce a similarity between situations and 
characters. In the case of many texts that feature a hero encountering an 
enemy, for example, chiasmus assists in drawing the distinction between the 
two opposing forces – or in bringing the text full circle, to a conclusion which 
complements the introduction but is distinct from it.  
Beyond the narrative, the raison d’être and usefulness of chiasmus 
could derive from how embodied agents more generally conceptualize 
situations, people and the progression of events through space and time. 
Patricia Lissner (2007) provided the first treatment of embodied chiasmus, 
and coined the term “chi-thinking” to denote how humans form dichotomies 
in argumentation. Rodolphe Gasché (1987) defines chiasmus as “what 
allows oppositions to be bound into unity…. a form that makes it possible to 
determine differences with respect to an underlying totality.” Gasché 
considers chiasmus the “originary form of thought” (1987: xvi). The 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty also develops “chiasm” as a 
concept in his late book The Visible and the Invisible. His working notes 
define “the chiasm” as “not only a me-other exchange (the messages he 
receives reach me, the messages I receive reach him), [but]…also an 
exchange between me and the world, between the phenomenal body and 
                                               









the “‘objective’ body, between the perceiving and the perceived: what begins 
as a thing ends as consciousness of the thing, what begins as a ‘state of 
consciousness’ ends as a thing” (215). Ivo Strecker’s studies in ethnography 
consider chiasmus as a me-other relation between the ethnographer and the 
people he studies. More recently, Jamin Pelkey’s publications propose the 
idea that our corporeal understanding of chiasmus entwines with our 
modalities for making meaning of the world (2017). Pelkey’s chief claim is 
that the spread eagle posture (which forms the bodily “X”) corresponds with 
extreme felt experiences, and that these experiences percolate through 
many aspects of our lives, including art and culture. His studies pertain to the 
field of semiotics, anthropology and cross-disciplinary research, and his 
recent work reports on four semiotics types of thematic chiasmus.  
 Pelkey’s chiastic semiotic typology derives from Anthony Paul’s four 
syntactic types. These four types, to be elaborated upon below, are evident 
in cross-cultural symbols and cross-linguistic texts. Randy Harris has also 
developed a typology called the chiastic suite, which characterizes chiasmus 
as a linguistic element with several different types. At several different 
conference proceedings and in publications, Harris explains how chiasmus 
entwines with a number of other rhetorical devices at the sentence level and 
touches upon the subject of logic.  
The following section summarizes the available literature on chiasmus 
and culminates in a discussion of how my work can provide ways of unifying 









literary flourish, and in its varying incarnations may reveal something more 
fundamental about languages and human cognition. Syntactically, the 
thematic and structural aspects of the device seem to be inseparable, in that 
structure seems to reinforce the theme of the chiastic phrase. This will be 
taken up in more detail after further exposition of what chiasmus is, how it 
appears in semiotics and syntax, and the types that have been noted to date.  
Though examples of chiasmus can be found even in ancient texts 
across different civilizations (e.g. those of Asia, Ancient Egypt, Greece and 
Rome, to name a few), it is only within the last ten years that chiasmus 
studies have attracted greater interest. Before that, studies of chiasmus were 
often isolated to particular analyses of texts or authors (e.g. Niles’ treatment 
of Beowulf and Norrman’s study of Samuel Butler). Although this continues 
to be the trend, with much modern work on chiasmus centering on a 
structural analysis of a story, or an analysis of a particular person’s work, 
there are increasing efforts to characterize chiasmus itself. There are five 
chief scholars who have contributed much to the literature, recognizing 
chiasmus as both an important device in language and much more. Each of 
these researchers has directed their studies of chiasmus towards a different 
primary topic, here listed in the order in which they are mentioned: 
 
1. Strecker – Ethnography and Anthropology 









3. Paul – Poetics and Literature 
4. Pelkey – Semiotics and Embodied Cognition 
5. Harris – Rhetoric and Logic 
 
In almost every case, each of these researchers has also applied their 
studies of chiasmus to multiple other secondary areas of focus. For example, 
Pelkey also homes in on anthropology, linguistics, music and many other 
topics in his recent publications. Chiasmus is a phenomenon with wide-
ranging applications and cultural impact.  
 
Strecker uses chiasmus as a frame for understanding the relationship 
between ethnographers and the people they study. He asserts that there is a 
chiastic exchange in ethnography and anthropology, where “other becomes 
self, self other” (EC/Strecker 6). Applying this to the study of the Hamar 
people who live in Southwestern Ethiopia, Strecker describes several facets 
of their culture and his own experience of living among them for years as an 
ethnographer. His Ethnography and Chiasmus centers on his relationship 
with a man named Baldambe and Baldambe’s family. Through Baldambe 
and his family members, Strecker implements the tools of rhetorical analysis 
to examine several aspects of Hamar culture, including identity, family 
relationships, magic, gender relations and war. Strecker’s research concerns 
particular terms and concepts, along with extensive analysis of real 









important concepts and terms are barjo and michere. Barjo refers to “good 
fortune,” but it also seems to represent the equanimity of the individual, as 
“the greater anyone’s barjo is, the more that person will be harmonious, non-
aggressive, non-competitive and non-problematic” (EC/Strecker 53). Honor 
and barjo are distinct but related concepts, according to Strecker’s detailed 
considerations and overview. He highlights a few aspects of the persona in 
Hamar culture, which are featured in his chart below (EC/Strecker 63).  
                                             
                                       Figure 1. Elements of Hamar persona (EC/Strecker).  
         Each of these different aspects above deal with the body, action, 
socialization, and individual traits. Strecker’s text introduces the Hamar 
through his first-person accounts and provides a chiastic bridge between his 
cultural concepts and the culture of the people in this Southwestern 
Ethiopian culture.  
In this case study, Strecker looks not only at the chiastic exchanges 
between the ethnographer and the people he studies, but also chiastic 
exchanges between the people of Hamar culture. These take place in a 









examples by citing informal conversations, rites, adages and more. One 
Hamar proverb states, “The hyena – its son is a lion; the lion – its son is a 
hyena” (EC/Strecker 5). This chiastic saying speaks to intergenerational 
conflict, as “magnificent fathers who are like lions beget sons who are 
miserable like hyenas, and then—mysteriously—the hyenas again beget 
lions, and so on” (EC/Strecker 5). At the sentence level, Baldambe used this 
chiastic expression to divulge a general wisdom about family dynamics. 
Recounting his experiences with Baldambe, Strecker also mentions how 
Baldambe engaged in something he refers to as “tacit collusion” when 
speaking of ancestors called bitta, or ritual leaders. 3At times, Baldambe 
would take on the role of the bitta and interact with others in a mimetic re-
envisioning of the earlier conversations between the bitta and the people. 
Strecker characterizes this rhetorical act with reference to chiasmus, as it 
entails a situation “where interlocutors may safely say what they don’t mean, 
and mean what they don’t say” (EC Strecker/36).   
Overall, for Strecker, chiasmus is both a rhetorical structure and also 
a frame for understanding complex interaction at several different social 
levels, both within and between different cultures. In his contribution to the 
text Chiasmus and Culture, Strecker also makes comparisons between 
metaphor and chiasmus. He views chiasmus as the opposite of metaphor, as 
primarily destabilizing in nature, whereas he considers metaphor as primarily 
stabilizing. Strecker considers chiasmus destabilizing, a structure that can be 
                                               
3 Strecker takes the term tacit collusion from the work of Denis Tedlock and Bruce Mannheim (1995), who were summarizing 









used to “oppose and invert” (CC/Strecker 87). He views chiasmus as 
something which emerges during an “ideological confrontation,” citing 
examples such as a quote attributed to Albert Einstein: “People were not 
created for the state, but the state for the people” (CC/Strecker 86). This 
presents a clear argument challenging particular forms of government in 
which the people are under close control of a central body, and Strecker 
points out that Einstein came up with this statement during a time when 
“totalitarian regimes ruled over most of Europe and parts of Asia” – although 
it can be certainly said this is true of current day and other similar phrases 
have popped up at many other points in history (CC/Strecker 86).  
Patricia Lissner (2007) also explores chiasmus as a phenomenon with 
both destabilizing and stabilizing characteristics. Lissner’s text has two aims: 
1) to show how thought or embodied conceptualization is in large part 
chiastic in nature and 2) to consider how this “chi-thinking,” as she calls it, 
involves spatiality (Lissner 5). Referring to the psychologist Jerome Bruner, 
known for his progressive ideals and his educational theories about the 
learning process, Lissner notes some overlaps between his theorization on 
cognition and her own. She cites On Knowing, in which Bruner asserts that 
every learner has operational techniques for synthesizing and representing 
information, and proposes that chi-thinking is one such technique (Lissner 
10). According to Lissner, chi-thinking partly consists in recognizing “likeness 
and difference, partitioning and totality, duality and reciprocation” (12). Given 









comparisons to be drawn. Lissner shows the embeddedness of chiasmus 
across several different contexts, along with the prevalence of X (the 
semiotic equivalent of chiasmus) as a form. While Lissner seems to 
acknowledge the potential of chiasmus as a structure capable of showing 
balanced and imbalanced relationships between pairs of elements, and while 
she points out that the crisscross in the chiasm has a “hoard of Gestaltian 
riches” to offer, she also insists that “a chiasm will always be discriminatory.” 
The chiastic structure, in other words, places demands on the perceiver to 
“pick and choose from its variety and profusion as needs be…according to 
present (contextual) requirements or wishes” (217).   
Building upon Lissner’s work on embodiment and chiasmus, Pelkey 
(2017) devotes a great deal of attention to semiotic X as a symbol of the 
human form. The human body strikes postures which can be both stabilizing 
and destabilizing, and Pelkey describes different X positions of the body. 
Pelkey’s efforts also extend the research of Paul (2010) in developing a 
typology of chiasmus. While Paul’s work revolves around chiasmus as a 
syntactical and rhetorical phenomenon, Pelkey shows that thematically, 
semiotic X accomplishes similar effects. The syntactic-rhetoric typology of 
Paul and the semiotic typology of Pelkey will be featured side-by-side in a 
chart to facilitate comparison, then discussed further below. The chart 











Pelkey’s Typology (2017) Paul’s Typology (2014) 
Type: X 
 
Description: In its most basic form, X represents the 
human figure, with both arms and legs outstretched. 
Pelkey describes this as a “spread-eagle leap.”  
 
Example: Corporate logo for the organization One 







Description: Paul describes chiasmus as “cross-shaped when 
it is a single coherent statement with no inner contradiction: the 
cross-chiasmus is associated with such qualities as 
reciprocation, balance and the orderly relation of things” (Paul 
23).  
Example: “If a gift is given it can be received; when it is 
received it can be given” (Paul 23). It is not clear if this is a 




Description: The hourglass is a destabilizing figure, with 
a center that cannot hold. It is typified by an extreme and 
uncomfortable spread eagle posture. Pelkey describes 
this as “spread-eagle torture.” 
 
Example: 127 Hours movie poster 
 




Description: The mirror type “combines formal symmetry with 
paradox or contradiction,” “associated with mental-blockage” 
(Paul 23).  
 
Example: “Fair is foul, foul is fair” (Quote from Macbeth) (Paul 





Description: It is formed by two X figures interlocking 
around the central, diamond shape – or a common 
ground of interest. 
 
Example: The logo for Dos Equis beer 





Description: The circle type “invites the mind to follow a line of 
thought that returns it to the starting point” (Paul 24).  
 
 
Example: “I am tired of thinking how thinking of you never tires 
me (Petrarch)” (Paul 24).  
Type: Argyle  
 
            
 
Description: Argyle pattern involves repeating XXXXX 
patterns, interlocking and stacked with shared space 
between the figures.  
 
Example: Company logo for Doing Family Right 
 (Pelkey 202). 
 
 
Type: “Spiral”  
 
 
Description: The spiral occurs “when formal symmetry sets up 
a more dynamic process of movement.”  
 
 
Example: Although this type mostly applies to longer poetic 
chains with ABCCBA reversals, or longer reversals, Paul also 
provides a sentence-level example: “The inner world is formed 
by the outer and the outer by the inner” (Paul 24). It is not clear 














Pelkey draws his examples from a database where he has collected 
over 200 exemplars to date (Pelkey 64). Paul does not comment as to how 
he gathered the examples for his typology, but most of them come from 
literary sources. Beginning with Paul’s cross type, as one which involves 
reciprocation, it is easy to see how his first example satisfies those 
conditions: “If a gift is given it can be received; when it is received it can be 
given” (Paul 24). Giving and receiving is the essence of reciprocity. Another 
example Paul uses is a paraphrased biblical quote: “Man is made for woman 
and woman for man” (Paul 24). The reciprocal relation here is evident in the 
presumed intimate dynamics of the couple. Pelkey’s X type corresponds to 
the “cross” of Paul’s type, but his main focus is not on reciprocity. He deems 
the general mood of X to be satisfaction, and associates the X with the 
spread-eagle leap – and sports such as skiing and figure-skating, where the 
athlete must execute such moves with poise and precision (Pelkey 42). On 
its own, Pelkey shows how the X represents the human form and how it is 
used to convey a variety of messages about human body and the conditions 
it might be under.  
For Paul, the next type is the mirror, which involves a projection of 
one meaning onto another. The quote “Fair is foul and foul is fair” expresses 
a contradiction that arises through this projection, because fair and foul are 









logical oppositions, the Greimas square,4 and marked-unmarked relations 
(36). He devotes a chapter of his text to arguing how these models contain 
“embodied relations” from which we “derive basic structural awareness of 
opposition and contrast,” and yet he also explains how these models can 
present “false dichotomies, impossible decisions, and double-binds” (Pelkey 
36). This is certainly the case with the line “Fair is foul and foul is fair,” 
because within the context of Macbeth, they prove to be two simultaneously 
held conditions for Lady Macbeth. She is fair of appearance, and foul on the 
inside as she secretly plots murder. Nevertheless, possessing these two 
traits did not serve Lady Macbeth well in the end, as she eventually goes 
mad.  
Pelkey correlates Paul’s mirror type and his own corresponding 
hourglass type with a tortured psyche, one in which there is a restrictedness 
that cannot be overcome unless the structure is dismantled (104). Visually, 
the hourglass has a narrow center which evokes a sense that the structure 
will collapse. Pelkey shows several examples of how the hourglass has 
appeared in logos, graphic art, art for exhibitions, and in advertisements to 
communicate this message. The poster for the movie 127 Hours is one 
example, since the film itself is about Aron Ralston, who needed to remove 
his arm to survive getting trapped by a boulder while canyoneering. Ralston 
found himself in a position that his physical body could not sustain and the 
                                               
4 Algirdas Julien Greimas developed the Greimas or semiotic square to analyze signs and their logical opposites, such as right-
left, night-day, fat-thin. To say it is both night and day would be a contradiction. Any pair of binaries which describe polar 









poster shows the precariousness of his situation. To Pelkey, the hourglass 
represents the tortured spread-eagle posture of the body, stretched beyond 
what it can endure.  
Paul and Pelkey’s third type accomplishes a much different effect, one 
that entails a communion or coming together. For Paul, the circle type 
involves “enlarged consciousness,” “meditational ecstasy” or an out of body 
experience – a transcendence that takes the poet, speaker or writer beyond 
himself (Paul 36). Paul’s main example of the circle type is “L’Infinito,” a 
poem by Italian philosopher and poet Giacomo Leopardi. “L’Infinito” is an 
appropriate title that goes with Leopardi’s theme of endless space and 
silences (Paul 35). Paul points out that, “Besides its closing chiasmus, the 
poem contains a number of chiastically arranged parallels and pairs, with the 
words ‘m’è dolce’ in the last line making a pair with ‘caro mi fu’ in the first 
line” (35). These Italian phrases can be glossed as 
  m’      è  dolce   caro    mi      fu 
to me  is  sweet  dear  to me  was 
 
Pelkey’s corresponding type is the diamond, which a usually created 
wherever a double X occurs, because there is a shared middle space in 
between the two X figures. Noting the example of the logo for Dos Equis 
Beer, Pelkey explains how it could “represent contact between colonial 
powers German and Spain” (204). The German brewer Wilhelm Hasse 









Moctezuma II is featured at the center of the two X figures. Dos Equis Beer 
emerges as a product from this combined cultural history. Pelkey’s diamond 
type and Paul’s circle type seem to both emphasize that which is beyond the 
individual.  
This is also shared by Paul and Pelkey’s final types, the spiral and 
argyle pattern, respectively. The spiral, unlike the circle, is “an open-ended 
movement, returning the point to a starting point that is now changed” (Paul 
36). Paul explains that the Leopardi poem could be interpreted as an 
example of spiral chiasmus, although another example he gives is a quote 
from Lao Tzu’s Tao te Ching, translated by D.C. Lau: 
 
The world had a beginning 
And this beginning could be the mother of the world. 
When you know the mother 
Go on to know the child. 
After you have known the child, 
Go back to holding fast to the mother, 
And to the end of your days you will not meet with danger.  
 
The obvious chiastic ABBA repetition in the above poem can be seen 
with the repeated terms mother /child /child / mother, and the poem 
continues with another clause after the repetition. For Pelkey’s argyle type, 
the repeated patterns or lattices give a sense of ongoing connection – the 









the Typology chart under Pelkey (2017) is one example, and presents the 
graphic idea of familial support, with each X representing a member of that 
family.  
Paul and Pelkey’s types focus on the thematic import of each chiastic 
structure, or the message that can be expressed either with the syntactic or 
semiotic forms. These types are beneficial in facilitating discussion about 
chiasmus as a phenomenon in language and art, and in Paul’s case, his 
typology extends itself to analysis of longer texts and poems. Pelkey’s types 
contribute a frame for understanding semiotic chiasmus and shows how the 
human body is conceptualized through X.  
Randy Harris has also created a typology of chiasmus, which he 
called the chiastic suite. The chiastic suite distinguishes between chiasmus 
at different syntactic-rhetorical levels, placing five types on a continuum. One 
of Harris’ important observations about chiasmus is its relatedness to other 
rhetorical devices, including epanalepsis, because both involve a repetition 
of elements. Epanalepsis is character by repetitions at the sentence level, at 
the beginning and end of a sentence, as in the example, “Boys will be boys” 
(Harris 2016).  
Chiasmus can be phonological, involving a reversal of phonemes or 
units of sound rather than a reversal of terms. At all levels, there can also be 
a semantic reversal, in which a concept or theme is featured alongside an 
opposite concept or reversal of that theme. This can be the case in texts, 









antimetathesis or phonological chiasmus, morphological chiasmus, 
antimetabole, syntactic chiasmus and antimetalepsis or semantic chiasmus. 
He also explains two sub-types, what he calls pseudo antimetabole and 
implied antimetabole. Each of these types is explained below with Harris’ 
(2016) featured examples:  
          
 
                      Figure 2. The chiastic suite from Randy Harris’ (2016) presentation. 
 
 
Phonological chiasmus entails a reversal or transposition of sound units in a 
sentence in a chiastic pattern. Harris refers to this with the rhetorical term 
antimetathesis. Metathesis refers to interchanging elements of sound or 
letters, and “antimeta” is a shortened referent for antimetabole. In his 
presentation, Harris cites Terry Sullivan’s 1908 lyrics as an example of his 
antimetathesis type: “She sells sea shells on the seashore.” Another 
example he provides is a quote, variously attributed to the painter Francis 
Bacon and the musician Tom Waits: “Champagne for my real friends, real 









𝐹(𝑝% …𝑝' …𝑝% …𝑝')5 with “p” indicating phonology. For a further explanation 
of the formula, see the footnote below.  
On the opposite end of the continuum, Harris places antimetalepsis, 
which pertains to semantic chiasmi. Metalepsis is another rhetorical device 
related to metaphor and metonymy, in which part of thing is removed from its 
context and used to refer to another thing in a new way. Under this category, 
Harris puts examples which include AB elements and BA elements that are 
semantically the same. The rhyme “Old King Cole was a merry old soul 
and a merry old soul was he” presents one idea: that Old King Cole is a 
merry soul. Another example Harris cites is, “You can know the position of 
an electron but you cannot know where it’s going… Or you can know its 
direction, but cannot know its position.” These are chiastic ABBA patterns, 
but Harris’ formula for this type is an ABAB pattern: 𝐹(𝐈% … 𝐈' … 𝐈% … 𝐈') as it 
indicates an ideological repetition.  
At the center of the continuum, Harris places three types: 
morphological chiasmus, antimetabole and syntactic chiasmus. In some 
cases, there can be overlaps between these types. All of Harris’ chiastic 
examples are syntactical in nature, but his syntactic chiasmus type 
accounts for reversals that are conceptually comparative and do not include 
precise repetitions of terms. An example Harris cites is from Milton’s 
Paradise Lost, “When Adam first of men, to first of women Eve.” Another 
                                               
5 The presentation actually reads, 𝐹(𝑝% …𝑝' …𝑝% …𝑝') but given Harris’ examples, there are some that do double-duty, 
achieving both the traditional chiastic form , 𝐹(𝑝% …𝑝' …𝑝' …𝑝%) and this alternating repetition. The sentence “Light a fire, 









example he includes is: “Despised, if ugly; if she’s fair, betrayed” from the 
poem “Essay on Woman, An” by Mary Leapor. Harris’ formula for this type is: 
𝐹(XP% …XP' …XP% …XP'). In the Leapor example, Despised/betrayed are 
the A element, and ugly/fair are the B element. This chiastic example forms 
two different groups of women based on their appearances and how they are 
treated. The chiastic structure helps to make the comparison between them. 
On Harris’ continuum, syntactic chiasmus sits beside antimetabole.  
Antimetabole is central in the chiastic suite. It involves precise 
repetitions of elements in a sentence, as in the example “Un pour tous, tous 
pour un” or in English, “One for all, all for one” from Alexandre Dumas’ novel 
The Three Musketeers. Harris cites this example in his presentation (2016). 
His formula for antimetabole is 𝐹(W% …W' …W' …W%). A more elaborate 
discussion of antimetabole and Harris’ examples will be considered towards 
the end of the paper and explained alongside the typology I developed 
based on a cross-linguistic sampling. Related to antimetabole in the chiastic 
suite is what Harris calls morphological chiasmus. Morphological chiasmus 
is similar in that it involves an almost precise repetition. One of Harris’ 
examples is “Quitters never win and winners never quit” – an idiom in 
American culture, also often worded in the reverse as “Winners never quit 
and quitters never win.” The accompanying formula Harris uses is, 
𝐹(m% …m' …m% …m'). 
Harris also describes two sub-types of antimetabole, including 









term “pseudo” antimetabole to the examples Harris collocates in his 
presentation, only because there is a precise or a near repetition in the 
examples. The only difference between antimetabole and pseudo-
antimetabole is that Harris’ examples of antimetabole seem to be mutually 
reinforcing, whereas pseudo-antimetabole seems to be making a clear 
comparison, offering up two options, or ranking the “AB” or “BA” as superior 
to the other. The referents of the “A” or “B” elements are also sometimes 
polysemous in this category. Some examples Harris shares are: “Women 
don’t want dates on their condoms; they want condoms on their dates.” In 
this case, the term dates is a polysemous element where it refers to both a 
day on the calendar and a romantic date. In my own typology, I classify such 
examples much differently. The other sub-type, implied antimetabole, alludes 
to a reversal without outright including it in the sentence. One of Harris’ 
examples is “The Wrath of Grapes,” which alludes to the Steinbeck novel 
The Grapes of Wrath and the “The Battle-Hymn of the Republic.” Another is 
“Time wounds all heels,” which is a reversal of the adage “Time heals all 
wounds.”  
The next section of this review draws comparisons between my work 
and the research of Pelkey, Paul and Harris in order to highlight overlaps in 
our various systems of classification for chiasmus. This discussion will 
include a few select examples from my typology, best suited for the purposes 
here of illustrating important differences and similarities and explaining my 









examples will be available in the next section.  To develop a typology of 
chiasmus, I searched for examples from all different language families and 
groups, collecting a sampling from 28 in total. I used a Glaserian grounded 
methodology, beginning with the process of data collection and then 
proceeding on to analyzing and organizing that data. The first goal of the 
research was to simply gather as many samples of chiasmus and 
antimetabole as possible from as many different language families and 
groups as possible. One of the key questions addressed was: how many 
different language families and groups contain examples of chiasmus? Due 
to the ambitious goal of performing cross-linguistic research, it was 
necessary to use multiple means of finding samples – including web-based 
research, referring to texts, and accessing examples through social media. 
More information on the methodology can be found in the following section, 
but from this wide-ranging search, I was able to identify 8 different types of 
chiasmus antimetabole (with precise or near-precise reversals) cross-
linguistically. One main difference of the typology is that I do not draw all of 
the same distinctions that Randy Harris does between syntactic chiasmus, 
antimetabole and morphological chiasmus. As stated above, I do not 
separate antimetabole from what Harris refers to as “pseudo antimetabole” 
and I also do not separate morphological chiasmus from antimetabole in the 
same way that Harris does. Even with syntactic chiasmus, I would organize 
his examples differently under my scheme, based upon certain structural 









Overall Harris provides a set of very useful types, but in my own 
scheme, morphological chiasmus (which features near-precise reversals of 
terms) is one of the antimetabole types, and not considered under another 
column as a different form of chiasmus. Within Harris’ typology, there can be 
some examples that fit between categories, and in my own typology there 
are also some notable overlaps: some examples can be classed under two 
different types. My typology represents a first effort to better understand how 
chiasmus, and specifically antimetabole (or near-precise reversals) are used 
cross-linguistically – how form and function come together in this device. 
While this seems to be Harris’ goal too, and he separates chiasmus by 
linguistic elements – e.g. phonology and morphology – my typology is 
instead devised with logic in mind, and the possible relationships that can 
exist between elements A and B.  
It is my belief that a collaborative effort among all researchers of 
chiasmus would result in the most fruitful tool or typology of chiasmus. This is 
an area in need of further development, as chiasmus studies are still in their 
infancy. The typology I propose considers both the thematic nature and the 
structure of the antimetabole examples, broken down thus: 
 
1) Equalization: AB equates to or is the same as BA; A and B are the same 
 










3) Exclusion: A excludes B, and B excludes A 
 
4) Dissociation: A dissociates from B, B dissociates from A 
 
5) Combination: A and B, B and A; the elements are grouped together, and 
in some cases one or more element is polysemous  
 
6) Comparison: A and B are better than B and A; or A and B are worse than 
B and A 
 
7) One Way Effects: A affects B, but B does not affect A; or A does not affect 
B, but B affects A. Includes phrasing in which the speaker or writer is 
encouraging the listener or reader to take one course of action over another 
 
8) Multiple Effects: A affects B, and B affects A; or A affects B and B affects 
 
My criteria for defining these 8 categories will be delineated below, as I give 
a few examples of each. My first category is equalization. The criteria for 
inclusion in this category is that the A and B elements are being defined 
synonymously using copular verbs, “is” or “are”, or otherwise treated as 
interchangeable. This is a very balancing structure as it can bring two unlike 
terms together. It is one of two types that is comparable to Pelkey’s “X” type 
and the “cross” type of Paul. An example in English is “Beauty is truth, truth 









is “Was vernünftig ist, das ist Wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig” 
from Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right. The English translation of 
the German example is, “What is reasonable is real; and what is real is 
reasonable.” Under this category, I also include examples of near-precise 
repetition (or what Harris terms “morphological chiasmus” as in the French 
example from François de Malherbe: “Et rose, elle a vécu ce que vivent les 
roses”, which translates to, “And Rose, she lived as live the roses.” In this 
last example, Rose and the roses are being described as living the same 
way – this is a balancing sentence, in which one “A” element is being used to 
better understand the second “A” element and they are equalized. One 
further definitional example comes from a Tibetan proverb,  
                   
“It is a clever thief who keeps finding things, but finding things too often 
makes one a thief.”  
Using logical expressions, it is possible to write these examples as:  
p = q, q = p given the specific conditions defined in the sentence. For 
example: Beauty = truth. When describing how they lived, Rose = roses, or 
one who finds things = clever thief. These types can also be illustrated with a 









The next type is the part whole type, in which A is either part of B, or vice 
versa. Such sentences are balancing in that they show a connectivity of 
things rather than a disconnection or discordance between them. The criteria 
for inclusion in this type involves the use of key terms, like “on” or “in” or a 
more explicit reference to the connectivity of the elements, or the possession 
of one by the other. This not comparable to any one type of Harris’ – 
however, it aligns thematically with Pelkey’s X and Paul’s cross, due to how 
these syntactic examples show an overlapping relation or a joining of A to B. 
There is a sense that A belongs to B, or is contained within it, and vice versa. 
Two examples are as follows:  
 
“Most countries have armies, but in Pakistan the army has a country.” – The 
Economist.com  
 
Here I do not differentiate between what Harris calls morphological chiasmus 
and antimetabole – this is a near-reversal, not a precise one. Although the 
terms “countries” and “armies” have multiple referents where “army” and 
“country” have a particular referent, the part-whole relations stand.   
 
An illustration might better demonstrate the relationships between the A and 
B elements: 









                                          
 
Another example, this time with precise reversals: 
“Le langage est une peau: je frotte mon langage contre l’autre. Comme si 
j’avais des mots en guise de doigts, ou des doigts au bout de mes mots. 
Mon langage tremble de désir” – Roland Barthes, from Fragments d’un 
discours amoureux  
 
The English translation for this sentence is, “Language is a skin: I rub my 
language against the other. As if I had words instead of fingers, or fingers at 
the tips of my words. My language trembles with desire.” 
 
Another example with a precise reversal is Russian theatre director and 
acting teacher Konstanin Stanislavski’s remark, “Любите искусство в себе, 
а не себя в искусстве” or “Love the art in yourself, not yourself in the art.” 
 
Using the symbols of predicate calculus there are many mereological 
formulas that could be used to express the above—that “A” is part of “B” and 
vice versa. As there are disagreements in mereology as to what formula 









one, but what is important is that these phrases could be expressed with 
these symbols.  
The next type is exclusions, where the A and B elements are 
considered along with a “never” condition, or qualifier deeming them entities 
that do not intersect or overlap in any way. This is similar to first order logic: 
where an exclusion condition is determined, there is no middle ground 
possible. Criteria for inclusion in this type requires a “never” condition to be 
stipulated or other qualifiers that exclude any overlap. These can all be 
expressed with logic as: 
              
       or  p v ~p = T  
 
In other words, “p” or “q” is logically possible – both cannot be 
simultaneously possible, and either “p” or “not p” is possible (which is one of 
Aristotle’s original Laws of Thought). For example, the sentence “Quitters 
never win, and winners never quit” aligns with this perfectly. If someone is 
“quitter” then he is not also a winner.  
Another example is from Vladimir Lenin’s The State and Revolution: “ 
Пока есть государство, нет свободы. Когда будет свобода, не будет 
государства” or “So long as the state exists there is no freedom. When 
there is freedom, there will be no state.” These are defined as mutually 
exclusive conditions. The relationship between the elements in sentences of 










                         
 
Harris’ typology continues to be different from my own, but there are 
some thematic similarities between my exclusion type and Pelkey’s 
hourglass type with its narrowed center. Exclusion conditions do not support 
a center, or middle ground between the two entities defined.  
Paul’s related “mirror” type does not match mine in this case, because 
of the specific examples he discusses. I would place Paul’s example “Fair is 
foul and foul is fair” in my first category of equalization, because even 
though the terms “fair” and “foul” are logical opposites, they are not being 
considered as logical opposites in the context of the sentence; in fact their 
meanings are being conflated, and while this might be contradictory, it 
serves a purpose in the context of Shakespeare’s Macbeth to define fair as 
foul and foul as fair – because in the character of Lady Macbeth, they are 
simultaneously held conditions. She is both fair as a beautiful woman and 
foul, because of what she is plotting. Nevertheless, when considering Paul’s 
descriptions of the “mirror” type, it fits well with my exclusion type – in a 
mirror, only one image can be projected and not two. In a logical exclusion, 









A similar but distinct type in my typology is dissociation. In these 
sentences, sometimes an association is constructed and then dismantled. 
This can best be illustrated with a diagram, using the following example: 
 
“Your manuscript is both good and original, but the part that is good is not 
original and the part that is original is not good” – a quote misattributed to Dr. 
Samuel Johnson 
 
                                
 
A quote from Paul Valéry is another such example: 
 
“La guerre, c’est un massacre de gens qui ne se connaissent pas au profit 
de gens qui se connaissent, mais ne se massacrent pas” – Paul Valéry 
 
The English translation is, “War is a massacre of people who do not know 
each other for the benefit of people who know each other, but do not 
massacre each other.” The diagram below helps to illustrate the relationships 
at play between the A and B elements in the sentence, or the dissociation 









                                        
Another example can be found in Sanskrit, from the Panchatantra or 
Pañcatantram by Vishnu Sharma, Verse 325 from Mitra Bheda or the Loss of 
Friends. The Sanksrit below is from Dr. Naveen Kumar Jha’s edition of the 
Pañcatantram. 
 
                              
 
The common English translation of these lines is, “If the king is like a vulture 
but surrounded by swan-like courtiers, he must be served well; if a swan-like 
king is surrounded by people who act like vultures, then he should be 
ignored.” In this case, nrpah signifies “king” and the ABBA symmetry can be 
seen with the terms grdhrākāro and grdhrākāraih (containing variants of 
vulture or vulture-eyed, “gRdhradRSTi”) and dhamsākāraih and hamsākāro  
(containing “hamsa” or swan). Below there is another diagram to help 









                                  
The examples that fall into this category would come under different 
categories under Harris’ typology – they would be classed variously as the 
syntactic chiasmus and the morphological chiasmus types. The dissociation 
type is also not comparable to any of Pelkey or Paul’s types.   
The next type I noted is combination – in which one of the elements 
A or B can have multiple referents or simply be joined with a conjunction 
such as the term “and,” for example. This is seen in the humorous French 
example from Marquis de Bièvres, “Je lève mon verre au beau sexe des 
deux hémisphères, et aux deux hémisphères du beau sexe” which in English 
translates to, “I raise my glass to the fair sex of both hemispheres, and to 
both hemispheres of the fair sex.” The criteria for inclusion in this type is that 
the sentence must either have a conjunction to bring together or group the 
terms A and B, or otherwise one of the elements is polysemous but a 
conjunction “and” is still present. Another example is Ambrose Bierce’s line, 
“Architect, n. One who drafts a plan of your house, and plans a draft of your 










                     
This type could again include several examples from a range of Harris’ types, 
including morphological chiasmus, antimetabole, and syntactic chiasmus. 
There are not comparable types under Pelkey or Paul’s typology.  
Although all examples of chiasmus are in some way comparative, 
there are many examples in which an explicit comparison is made using 
terms like “better” or “worse” or through use of terms of frequency such as 
“more often” and/or a scale of time or ability. The criteria for inclusion in this 
group is the use of phrases or terms that rank the A and B elements, or 
directly compares between them like the terms listed above. There are no 
obvious thematic similarities between my comparative type and either Pelkey 
or Paul’s types. Several of Harris’ types may be categorizable under the 
comparative type, if they meet the criteria of explicitly comparing between the 
A and B elements and attempting to argue for the superiority of one over the 
other. The graphics below and their accompanying examples are a visual aid 
to convey the hierarchy apparent in such chiastic comparative examples. 
The comparative terms are bolded.  
“Because the force of arguments is always better than the argument of 
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“La vie ressemble plus souvent à un roman qu’un roman ne ressemble à la 
vie” – George Sand, Metella, Chapter 1  
English translation: Life resembles a novel more often than a novel 
resembles life. 
                                              
 
 
“是故勝兵先勝，而後求戰；敗兵先戰，而後求勝” – Sun Tzu, Art of War 
English translation: Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while 









                                                  
 
 
The final types in my typology involve a dynamic interactivity between 
elements A and B, usually showcasing a cause and effect relationship. The 
criteria for the inclusion of an example in the One-way effects category is 
that a cause and effect relationship is defined, and it is one-directional: the A 
or B element has some impact on the other element B or A, but there is a 
negation involving the term “not” in the sentence or some similar phrasing, so 
that if A influences or affects B, B does not influence or affect B in return. As 
usual, examples of morphological chiasmus, antimetabole and syntactic 
chiasmus from Harris’ typology could feasibly meet these requirements. In 
this case, Pelkey and Paul’s hourglass and mirror types are thematically 
alike, in that the flow of activity is one-directional, as it is with an hourglass 
and mirror. Some examples and graphics illustrating the relationships 
between A and B can be found below: 
 
“I don’t hate you because you’re fat. You’re fat because I hate you.” – Mean 
Girls (2004 film),  










                        
                             
“…Non i titoli illustrono gli uomini, ma gli uomini i titoli” – Niccolò Machiavelli, 
Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, Book 3, Chapter 38 
English translation: It is not titles that make men illustrious, but men who do 
that to titles. 
                              
 
The final type I noted across different language families and groups were 
chiastic examples which had A and B elements that mutually affected or 
altered one another, or what I call the multiple effect type. To be 
established as an example of this type, there needed to be two-directional 
activity or interactivity between the elements. Thematically, this is similar to 
Pelkey’s argyle and diamond, in that those types represent an interactivity of 
perspectives or entities. Any of Harris’ three types – including morphological 
chiasmus, syntactic chiasmus and antimetabole might be found in this 
category. Below are a few select examples and graphics to demonstrate the 










The Romance of Three Kingdoms, attributed to Luo Guanzhong 
English translation: The world under heaven, after a long period of division, 
tends to unite; after a long period of union, tends to divide. 
                                
Qui craint de souffrir, souffre déjà de ce qu’il craint” – Michel de Montaigne, 
Essais, livre 3  
English translation: Whosoever fears suffering already suffers from what 
he fears. 
                                    
These eight different chiastic types will be explored more thoroughly and with 
more examples in the next section, but this comparison between my own 
findings and the research of Harris, Pelkey, and Paul can help facilitate 
future discussions and highlight each researcher’s individual efforts to 
characterize chiasmus. To my knowledge, my research is unique in that it 
examines the device chiasmus across different language families and 
groups. My work meshes well with Harris’ typology, as we both analyze form 
in distinct but not necessarily discrepant ways, and some of my types are 
also thematically quite similar to those of Pelkey and Paul. Figure 3 on the 









alongside Harris’, Pelkey’s and Paul’s contributions. All of this has been 
reviewed at length in this section. For my research methods and more 
examples, see the next section. 
     
                  Figure 3. An overview of Chiastic Typology – my contributions in red.  
 
  Chiasmus studies are still in their infancy, and as such they will 
require much nurturance from multiple scholars. There is potential for a 
range of diverse research projects in this area, as evidenced by the overview 
of five different researchers provided in this section. Strecker’s work in the 
area of ethnography reveals how chiasmus can be used as a tool for 
understanding the role of the ethnographer in relation to the people he 
studies and more. Lissner delves into how chiasmus can be considered an 
aspect of embodiment. Pelkey expands on Lissner’s initial efforts and 









the syntactical typology of Paul (2014). Harris examines chiasmus as a 
linguistic form at multiple levels, syntactically, phonologically and 
semantically, and he also considers what chiasmus and other classical 
rhetorical devices might have in common. Finally, my work concentrates on 
investigating the device cross-linguistically, and from my data, I developed a 
typology to organize the examples I identified. This section has been 
devoted to reviewing the literature on chiasmus and comparing my research 
with Harris’, Pelkey’s and Paul’s work.  
As truth-functional logic has in some ways influenced how I processed 
my data and created my typology, the next section primarily focuses on how 
logic and chiasmus are alike and dissimilar. Aristotle’s laws of logic, analytic 
philosophy, and the topic of systematicity are at the forefront of the 
discussion. Additionally, the next section considers how examples of 
semiotic X entwine thematically with moral truths and righteousness. My 
typology is then presented in greater detail to show the many different facets 
of chiasmus as a cross-linguistic literary and rhetorical device. I consider 
chiasmus alongside metaphor, because both of the devices assist a writer or 
speaker in forming comparisons and metaphor is a more studied device in 














                                   References 
 
Barthes, Roland. 1977. Fragments d’un discours amoureux. Paris: Éditions
 du Seuil. 
 
Bierce, Ambrose. 1906. [2008]. The Devil’s Dictionary. London: Bloomsbury. 
 
Douglas, Mary. 2007. Thinking in Circles: An essay on ring composition. New
 Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Gasché, Rodolphe. 1987. Introduction to Andrzej Warminski, Readings in
 Interpretation: Hölderlin, Hegel, Heidegger. Minneapolis, MN:
 University of Minnesota Press, p. xvi. 
 
Guanzhong, Luo. 1522. The Romance of Three Kingdoms. Donald Sturgeon
 (ed.) Chinese Text Project: ctext.org. 
 
Hall, Evelyn Beatrice. 1907. The Friends of Voltaire. New York, NY: G.P.
 Putnam’s Sons. 
 
Harris, Randy. 2016. “Chiasmus, cognition, computation; computation, 
 cognition, chiasmus.” Lecture/Workshop, Computing Figures, Figuring
 Computers II: A workshop on Computational Rhetoric at the University 
           of Waterloo, August 12 2016.  
 
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. 1991. [1821]. Elements of the Philosophy of
 Right. A.W. Wood (ed.), H.B. Nisbet (trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge
 University Press. 
 
Keats, John. 1820. “Ode on a Grecian Urn.” Annals of the Fine Arts, 15. 
 
Lenin, Vladimir. 1917. [1999] The State and Revolution. Lenin Internet
 Archive. marxists.org. 
 
Lissner, Patricia. 2007. Chi-thinking: Chiasmus and Cognition. College Park:
 University of Maryland PhD dissertation. 
 
Machiavelli, Niccolò. 1517. [1971]. Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio.
 Mario Martelli (ed.) Firenze: Einaudi. 
 











Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1960 [1968]. The Visible and the Invisible, Claude
 Lefort (ed.), Alphonso Lingis (trans.). Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern
 University Press. 
 
Montaigne, Michel de. 1580. Essais De Messire Michel De Montaigne.
 Bordeaux: Simon Millanges. 
 
Niles, J.D. “Ring Composition and the Structure of Beowulf.” PMLA, 94(5),
 924-935. 
 
Norrman, Ralf. 1986. Samuel Butler and the Meaning of Chiasmus.
 Basingstoke: Macmillan.  
 
Paul, Anthony. 2014. When fair is foul and foul is fair: Lessons from 
 Macbeth. In Ivo Strecker and Stephen Tyler (eds.), Culture and
 rhetoric (Studies in Rhetoric and Culture 1), 104–114. Oxford:
 Berghahn. 
 
Pelkey, Jamin. 2017. The Semiotics of X: Chiasmus, Cognition, and Extreme
 Body Memory. London: Bloomsbury. 
 
Pemba, Lhamo (ed.) 1996. Tibetan Proverbs. Dharamsala, India: Library of
 Tibetan Works and Archives. 
 
Sand, George. 1833. [2006]. Metella. Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen. 
 
Sharma, Vishnu. 2016. Pañcatantram. Naveen Kumar Jha. (trans.) Delhi,
 India: J.P. Publishing House. 
 
Soloman, Susan. 2016. Inverted Commas, Unreality and Chiasmus in
 “Aeolus.” James Joyce Quarterly, 51(4). 613-630. 
 
Strecker, Ivo. 2011. Ethnographic chiasmus: Essays on culture, conflict and
 rhetoric. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.  
 
Strecker, Ivo. 2014. Chiasmus and metaphor. In Ivo Strecker and Stephen
 Tyler (eds.), Culture and rhetoric (Studies in Rhetoric and Culture
 1), 69-88. Oxford: Berghahn. 
 
“The Army in Pakistan: Why Pakistan’s Army Wields So Much Power.” 2014.
 econimist.com/books-and-arts/2014/09/20/nosebags 
 
Tusk, Donald. 2017. Address to the European Committee of the Regions.












Tzu, Sun. 4th Century BC. [1910]. The Art of War. Lionel Giles (trans.)
 London: British Museum. 
 





















































Abstract: The core of this paper investigates chiasmus cross-
linguistically and reveals how syntactic chiasmus has a number of impactful 
and discriminating effects that assist a speaker or writer in espousing a 
particular view. The main discussion explores the presence of these chiastic 
structures in 28 different language families and groups to identify common 
types and effects. Chiasmus refers to both a syntactic and semiotic 
phenomenon. The most simplistic example of semiotic chiasmus is the X – 
two lines crossing at a central point. At the syntactical level, chiasmus is 
characterized by its A-B-B-A pattern, as in the example, “Winners never quit 
and quitters never win.” For Pelkey (2017) chiasmus is a symbol of the 
human body in an extreme posture, with arms and legs outstretched. 
Oftentimes, chiasmus presents a dichotomy – two extreme perspectives that 
clash and diverge. The X may also be considered a symbol of a “truth” that 
prevails over others, vis-à-vis Western heritage, and the Greek alphabetic 
correlate chi. The chi is the first character of Christ, and through the influence 
of Christianity, the sign not only represents a single-minded perspective or 
cause, but also was meant to attest to the integrity or truthful testimony of 
whoever used it as a personal signature. X can signify a “truth,” and at the 
syntactical level, mute out other possibilities or opposites, as in truth-
functional logic. Transitioning into a discussion of the relations that are 
present in both logical formulations and chiasmus, this study touches upon 
the philosophies of Frege, Wittgenstein and Kripke and the history of logic. 
Finally, the inquiry goes on to consider whether and how syntactical X 
patterns may in some way be fundamentally linked to systematicity in 
language, as chiastic patterns like “mind on my money, money on my mind” 
are similar to the popular example of systematicity, i.e. “John loves Mary” 
and “Mary loves John.”   
 
 
The following paper examines sentence-level examples of chiasmus 
from twenty-eight different language families and groups, with the intent to 
show structural similarities that can arise across languages. The purpose 
here is not to make a claim about the universality of the chiastic ABBA form, 
but simply to compare and make observations about how chiasmus is used 
cross-linguistically and its import as a device. Chiasmus is a little known but 
widely implemented rhetorical tool – and each section of the dissertation 









its multi-faceted incarnations. The discussion that precedes the cross-
linguistic survey is focused on semiotic X and truth-functional logic. There 
are a few objectives that the paper seeks to achieve: 
 
1) To discuss how truth-functional logic (the intent of which is to get at true 
statements) is in some cases similar to syntactic chiasmus; and to explore a 
possible connection between the concept of truth in Western culture and 
semiotic X;   
 
2) To reveal the range and power that syntactic chiasmus has as an 
instrument of comparison, through a close look at 80 examples taken from 
28 different language families and groups; 
 
3) To consider syntactic chiasmus alongside metaphor, which is also a 
comparative tool; 
 
4) To apply this entire discussion to the relevant field of artificial intelligence, 
as chiasmus is both a scheme and trope with embodied meanings, but also 
similar in nature to what Fodor and Pylyshyn define as systematicity—as it 
deals with the logical and organized re-arrangement of elements in a 
sentence. 
 









definition is preferred: it is an ABBA structure in language, in which the A 
elements may either refer to two synonymous or antonymous semantic 
entities, or the A elements may be morphologically and semantically the 
same. The B elements are likewise paired with each other. Antimetabole 
features an exact reversal of the elements as they appear, and while some 
of the 80 examples below are instances of antimetabole, other examples 
feature reversals that do not have precisely the same reversed elements. 
The chart below can help to clarify examples of what we will consider 
chiasmus. Chiasmus includes, but is not limited to the following possible 
structures containing reversals:  
 
Semantic reversal Morphological reversal Antimetabole 
Similar semantic elements: 
 
From Fifteen Dogs by André Alex:  
 
“It was he who, in a manner of speaking, 
muddied waters that became too clear or 
clarified those that had grown murky.” 
 
Muddied / clear 
Clarified / murky 
 
 
(The above example is also featured in 
Randy Harris’ 2016 presentation 
“Chiasmus, cognition, computation; 
computation, cognition, chiasmus”) 
 
 
Dissimilar semantic elements, but 
repeating themes nonetheless, which 
show two opposite conditions:  
 
From Sir Thomas Wyatt’s poem “They 
Flee from me who sometime did me 
seek” -- 
 
“They Flee from me who sometime did 
me seek” -  
 
Flee / me 




Almost alike elements: 
 
From Evelyn Beatrice Hall’s book The 
Friends of Voltaire (1907): “The instinct of 
a man is to pursue everything that flies 





Pursue / flies 
Fly / pursues  
Exact, repeating elements: 
 
“One for all, and all for one”  
 
One / all 










For the present purposes, the survey does not seek to discriminate or 
necessarily exclude any of the above possible chiastic configurations — but 
most of the 80 examples that follow are either of morphological chiasmus or 
antimetabole. One practical reason for limiting the survey to include 
examples mainly of this kind has to do with a need to narrow the scope 
somewhere; presumably other chiastic types could be explored and 
incorporated. 6 In all of the above possible configurations, chiasmus is an “X” 
structure which defines two possible arrangements of the elements and A 
and B – that is, AB and BA. This can be an outright way of comparing 
between the two, or expressing the co-functioning or disharmonious dynamic 
between elements A and B. Logical propositions and negations can be 
defined through chiastic AB and BA arrangements, logical disjunctions can 
appear when the term “never” is introduced, and other relationships between 
elements A and B may be formulated.  
There are some similarities between chiasmus and logic, but there are 
also important distinctions between the two that will later be reviewed, as 
chiasmus achieves a variety of expression that logic does not. Chiasmus 
tends to come into play when the speaker or writer has an argument to 
present, which in short form can mute out other possibilities and show a 
preference for one path of action, either AB or BA — but this is not all that 
                                               
6 My decision to focus on morphological chiasmus and antimetabole came about in part because of the obscurity of chiasmus. 
It is still a device that does not receive much recognition in journals on rhetoric, or in other disciplines — and because it is so 
little known, I chose to use examples in which the ABBA elements are immediately recognizable because they are the same or 









chiasmus can do, as the survey of examples will reveal. Nonetheless, 
chiasmus is a powerful instrument of argumentation, as the X structure lends 
an opportunity to consider two arrangements AB and BA side by side. 
Without lengthier exposition, chiasmus allows the speaker or writer to 
consider the two and express which might be better, right or true.   
A core value of Western ethics, religion and logic is to get at the truth 
— and the syntactic and semiotic X may in some ways reflect or hinder these 
goals, as it is outlines all possible arrangements of the elements, or the 
seeming totality of available options, but also allows the user to dichotomize 
between AB and BA and/or select one option while shunning the other. 
Exploring semiotic X also reveals its possible connection with the concept of 
truth in Western culture. As a formal signature at the end of documents, X 
historically represented a vow on the part of the inscriber that he or she has 
represented the truth within the pages of the document. With other religious 
symbols like the Chi Rho, the chi may express the truthfulness and 
righteousness of a adopting a particular religious view. 
 
Semiotics and X: Signatures, Self and the Applications of this Study  
It is possible to trace “X” back to an early use in medieval Europe as a 
common signature. Literacy had a complex role in both the civil and social 
functioning of medieval Europe, but the majority of laypeople lacked the 
ability to read and write in Latin. Bäuml (1980) examined this issue and 









the modern standard definition of “literate” does not take into account 
“elusive intermediate levels,” and yet it is clear from the documentation of 
this period that many men and women did not possess the ability to scrawl 
even their given name. However, these individuals could manage a single 
letter: the “X” or Greek “chi” became their signature. During the medieval 
period, the “X” also denoted Christ (χριστός), and in this double function it 
legitimated any oath that the signatory swore to keep. It also attested to the 
truthfulness on the part of the signatories, that all of the material that the 
document contained was true and accurate. Below is an example from 
Medieval Spain, dated to between the ninth and twelfth centuries. It is worth 
noting that the “X” continued to appear on official documents during this 
period, even though the country was under Muslim control. Although the 
charter is damaged, Castro-Correa (2014) provides a critical reconstruction 
of the Latin and reveals that it documents a donation. The elaborate signum 
or “X” at the bottom belongs to someone named Recamundo. Even today, it 
is a practice to sign off on emails or texts with “X,” although most people are 
not aware of how this tradition originated or changed throughout history. The 
“X” can represent the author himself, or his word—a symbol of truthfulness 









       
Figure 1. (Left): The early Medieval Galician charter in which the signature appears. (Right): A close-up of 
Recamundo’s signum. From Castro Correa, A. 2014. The reconstruction of early medieval Spanish manuscript 




The semiotics of “X” has a rich and expansive history, one that Jamin 
Pelkey (2017) comprehensively treats in a book bearing the title The 
Semiotics of X: Chiasmus, Cognition and Extreme Body Memory. Patricia 
Lissner (2007) produced the first full treatment of “X” and embodiment, on 
both the figure “X” and the syntactic-rhetorical ABBA pattern referred to as 
chiasmus. Pelkey extended Lissner’s analysis of “X” and chiasmus to the 
study of paleogesture, arguing that “X” holds a unique place in human 
development. He proposed that when humans developed the ability to walk 
in an upright posture, they also honed their ability to compare. This is 
reflected in several cultures where the terms that describe the anatomy of 
the upper body are also used in describing the lower body: the terms “lips” 
and “labia” are one example in English. 
 One of the earliest comparisons that a human agent will make 









feet, and across the sagittal plane or left and right sides of the body. The 
outstretched limbs of the human agent form the embodied “X,” and Pelkey’s 
thesis is made all the more enticing by an impressive array of icons he has 
gathered to depict how the “X” figure often appears with humanlike features. 
These “X” symbols find widespread usage with companies that provide 
services for the body – healthcare, wellness and fitness industries favor the 
icons to convey messages about status of the body. The “X” can be readily 
perceived as a symbol of the dynamic, acting individual. 
Pelkey’s previous research on the semiotic history of X has uncovered 
a wealth of examples that bear out its extreme, dichotomous nature. The X 
highlights two distinct and diverging but comparable paths. The X may also 
be considered a symbol of a process and how a “truth” prevails over others, 
vis-à-vis Western heritage, and the Greek alphabetic correlate chi. The chi is 
the first character of Christ, and through the influence of Christianity, the sign 
not only represents a single-minded perspective or cause, but also was 
meant to attest to the integrity or truthful testimony of whoever used it as a 
personal signature. Investigating X as the syntactical structure chiasmus (or 
ABBA pattern) further reveals how the pattern has considerable potency – a 
number of impactful and discriminating effects that assist a speaker or writer 
in espousing a particular view.   
The work continues with an exposition of how X can signify a “truth,” 
and at the syntactical level, mute out other possibilities or opposites, as in 









present in both logical formulations and chiasmus, this inquiry touches upon 
the philosophies of Frege, Wittgenstein and Kripke and the history of logical 
theorization. Finally, it is possible to consider whether and how syntactical X 
patterns may be an essential part of systematicity in language.  
Fodor (1975) draws on theories of logic in conceiving of 
“systematicity” -- a concept he applies in describing how lexical parts 
combine to create meaningful sentences, and how these parts must flexibly 
reconfigure to allow for other meanings to be formed. Pullum and Scholz 
(2007) also remark that systematicity concerns how “parts of expressions in 
natural languages…can be substituted for others without altering well-
formedness.” Syntactic-rhetorical chiasmus must accomplish this every time 
in substituting AB for BA. Therefore chiasmus may be a feature of language 
capable of furthering our understanding of systematicity. Following in the 
structuralist tradition of Saussure, Benveniste (1971) reflects that, “a 
language constitutes a system whose parts are all united in a relationship of 
solidarity and dependence. This system organizes units, which are the 
articulated signs, mutually differentiating and delimiting themselves” (83).  
When surveying a modest number of examples from fourteen different 
language families, several distinguishable categories emerge that are worthy 
of attention: chiasmus works when “A” and “B” elements are somehow 
comparable, whether because they are similar in constitution and easily 
interchangeable, or otherwise on the opposite end of a spectrum of 









might seem to be a verification of the systematicity of language and have 
applications in artificial intelligence, but closer inspection is required to make 
sense of all of these issues, beginning with an overview of semiotic X.   
 
 
X Figures, Forms and Truths 
 
The “X” as an alphabetic unit has a complicated history, one that is 
shared with t. In Phoenician and Paleo-Hebrew, “X” represented the t—taw, 
or tav (borrowed into Greek as “tau”). The tav was also used in Hebrew as a 
sign indicating meaning or signification. The letter t also has historical 
correlates with an Ancient Egyptian symbol depicting the heart and trachea 
(Quaknin 1999). In the myths of Ancient Egypt, as indeed it would later be in 
the doctrine of Aristotle, the heart was thought to be in possession of the 
faculties that are modernly attributed to mind. The heart bore the 
responsibility for the person’s actions, ensuring he spoke truthfully. In the 
afterlife, the heart endured a trial of judgment to determine whether the 
person had deceived others or had chosen to live an honest life. Another 
symbol or way of writing “X” resembles fish bones (or a horizontal or vertical 
tree) and was initially used in the proto-Sinaitic alphabet. According to 
Quaknin (1999), some scholars including Benveniste “claim it derives from 
an Egyptian determinative” (338). This “X” however has little in common with 










                                                                                                                  Figure 2. An example from Quaknin (1999) of “tree shape” X.  
 
In English, “X” relates closely to the Ancient Greek “khi” or “chi” and the /k/ 
still figures in the modern pronunciation /ɛks/.   
The “chi” or X gained authority as the essential element of the name 
Christ in the age of Constantine, when the Chi Rho came to be embellished 
on all manner of objects, including clothing and items made of silver or gold. 
The Chi Rho is a symbol comprising the first two letters of Christ’s name, “X” 
and “P” in an intersecting arrangement. Oftentimes it is also depicted with the 
first and last letters of the Greek alphabet, the alpha and omega – the 
beginning and the end.  
 
                                                                          
                                               Figure 3. (Left): The Chi Rho. (Right): The Chi Rho with the alpha and omega 
                 symbols. 
 
There are differing accounts of why and how this christogram came into use, 
but all claim that the symbol occurred to Constantine in a dream or waking 









incorporated the Chi Rho into his military decorations.7 In fact, the history of 
the symbol is likely to be more complex and influenced by Ancient Egyptian 
culture; the crux ansata, or the ankh (Fig. 4) is one possible source of 
inspiration. Bardill (2012) considers this suggestion—that Constantine’s 
advisor Lactantius was describing the crux ansata when he recounted the 
tale of Constantine’s dream. The crux ansata or ankh is a symbol of life. In its 
most common interpretation, the ankh is viewed as a pictogram representing 
sandal straps—yet the ankh also appears in reliefs which depict deities 
offering it towards the mouths of leaders, associating it with food or speech. 
It is likewise shown adorning staves, and looped around the neck of the 
snake, which are symbols of authority and power, and it is sometimes given 
human characteristics – typically human arms, and more rarely faces.  
 
                               
                                Figure 4. Royal Cartridges of Ramses III. The Temple of Ramses III. 
 
 
Whatever the symbol’s precise origins, Constantine’s use of the Chi 
Rho went hand in hand with a significant change in culture: he systematically 
converted the citizens of Rome from polytheism to the monotheistic worship 
                                               
7 Two stories about the chi rho exist--one from Constantine’s counselor Lactantius, and another from Eusebius who 
chronicled Constantine’s life. Lactantius claims that Constantine saw the Chi-Rho in a dream, while Eusebius writes that 









of Christ. Through the Chi Rho, a single set of values, way of life and truth 
came to be defined. Constantine’s followers and subsequent generations 
acted in accordance with this truth, and with the Edict of Thessalonika, the 
Roman Emperors Gratian, Theodosius I, and Valentinian II named 
Christianity the official religion of all Romans. Any person who refused the 
monotheistic religion and worship of the holy Trinity was deemed a heretic, 
and thereby susceptible to severe punishment by the empire. Christianity 
spread throughout Italy and all of Europe with the force of the Roman army 
behind it, and relics of the conquest can be found across the continent. The 
National Museum of Scotland in Edinburgh contains a spoon marked with a 
Chi Rho, encased along with smithereens of silver recovered from Traprain 
Law, a hill located in East Lothian, Scotland. It is salient that the symbol is at 
the focal point of the spoon, an instrument of delivering sustenance. On the 
one hand, this could simply demonstrate Roman ownership of the utensil, 
but it could also be a reminder of the power of the empire to provide 
nourishing food for its military. The fact that the spoon must be inserted in 
the mouth also may have another significance, as it is from a person’s mouth 
that he is able to speak utterances and such utterances should be expected 
to align with the messages of the empire, and spoons were used to deliver 
holy communion to the consumers of the church’s message.  
According to museum guides at the National Museum of Scotland in 
Edinburgh, scholars are still puzzling over what occurred at Traprain Law, 









smithereens. 8 At this point in time the Roman army was under attack from 
barbaric forces and other forces on all sides. These artifacts may be just 
some of the remnants of the Romans attempting to Christianize Scotland 
from AD75 to AD1000. The Romans might have destroyed these artifacts 
melted the silver down for trade, but it is interesting that a few remained 
intact—including the silver spoon with the Chi Rho, the powerful symbol of 
the empire.  
                                      
 
                        Figure 5. Silver spoon from the National Museum of Scotland in Edinburgh.  
                        The spoon was recovered from Traprain Law, a hill in southeast Scotland.  
 
 
The “X” is a deeply strategic tool and a political symbol in the Western 
tradition through Christianity: it stands for the individual and may also 
represent the truthfulness or integrity of that individual. At the sentence level, 
the “X” entwines with truth statements and dialectic. The syntactical “X” 
structure lays out two possible arrangements, AB and BA, sometimes for the 
purpose of comparing and evaluating the AB statement as true or better. 
Speaking truthfully is a fundamental value of Western philosophy in its 
originary rejection of sophistry. In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates criticized 
anyone who used eloquent language to persuade others to adopt misguided 
                                               











views. The dialogues Theatetus, Gorgias, and Phaedrus capture these 
criticisms of sophistry. Socrates’ chief concern was about speakers who 
expressed empty sentiments and the audience that would find within those 
speeches a justification to act wrongfully, unjustly or foolishly. The famous 
sophist Protagoras for example believed that truths and falsehoods could 
only be personally defined—and that “man is the measure of all things”.  
Socrates challenged this idea, and sought one, objective truth over such 
forms of moral relativism. In Theatetus, Socrates attempted to describe ways 
of getting at the truth; he defined three methods, including one that entails 
formulating a comparison and discerning the difference between the object 
and other objects. Socrates remarked that knowing what is “true” requires 
some knowledge of what is the opposite. Aristotle also writes on truth, logic 
and categorization in Organon. In this text and elsewhere, Aristotle 
formulates definitions of what something is by pondering and rationalizing 
what it differs from—or what it is not.   
With sentence level chiasmus, two ways of engaging with or seeing 
the world will often be presented and no further options. In logic, this is in 
keeping with a classic law of thought.  Pelkey (2017) mentions how Tertium 
Non Datur (or the Law of Excluded Middle) can relate to chiasmus: two 
immutable conditions are defined, with no third option or compromise. 9 
While Pelkey’s analysis moves beyond such a limiting binary chiastic 
                                               
9 It is important to note that a chiastic expression can also home in on the excluded middle alone – a category which does not 
fit either of two extremes. The 1991 movie Fried Green Tomatoes contains an example of this, when Kathy Bates’ character 









structure (to note other salient features of the device), there are many 
examples of chiasmus that seem to point out two ways of acting upon or 
viewing a situation. A prime example of this is a quote from Evelyn Beatrice 
Hall, which is commonly misattributed to Voltaire: “The instinct of a man is to 
pursue (A) everything that flies (B) from him, and to fly (B) from all that 
pursues (A) him.” There are two options covered by this proposition: at any 
given time, it is either true that the man flies, or it is true that he pursues. In a 
moment of space and time, a human agent cannot manage to both pursue 
and flee from a single object, and Hall does not divulge any other 
compromise or middle way.10 This is a superficial reading of the quote, which 
in its context hints at romantic entanglements – but nonetheless, Hall is 
making a suggestion about human behavior; the object to be pursued is an 
object of one’s affections, while the object to flee is an object of one’s 
rejections. There is no in-between. Axiomatic-deductive theories of meaning 
and truth-functional logic rest on the supposition that a statement will either 
be true, or false: two conflicting “truths” cannot be upheld simultaneously. 
Chiasmus may not manage to uphold conflicting reports simultaneously, but 
it is worth noting how the chiastic sentence can feature a proposition and its 
negation, and also join the pair together in one unified, whole structure.  
More often than not, however, “X” becomes a crossing point of 
opposite ideas and the listener or reader can extract a certain “truth” from 
chiastic communications. The examples that follow the Law of Excluded 
                                               









Middle might be employed to formulate what appear to be absolutes, and 
this makes the device a prime tool for asserting an ideology, rule or principle. 
The following quote that Plutarch credits to Socrates is a further 
demonstration of this: “Bad men live (A) that they may eat and drink (B), 
whereas good men eat and drink (B) that they may live (A).”11 Similar 
chiastic statements can be found in political speeches, religious texts, 
spoken word poetry, or casual repartee. The takeaway from the statement 
happens to be a moral one, but this syntactical example can render axioms 
defining “good” and “bad” conditions. In syntax, the “X” may be used in these 
evaluative ways with respect to “same” or “different” relations, or it may 
represent the true, as it can be calculated alongside the false. Arguably, 
such assessments entwine in chiasmus. The chiasmus or “X” is a crossing 
point of opposite ideas that typically delivers a set of conditions and a truth-
value to an audience. Even in practical usage, marking “X” on a page might 
designate a salient passage requiring further attention, while an “X” that 
covers the text will indicate a negation or deletion.  
The effect of this is the same in formal logics: a truth function is 
defined either by directing attention to an important proposition, or by 
stipulating a “not this” condition or erasure. Harris (2016) makes a 
connection between chiasmus, mathematical and logical formulations. He 
                                               
11 This is from Plutarch’s Moralia, How a Young Man Should Listen to the poets (Pelling 2005). There are several variations of 
this original statement. One example is from Ben Franklin’s Poor Richard’s Alamanc (1733), in which Frankling said, “Eat to 









mentions several formulas in his presentation, listed here:   
 m + n = n + m  
mn = nm; m x n = n x m 
m – n ≠ n – m 
m/n ≠ n/m ; m ÷ n ≠ n ÷ m 
(p&q) ↔ (q&p) 
(p v q) ↔ (q v p) 
The chiastic structure of such formulations can be noted with clear reversals 
in each case. When it comes to a consideration of logic and syntax, some 
chiastic sentences can be written as logical operations, as has been 
explored in the section, Chiastic Studies and Typology in this dissertation. 
Not all examples of syntactic chiasmus can be written in the symbols of 
formal logic, but it is interesting that some can be expressed that way and 
that some logical formulations in turn are chiastic.  
Below, Pelkey and Paul’s chiastic types are revisited, but this time not 
for the sake of comparing between my own typology and theirs, but rather to 
glean from primarily Pelkey’s work a few more observations about the 













Anthony Paul and Jamin Pelkey have both delineated four striking 
thematic chiastic types, although they have differing interpretations. For 
Paul, there is:  
 
(1) X or cross-shape chiasmus, which he claims causes no “contradiction 
or clash of meanings.”  Paul provides several examples, including:  “If a gift 
is given it can be received; when it is received it can be given” (23).  
 
(2) Mirror-chiasmus, which characterizes a “mental blockage” or 
contradiction that results in cognitive dissonance. It “combines formal 
symmetry with paradox or contradiction,” as in the Shakespeare example: 
“Fair is foul and foul is fair” (23). 
 
(3) Circular-chiasmus, which is “experienced as a ‘circling’ when it invites 
the mind to follow a line of thought that returns to the starting point. 
Leopardi’s “L’Infinito” is the example Paul cites, for it contains within it an 
arrangement of parallels (35). This includes: 
“Sempre caro mi fu” // m’è dolce”      or      “Always dear to me // to me is 
lovely” 
“Interminati // infinito”                        or       “Boundless // infinite” 
 
(4) and Spiral chiasmus, which “sets up a more dynamic process of 









gives the following example in his work (36):  
“The world had a beginning 
And this beginning could be the mother of the world. 
When you know the mother 
Go on to know the child. 
After you have known the child 
Go back to holding fast to the mother. 
And to the end of your days you will not meet with danger.”  
(Lao Tzu, Tao te Ching, LIII, translated by D.C. Lau).  
 
Pelkey alters Paul’s original categorization and defines the following 
chiastic types: (1) X (2) diamond (3) hourglass, and (4) argyle. Pelkey 
considers the “X” a representation of the embodied agent and the extreme 
postures such an agent can assume. He goes on to identify other types of 
“X” – including the repeating “X” or argyle pattern. According to Pelkey, the 
argyle pattern is the individual in direct contact with other individuals. In 
substantiating these claims, Pelkey draws upon evidence from graphic 
design, such as the logo for the company Doing Family Right, which features 
several overlapping or “lattice” spread eagle “X” figures (Pelkey 202). 
 
 










 The argyle pattern can be representative of bringing people together, 
as seen in the example above. The two other types of “X” in Pelkey’s 
classification system are the hourglass type and the diamond type—and 
these types seem to serve opposite functions. The hourglass as a symbol is 
associated with passing time and mortality, and Pelkey likens the hourglass 
type to Lacan’s L-Schema, because its “dihedral symmetry” forms a “double 
mirror” and the L-schema is a mirroring of the “ego constantly projecting its 
self-image and assumptions with confidence onto others and having this 
image reflected back with little change” (Pelkey 89). Below is a visual 
rendering of the L-Schema and its “X” shape.  
                                                        
    Figure 7. Lacan’s L-Schema – and its hourglass and “X” configuration. 
    
Unlike the hourglass type, Pelkey’s diamond type involves two “X” 
figures positioned around a shared middle ground. The diamond comes forth 
in this interspace, and Pelkey posits that this type conveys the experience of 
one and Other communing in awe over a third Other. “X” may signify 
reciprocity or exchange—but also represents confrontation. Paul and 
Pelkey’s different types facilitate a discussion of chiasmus, and help to 
articulate how even two “X” types can be in conflict: Paul’s “X” type is 









entrapment, in which the reader ends up right where he started, while the 
spiral type commands the reverse effect and enables movement.  
Following with the connections that Kunze (2010) has made between 
chiasmus and architecture, what the “X” accomplishes is akin to what Lacan 
referred to as “mi-dire,” or “saying half” – which for Lacan came as a result of 
reaching after truth. Van Haute and Geyskens (2015) aptly explain Lacan’s 
concept of mi-dire: “Every piece of knowledge leaves a remainder. No one 
can ever fully express truth; structurally it is half-said.” Kunze explores mi-
dire alongside Lacan’s interest in the mirror stage of human development, 
which occurs when a young child begins to recognize his or her appearance 
in the mirror and identifies themselves. According to Kunze, the concept of 
mi-dire “goes to the heart of the mirror stages primal condition of its own truth 
told in halves, and halves of a half” (378). In some of its incarnations, “X” can 
pick a stance or arguing point, which is a “mi-dire” or crossroads within some 
greater truth or issue. The syntactical “X” or ABBA pattern may create the 
illusion that two perspectives are under consideration, when oftentimes only 
one is being emphatically expressed (and several more are possible). The 
repetitions also have the effect of a mirror or echo, which can amplify the 
primary sentiment of the sentence or appeal to emotion (“pathos”).  
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1968) also applied the term chiasm broadly 
to his discussion of the mind-body dichotomy, language, perception and 
other phenomena. Merleau-Ponty turned the chiasm into an expansive 









disembodied mind as a half-truth, and argued that the mind could not be 
dissevered from corporeality. The chiasm can dismantle dichotomies, but 
more often, it seems to be noted for building them.  
In politics, this is especially notable. Such dichotomies often 
demarcate two courses of action, or render a comparison, then go on to 
suggest which is the correct or proper path. John F. Kennedy’s 1961 
inaugural speech contains one such example: “Ask not what your country (A) 
can do for you (B), but what you (B) can do for your country (A).” This 
chiastic example is asymmetric, with the addition of the phrase “Ask not,” 
which puts added stress on the negation of the first clause. This much 
quoted and catchy line from his speech influenced young men to serve 
America. The line champions the idea of patriotic service, while also 
dismissing the importance of a government serving its people, and managing 
to do so in a way that is not wholly conspicuous. Notably, in 1965 James 
Baldwin wrote a New York Times article entitled “The American Dream and 
the American Negro,” in which he reflects on the experience of growing up 
as an African American. Baldwin states, “It comes as a great shock around 
the age of 5, 6, or 7 to discover that the flag to which you (A) have pledged 
allegiance (B), along with everybody else, has not pledged allegiance (B) to 
you (A).” This chiasmus also contains “not,” and seems to be engaging in 
dialogue with John F. Kennedy’s earlier speech as it conveys a clear 
dissatisfaction with a government that does not protect and respect its entire 









Baldwin’s and JFK’s comments could be what Lacan described as “mi-dire,” 
or expressing only a partial truth or perspective. Baldwin’s essay articulates a 
profound disenchantment with America and with patriotic fervor.  
This type of chiastic phrasing is still very much in use today in politics. 
Trump’s July 2017 speech to the Boy Scouts contains chiastic phrasing. The 
persuasive lines reinforce the notion of a mutually beneficial relationship 
between the nation and the Boy Scouts:  
 
TRUMP: America turns to the Boy Scouts because we know that the Boy 
Scouts never ever, ever let us down. 
(APPLAUSE) 
TRUMP: Just like you know you can count on me, we know we can count on 
you, because we know the values that you live by. 
(APPLAUSE) 
TRUMP: Your values are the same values that have always kept America 
strong, proud and free. 
TRUMP: And by the way, do you see the billions and billions and billions of 




 Syntactic-rhetorical chiasmus can appear where reciprocity is 
expected to exist, and yet in this politically charged example, that seeming 
reciprocity segues into another message about military support and 
servitude. This is not to say that chiasmus exclusively misleads and can 
never express reciprocal relations. Nonetheless, recognizing such patterns 
exposes the imperfectness and incompleteness of assertions and the 
mutability of things. It may be beneficial for readers to notice where chiasmus 
crops up, so as to understand when an assertion has been made and yet 
                                               










subtly repealed within a speech. On a grander scale, pinpointing chiasmus 
as an aspect of language may change how we conceive of topics like 
semantics and meaning – moving us away from the perspective that the 
meaning of a phrase is something which is fixed or static, and towards the 
view that meaning is in flux and invertible.   
The study of chiasmus also has possible implications for how 
embodied agents conceptualize through language. Patricia Lissner (2007) 
coins the term “chi-thinking” to denote a dichotomizing way of representing 
the world that comes to the fore in chiasmus. Rodolphe Gasché (1987) refers 
to chiasmus as “what allows oppositions to be bound into unity…. a form that 
makes it possible to determine differences with respect to an underlying 
totality.” Gasché also states that chiasmus is the “originary form of thought” 
(1987: xvi). While this may seem like a specious claim, chiasmus is more 
than just a rhetorical device or a figure. Pelkey’s (2017) efforts have gone a 
long way in deciphering the extreme and fluctuating statuses of “X” figures, 
but this matter requires still further investigation because of how chiasmus 
relates to logic. Chiasmus can reveal and debunk some paradoxes that 
persist in the world and in truth-functional logic (or any system characterized 
by strict and abiding binaristic rules), even if its practical usages seem to 
secure a place for such truth proofs.  
The story of “X” and truth-functional logic that we began to explore 









necessary to pick up where we left off with Frege and discuss his impact on 
other thinkers.  
 
Logic and the Systematicity of Language 
 
Gottlob Frege was a German mathematician and analytic philosopher, 
whose work centered on logic and arithmetic. In Begriffsschrift or Concept 
Writing (1879) and The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), Frege proposed a 
quantificational logic that was also a theory about thought. Frege separated 
objects from concepts, establishing that objects are material things in the 
world, but they can be pondered by means of different concepts. For Frege, 
concepts existed in a hierarchy, which involved a consideration of an object’s 
properties, with its physical attributes taking precedence over the more 
abstract qualities of the object. The object itself was the most important entity 
to consider. This became the backbone of his quantificational logic, which is 
the precursor to modern set theory, as he defined natural numbers (0, 1, 2, 
3) as logical objects. Everything else in the world could be analyzed by 
means of dealing with these logical objects, or natural numbers.  
Frege’s particular commitment to logical axiomatization influenced 
several thinkers in establishing their own theories of meaning, language and 
cognition. One scholar who expanded on the work of Frege was Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, who in his earlier work committed to Frege’s view of language 
as axiomatic, or reducible to fixed formulas; however, in his later work, 









Frege’s methods of analysis and definition and ultimately rejects this 
methodology. Wittgenstein likens analysis and interpretation to “chasing 
chimeras,” but as Hans Schneider (2014) points out, Wittgenstein might not 
be wholly endeavoring to minimize the importance of logic; he might rather 
be promulgating his discovery that logic and logical analysis alone are 
insufficient. Wittgenstein concludes that language games are essential for 
communication—that is, utterances take on significance only when 
understood through use and activity. Two or more language users set the 
rules for usage, and these rules undergo constant situational changes, so 
that generating new terms is ongoing and the terms can be applied in infinite 
ways. Truths are therefore never fixed, but always undergoing revision.  
Wittgenstein states in his own treatment of tertium non datur that 
human beings prefer to say definitively of something, “it must look either like 
this or that” -- yet simultaneously we “feel that it is not so” (352). In other 
words, it is preferred that the meaning of something is precise and fixed. It is 
possible that in some ways, Wittgenstein also finds himself confined to these 
possibilities—that his description of “language games” is in some way too 
restrictive in describing language use, after all—but Wittgenstein seems to 
be advocating for an end to restrictive categorization altogether. 13  
Saul Kripke draws on Wittgenstein in his discussion of possible worlds 
within Naming & Necessity. Throughout this series of lectures, Kripke 
concentrates on a popular thought experiment about former United States 
                                               









President Richard Nixon. When pondering the subject of other possible 
worlds, logicians have constructed the following assertion: Nixon won the 
election in our world, and he might not have won in another world. In 
conceiving of other worlds, the tendency is to envision an extreme 
opposite—to pick a point of divergence between this and that. Less import is 
ascribed to gradual shifts or minor changes than two extremes. In 
considering the Nixon thought-experiment, Kripke concludes that mutable 
conditions are used to fix the referent—or attach an identity to the person. 
While Fregeans would like for these referents to be definitive and immovable, 
Kripke proves the arbitrariness of assigning identities based on “this” or “that” 
descriptive conditions. Kripke’s work challenges Frege, but the tendency to 
represent the world in this way still endures.  
  The work of Jerry Fodor (1975) also addresses several problems 
Frege puzzled over. Fodor’s theories of cognition asserted there must be an 
algorithmic language of thought that determined how minds work, and that 
the predicate calculus of logic and all human language might in some way 
mirror these original rules of the mind. According to this perspective, the 
language of thought must be systematic to define the constraints and 
possibilities of how elements could be manipulated during these mental 
activities.  
Although few continue to adhere to the “classical” notion of 
systematicity, many scholars studying cognition still view language as 









regarding a language of thought.  To clarify the terminology, systematicity 
“refers to the fact that some sets of representations are intimately linked” 
(Eliasmith 2013). Fodor and the philosopher Zenon Pylyshyn have 
contended that human agents must be able to represent “Mary loves John” if 
they are able to represent “John loves Mary.” Such representations are at 
their core chiastic, if Mary (A) loves John (B) and John (B) loves Mary (A). 
Fodor and Pylyshyn’s theories about systematicity continue to influence 
modern theories of cognition, and therefore deserve further attention, yet as 
Johnson (2004) explains, “the nature of systematicity is rarely more than 
cursorily sketched: an example or two is typically thought to characterize the 
phenomenon adequately” (112). This does not seem to have changed much, 
even after the passing of over a decade.  
Johnson (2004) takes a skeptical perspective on systematicity and 
draws upon the theories of Robert Cummins, who conceives of systematic 
variation as encompassing all possible permutations of the elements in a 
sentence.  There is a difference between all possible permutations of a 
sentence, however, and all probable and coherent permutations, since not all 
elements are substitutable in the place of others. Chiastic samples can be 
collocated to survey what intelligible rearrangements and reversals hold in 
common. On the other hand, chiasmus can also be recruited as evidence to 
show how unsystematic language can be – and how new permutations in 
language are always materializing. This is certainly evident when looking at 









groups. All of the above focused on the topic of truth and truth-functional, but 
the survey below departs from that primary focal point, while still requiring it 
as background to a more thorough discussion on chiasmus as a 
dichotomizing device, and one that has both important similarities and 
differences from logic. First, I begin with an overview of how I conducted my 
research and then I examine particular chiastic examples.   
 
Methodology and Chiastic Typology  
Pelkey (2013) reports that “countless examples of chiastic patterning appear 
cross-linguistically,” and the early explorative stage of my study involved 
finding these phrases in as many different language families and groups as 
possible. While this did not begin in a strict or constrained way, and instead 
consisted of a broad sampling and collocating of examples, it became 
necessary to adopt a more systematic approach and method. The prime 
research goal was to confirm the presence of chiasmus in multiple 
languages, but evolved into developing a typology only after the data 
reflected a need for one. A Glaserian grounded methodology proved to be 
most beneficial, in that it does not require making prior assumptions about 
the data. In this case, the focus was foremost on the data and what could be 
gleaned from compiling it. As the main goal of the project was to make the 
survey of languages and types as broad as possible, it seemed best to 
collect the data and then later to see if any comparisons could be made 










One aim was to answer the question: how many different language families 
and groups contain examples of chiasmus? Investigating this question 
organically required both accessing data through resources on the internet 
and in research databases. In the interest of narrowing the search for 
chiastic phrasing, I chose to focus mainly on what Harris refers to as 
morphological chiasmus and antimetabole -- ABBA patterns with near exact 
reversals of elements, or exact repetitions of elements. One fruitful way to 
find these antimetabole examples was through social media and the 
hashtags for chiasmus, but the greatest success rate came from perusing 
websites like BrainyQuote, Goodreads and Wikiquote. Mardy Grothe’s book 
Never Let a Fool Kiss You or a Kiss Fool You was another helpful resource, 
although regardless of where each example was originally found, they all 
needed to be a) cross-referenced and b) traced back to the source text for 
verification. Some of the chiastic quotes I uncovered were misattributions or 
impossible to locate in any text. In the case of several of the following 
examples, I turned to both full texts and articles strictly devoted to proverbs. I 
read the entirety of those books or articles in a quest for chiasmus. 
Occasionally, I came across examples in my unrelated readings. All of the 
sources of the chiastic examples are directly cited in the chart. In the cases 
where I cross-referenced a proverb and it appeared in multiple locations on 
the web, no particular source is cited (as the original author is an unknown 









project included over five hundred examples, but only 80 were selected to 
include in the final project due to matters of space and to allow for some 
discussion of those examples to take place.  
After collecting the data, I realized I needed a systematic way to 
organize it, and that was when the types emerged through a process of 
comparison between the examples. Each time I identified a sentence with 
similar structural components to another sentence, I grouped them together. 
The descriptions of each functional type explains the particular attributes of 
the examples that make them qualify for inclusion under that type. It also 
must be acknowledged that in some cases an example could overlap and fall 
under more than one type. It took more time and effort to identify examples 
in certain languages over others, due in part to my limited knowledge of 
those languages. In hindsight, it might have been easier to create a forum 
and ask native speakers of all different languages to contribute examples of 
chiastic quotations. This might be a way to expand the project in the future.  
 Another way to expand would be to consider examples of 
phonological chiasmus (e.g. “A magician pulls rabbits out of hats. An 
experimental psychologist pulls habits out of rats” – which is a quote of 
unknown origin). Phonological chiasmus has not been incorporated into this 
survey because of the need to limit the scope. Longer examples of 
chiasmus, i.e. syntactical examples with multiple elements such as ABCCBA 
have likewise been omitted from the survey (although could feasibly be 









examples where the ABBA repetitions are more explicit. With both 
morphological chiasmus and antimetabole, it is not difficult to pick out the 
repeating, chiastic elements. The intent of this was to make the typology 
more accessible to those who have little background on chiasmus, or 
perhaps have never even heard of the device at all before.  While this is a 
potential limitation of the typology right now, it is one that can be addressed 
at some point in the future. 
Twenty-eight languages are represented in the typology, from 
fourteen different language families, including: an Afroasiastic language, 
Hausa; Niger-Congo languages, Yorùbá and Igbo; Indo-European 
languages, Dutch, Gaelic, Icelandic, Pashto, Sanskrit, Swedish, Yiddish; 
Dravidian languages, Kannada and Tamil; the Germanic languages, 
English and German; the Romance languages, French, Italian, Latin and 
Spanish; a Slavic language, Russian; Semitic languages, Arabic and 
Hebrew; Sino-Tibetan languages, Chinese and Tibetan; an Austro-Asiatic 
language, Vietnamese; the Japonic language, Japanese; Turkic language, 
Turkish; Greek; and also a French creole, Haitian.  
 Eight chiastic types are considered. Categories such as “Exclusions” 
and “Dissociations” are similar in that they describe different forms of spatial 
division, but a distinction can be drawn here because the examples found in 
“Dissociations” explicitly discuss or involve some separation of entities or 
groups – i.e. men and women. The examples in the “Exclusions” category do 









“Winning” and “quitting” cannot take place simultaneously (i.e. “Winners 
never quit, and quitters never win”).  
The eight chiastic types herein considered are delineated a list and 
then explained more thoroughly below: 
 
1) Equalization: AB equates to or is the same as BA 
2) Part-whole: A is part of B, and B is part of A  
3) Exclusion: A excludes B, and B excludes A 
4) Dissociation: A dissociates from B, B dissociates from A  
5) Combination: A and B, B and A; the elements are grouped together but do 
not necessarily affect each other 
6) Comparison: A and B are better than B and A; or A and B are worse than 
B and A 
7) One Way Effects: A affects B, but B does not affect A; or A does not affect 
B, but B affects A 
8) Multiple Effects: A affects B, and B affects A; or A affects B and B affects 
A; 
can also include more elaborate reversals with repeating C, D, E elements 
 
Equalization 
The first type encompasses substitution or associative effects, which can be 
signaled by to be verbs like is and are—but can also emerge when detailing 









All of these produce some form of equalization. Hegel’s Grundlinien der 
Philosophie des Rechts (Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 1821) includes 
one such example: “Was vernünftig ist, das ist Wirklich; und was wirklich ist, 
das ist vernünftig” (What is rational is real; and what is real is rational). At 
face value and considered as a whole, the chiastic arrangements that involve 
to be verbs might be deemed tautological, but here Hegel’s statement cannot 
be dismissed out of hand as a circular phrase; to get at a better interpretation 
of the sentence would require exploring his particular views on logical 
reasoning and dialectic, which would also entail gathering knowledge about 
philosophers that came before him who had much different views about the 
definition of rationality. Interpreting this line successfully demands going 
beyond its atomistic components, and having a wealth of prior knowledge 
from many texts.    
 
A Tibetan proverb provides a further definitional example:   
 
   
 The proverb asserts, “It’s a clever thief who keeps finding things, but 
finding things too often makes one a thief.” These examples illustrate the 
relationship between a  noun or adjective “A” and some qualifying verb or 
synonymous adjective “B”: the “A” is set up as the equivalent or definition of 
the “B” element. This makes these sentences circular, but necessarily so: the 









When these types appear in describing a process, they can also enumerate 
different ways of reaching the same end goal, as in the Yorùbá example: “Ká 
lo ̣ ́aṣo ̣mo ̣ ́ìdí, ká lo ̣ ́ìdí mo ̣ ́aṣo,̣ kí ìdí ṣáà má ti gbófo” (Whether we tie a 
wrapper round the waist, or tie the waist round a wrapper, to ensure the 
waist is not naked is what’s crucial).14  
There is a progression and movement evident in examples of this type—a 
self-caressing and self-reinforcement that seem salient and perhaps rooted 
in embodiment. An equalization can be written as a logical expression, p = q, 
q = p. Some further examples are featured in the chart below.  
 
Equalizations: A is the same as B, and B is the same as A 
1. “Beauty is truth, truth beauty” – John Keats, English poet, from “Ode 
on a Grecian Urn” 
2. “L’armi, qua l’armi:  io solo / Combatterò, procomberò sol io – 
Giacomo Leopardi, from the poem “All’Italia”  
English translation: The weapons, here the weapons: I’ll fight alone; 
I’ll fall alone. (Or “alone I’ll fall”). 
3.  
“Et rose, elle a vécu ce que vivent les roses” – François de Malherbe, 
French poet 
English translation: And rose, she lived as live the roses  
4. “Was vernünftig ist, das ist Wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist 
vernünftig.” – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, German philosopher, 
from Elements of the Philosophy of Right   
English translation: What is reasonable is real; and what is real is 
reasonable.  
5. “Ustedes son el mundo y el mundo es de ustedes” – User Sebastian 
Y. Wende (@sywende) on Twitter 
English Translation: You are the world, and the world is yours. 
6. “Выбор громадный, но я всё время был так пьян, что бутылки 
принимал за девиц, а девиц за бутылки” – Anton Chekhov, Letter to 
his sister M.P. Chekhov on April 25, 1887 
                                               









English Translation: The choice is enormous, but I was so drunk that 
I took the bottles for girls, and the girls for bottles. 
 
7. “Tala med bönder på bönders vis och med de lärde på latin” – 
Unknown, Swedish proverb  
English translation: Speak with farmers as farmers speak, and with 
the educated in Latin. 
 
English interpretation: Similar to the idiom “Now you speak my 
language” – it is an expression of how to promote understanding 
between oneself and others.  
 
8. “Kallaik kaNdAl nAyaik kANum, NAyaik kaNdAl kallaik kANum” – 
Unknown, Tamil proverb 
 
English translation: When you see a dog’s figure in the rock you 
can’t realize it’s a rock, when you see the rock you can’t realize it’s a 
dog. 
 
English interpretation: Once you adopt a certain perspective on 
something, you might not be able to see it another way. 
 
9. “Ká lọ́ aṣọ mọ́ ìdí, ká lọ́ ìdí mọ́ aṣọ, kí ìdí ṣáà má ti gbófo” – Unknown, 
Yorùbá proverb 
 
English translation: Whether we tie a wrapper round the waist or tie 
the waist round a wrapper, to ensure the waist is not naked is what’s 
crucial. 
 
English interpretation: It doesn’t matter which way you do 
something important, as long as it is accomplished. (A wrapper refers 
to a loin-cloth of sorts, and sometimes refers to a sanitary wrapper 
that women use).  
 
10. “        “  
      
- Unknown, Tibetan proverb 
English translation: It’s a clever thief who keeps finding things, but 













Another fairly common A-B-B-A reversal type occurs with elements that have 
a part-whole relation, as in the Greek proverb: “Απ' αγκάθι βγαίνει ρόδο κι 
από ρόδο βγαίνει αγκάθι (From a thorn a rose emerges and from a rose a 
thorn). Egyptian writer Anis Mansour composed a similar sentence.      
          
                                               
 
In English, the quotation reads, “The pessimist: A rose has thorns. The 
optimist: Thorns have a rose.” Although the Greek proverb appears 
straightforward and has a literal signification, the second quotation reveals 
the potential for these expressions to extend beyond the actual and into the 
territory of abstraction and metaphor. The rose epitomizes all that is beautiful 
and fresh, while the thorn pricks and epitomizes pain and unpleasantness. It 
has already been discussed how metaphors derive from embodiment, but 
the literary device metonymy also involves part-whole relationships, and it is 
worth noting how these permutations can bridge the two together. Another 
poetic example comes from Fragments d’un discours amoureux by Roland 
Barthes: “Le langage est une peau: je frotte mon langage contre l’autre. 
Comme si j’avais des mots en guise de doigts, ou des doigts au bout de mes 









against the other. As if I had words (A) instead of fingers (B), or fingers (B) 
at the tips of my words (A). My language trembles with desire). Such 
permutations seem naturally suited as a vehicle for metaphor—for attaching 
two unlike things in one body, but they can also be constructive for making 
comparisons between the parts within a single object, person or place. There 
are examples about nations and nationality, which are similar in theme: the 
German politician Gregor Gysi opines, “Wir brauchen ein europaisches 
Deutschland. Wir brauchen kein deutsches Europa” (We need a European 
Germany. Not a German Europe). Dialogue from the film Ocean’s 8 
furnishes another example with an A-B-B-A-A-B structure: 
 
            Debbie Ocean: These are all Russians. (A)  
 Lou: They’re hackers. (B) 
 Debbie Ocean: Are there no hackers (B) who aren’t Russians? (A) 
 Lou: No. There’s barely any Russians (A) who aren’t hackers. (B) 
Examples can also pertain to people, such as the reflection that 
“Danger hides in beauty, and beauty in danger,” attributed to Belva Plain -- 
or the Russian theatre director and acting teacher Konstanin Stanislavski’s 
suggestion to “Любите искусство в себе, а не себя в искусстве” (Love the 
art in yourself, not yourself in the art). Stanislavski’s recommendation about 
art seems to have overlaps with the one-way type, this time with a 
proposition placed alongside its negation. Several other part-whole examples 









the permutated elements are in part-whole relationships.   
            Comparison between the constituents of other objects or places likely 
finds a basis in comparing the constituents of the self and embodied 
cognition. The recognition of self-as-other, and proprioceptive processing of 
touching one’s left hand with the right hand might influence how humans 
represent part-whole relationships through language. Pelkey (2017) argues 
this in his recent work—that the ability to compare more broadly stems from 
making comparisons of the body—across the sagittal plane, and between 
the hands. He examines the possibility that in evolution, developing the 
ability to make these most basic comparisons was antecedent to and an 
incitation in generating language. 
 
 
Part-wholes: A is part of B, and B is part of A; or A somehow describes or is 
a possession of B, and B describes or is a possession of A 
1. “Любите искусство в себе, а не себя в искусстве” 
English Translation: “Love the art in yourself, not yourself in the art”      





- Anis Mansour, Egyptian writer 
 
English translation: “The Pessimist: A rose has thorns. The Optimist: 









(Translator and compiler of Arabic quotes: Ayeshah. 
Arabicquotes.co.uk).  
 
3. “Wir brauchen ein europaisches Deutschland. Wir brauchen kein 
deutsches Europa” – Gregor Gysi, German politician  
English translation: We need a European Germany, not a German 
Europe. 
 
4. “Most countries have armies, but in Pakistan the army has a country.” 
– The Economist/Economist.com 
5. “Le langage est une peau: je frotte mon langage contre l’autre. 
Comme si j’avais des mots en guise de doigts, ou des doigts au bout 
de mes mots. Mon langage tremble de désir” – Roland Barthes, from 
Fragments d’un Discours Amoureux  
English translation: Language is a skin: I rub my language against 
the other. As if I had words instead of fingers, or fingers at the tips of 
my words. My language trembles with desire. 
6. “En mistök eru hluti af skapandi hugsunarferli og ef bú ert að reyna að 
skapa eitthvað nýtt gerir bú fjölda mistake” – Jón Gnarr, Icelandic actor 
English translation: But mistakes are part of a creative thinking 
process and if you try to create something new, you make a lot of 
mistakes. 
7. “Ea invasit homines habendi cupido, ut possideri magi squam 
possidere videantur” – Pliny the Younger 
English translation: “The lust of lucre has so totally seized upon 
mankind, that their wealth seems rather to possess them, than they to 
possess their wealth.”   
8. “Kai ba ya wuce wuya wuya bay a wuce kai” – , Unknown, Hausa 
proverb 
English translation: The head cannot pass the neck, nor the neck 
the head. 
 
From: Jang, Tae-Sang. 2002. “Aspects of Poetic Balance and 
Cohesion in Hausa Proverbs.” Journal of African Cultural Studies 
15(2), 215-236. 
 
English interpretation: The author of the article does not offer up an 
explanation of the proverb, but as these are parts of the body, the 
part/whole relation is clear.  
9. “Απ' αγκάθι βγαίνει ρόδο κι από ρόδο βγαίνει αγκάθι” – Unknown, 
Greek proverb 










10. “  
- Unknown, Tibetan proverb 
 
English translation: In a law-abiding kingdom, the king should 
command but once; too many commands will only make a king lose 
his kingdom.  




These ABBA sentences are similar to a logical exclusive disjunction, defining 
conditions in which elements “A” and “B” hold no overlaps. The English 
sentence, “Winners never quit and quitters never win” is one famous 
example. One cannot be a winner and quitter at the same time. The 
examples located in the chart are very similar in structure and therefore 
require little exposition. These examples could be expressed with logic as: 
    or  p v ~p = T 
 
 
Exclusions: A excludes B, and B excludes A 
1. “Winners never quit, and quitters never win” – Unknown 
2. “知者不言，言者不知”- – Lao Tzu, Chinese philosopher, from The 
Tao Te Ching 
English translation: “He who knows does not speak of it; he who 
speaks does not know it”  
English interpretation: The knowledgeable person isn’t going to 
spread gossip of what he knows.  
3. “Was Hänschen nicht lernt, lernt Hans nimmermehr”  -  Unknown, 
German proverb 









will”    
English interpretation: You can’t teach an old dog new tricks.  
4. “ Пока есть государство, нет свободы. Когда будет свобода, не 
будет государства” – Vladimir Lenin, from The State and Revolution 
English translation: So long as the state exists there is no freedom. 
When there is freedom, there will be no state.  
 
5. “halliddAga kaDle illa; kaDle iddAga hallilla” – Unknown, Kannada 
proverb 
English translation: There are no nuts when one has teeth, and 
there are no teeth when there are nuts. 
English interpretation: When you have money or something you 
want, you’re already too old to enjoy it.  
6. “ 
 
- Abbas Mahmoud Al-Aqqad, Egyptian poet  
English translation: So many words on the tongues of people with 
no meaning, and so many meanings in their heads with no words! 
(Translator and compiler of Arabic quotes: Ayeshah. 
Arabicquotes.co.uk). 
 
7. “Neque enim ingenium sine disciplina aut disciplina sine ingenio 
perfectum artificem potest efficere” – Vitruvius, De architectura, Book 
1, Chapter I, Sec 3 
English translation: For neither talent without instruction nor 
instruction without talent can produce the perfect craftsman. 
8.  
“τὸ φρικωδέστατον οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐθὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς͵ 
ἐπειδήπερ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν͵ ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν͵ ὅταν δὲ ὁ 
θάνατος παρῇ͵ τόθ΄ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν” – Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, 
translated by Robert Drew Hicks 
English translation: Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is 
nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come; and when 
death is come, we are not. 
 
9. “Tout ce qui n’est point prose, est vers; et tout ce qui n’est point vers, 
est prose” – Molière, from Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, 1670, Act II 
Section iv 
English translation: “Everything that is not prose is verse, and 
everything that is not verse is prose.” 
 
10.  Einstaklingsræktin mà ekki vera fólgin í því að rækta eigingirnina – 














These sentences strip the A and B elements of their association and then 
isolate them through the introduction of either an adjectival modifier and/or 
negation modifier. A quote commonly misattributed to Dr. Samuel Johnson 
shows this effect: “Your manuscript is both good and original, but the part 
that is good is not original and the part that is original is not good.”  
 
Dissociations: A dissociates from B, and B dissociates from A   
1. “Your manuscript is both good and original, but the part that is good is 
not original and the part that is original is not good” – a quote 
misattributed to Dr. Samuel Johnson 
2. “La guerre, c’est un massacre de gens qui ne se connaissent pas au 
profit de gens qui se connaissent, mais ne se massacrent pas” – Paul 
Valéry 
English translation: The war is a massacre of people who do not 
know each other for the benefit of people who know each other, but 
do not massacre each other.  
3. “ 
” 
- Abbas Mahmoud Al-Aqqad, Egyptian poet 
 
English translation: Cruelty does not mean power, neither does 
compassion mean weakness; children – the weakest amongst the 
weak – are some of the cruelest in the world.  
 
Notes: This example is more complex, in that it dissociates cruelty 
from power and compassion from weakness, and also builds an 










b. Another Arabic example: 
 
- Yusuf Idris, Egyptian doctor and writer 
English translation: When terrified, a man’s mind may stop and his 
body flee; or, the opposite may happen: his body petrifies and his 
mind flees.  
 




– Sanskrit, from the Panchatantra or Pañcatantram by Vishnu 
Sharma, Verse 325 from Mitra Bheda or the Loss of Friends. Passage 
above from Dr. Naveen Kumar Jha’s Pañcatantram. 
 
English translation: If the king is like a vulture but surrounded by 
swan-like courtiers, he must be served well; if a swan-like king is 




5. “Qui stultis videri eruditi volunt stulti eruditis videntur” – Quintilian, De 
Institutione Oratoria, Book X, Chapter VII, 21 
English translation: Those who wish to seem learned among fools 
are merely regarded as fools among the learned.  
 
6. “Dieser absolute Bereicherungstrieb, diese leidenschaftliche Jagd auf 
den Wert ist dem Kapitalisten mit dem Schatzbildner gemein, aber 
während der Schatzbildner nur der verrückte Kapitalist, ist der 
Kapitalist der rationelle Schatzbildner” – Karl Marx, Das Kapital, 
Chapter 4 
English translation: This absolute enrichment instinct, this 
passionate hunt for value, is common to the capitalist and the 









is the rational hoarder.  
 
7. “; תומכח ערעייז  ןרעטלע  יד  ןלייצרעד  גנוי  ןענַײז  רעדניק  יד  ןעוו   
 . ןטַײקשירַאנ ערעייז  רעדניק  יד  ןלייצרעד  טלַא  ןענַײז  ןרעטלע  יד  ןעוו   
 
“Ven di kinder zaynen yung dertseyln di eltern zeyere khokhmes; ven 
di eltern zaynen alt dertseyln di kinder zeyere narishkaytn” 
- Unknown, in Hebrew and Yiddish, Yiddish proverb 
 
(Shared by Johanna Kovitz of YiddishWit.com and originally taken 
from the text Der Oyster fun der Yidisher or The Thesaurus of the 
Yiddish Language by linguist Nahum Stutchkoff)  
 
English translation: When children are young, their parents talk 
about how smart they are; when parents are old, their children talk 




る。  ”- Unknown, Japanese proverb 
English translation: Feed a dog for three days and he will remember 
your kindness for three years. Feed a cat for three years and she will 
forget your kindness after three days. 
 
This translation in The Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs, edited by 
Jennifer Speake and J.A. Simpson.  
 
9. “Neg rich se milat, milat pòv se neg” – Unknown, Haitian proverb 
English translation: The rich black is a milat, the poor milat is a 
black. 
[*Milat is a term referring to both color and class—denoting lighter 
skinned Haitians who are upper class].  
 
10.  “       
.   - Unknown, Tibetan proverb 
                  English translation: Less comprehension, more pride; more  
                 comprehension, less pride.  
 













It is noteworthy that although all of the types are on some level comparative, 
there is a type that does not overtly compare. The combinative type occurs 
when at least one of the elements is polysemous, or where there is simply a 
listing effect. These sentences are often attended by the conjunction and, 
which contributes to creating a message with dual segments that would be 
independently coherent. There is a striking effect when they are taken 
together, however; the complex example by Twitter user @cl425 poetically 
illustrates this with the lines,  
 
“At night she played to the beat of Market Street; by day she played the 
market to beat the street” - Twitter user @cl425 
 
All of the elements in the reversal are polysemous. Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) explores how one of the ways that polysemy develops is through 
metaphorical mapping—taking a word from its source domain and applying it 
to a new target domain on the basis of some commonalities between them. 
In the case of the example above, “Market Street” refers to a literal street, 
whereas “the street” in the second clause refers to homelessness. In the first 
clause, “beat” is a noun that signifies a pulsing or drumming noise; in the 
second clause, it is a verb that expresses to overcome.  
                In the combinative type, the comparisons can therefore be more 









conducted an investigation of polysemy, and determined that the evolution of 
word meanings through metaphorical mapping is highly systematic. Their 
findings revealed that externality is the strongest predictor accounting for the 
majority of 5000 metaphorical mappings that they studied. Externality 
describes how words referring to external features of objects in the world 
become applied to internal aspects of sense, feeling or personality. A good 
example is the word hardness, which applies to the solidity and 
impenetrability of objects. Through a metaphorical mapping, hardness 
became exapted from its usage as a descriptor of an external object to a 
descriptor of a more internal attribute – someone’s personality or way of 
behaving. In the Market Street example, this progression can be noted: the 
term beat originally designated hitting or lashing, and was later extended to 
refer to the noise associated with the action. The more abstract sense of 
“beat” (i.e. to overcome) derives from these other usages. The same holds 
true for the literal referent “Market Street” and the metonymic use of the word 
street to allude to homelessness.15 There are also combinative examples 
that do not include polysemous elements, although there can still be an 
identity shift of one of the elements, brought on by the addition of new terms. 
One such example is an Igbo proverb that declares, “Dibia gworo ozo mana 
ozo gburu dibia” (An herbalist cured a certain disease, and another disease 
killed the herbalist). The term disease has not changed, but it has two 
different referents due to the addition of the preposition another.  
                                               
15 The chiastic reversal pivots on the terms (A) beat and (B) market, but “street” is also a crucial but complicating element – 










Combination: AB and BA, or A and B; B and A  
 
1. “Je lève mon verre au beau sexe des deux hémisphères, et aux deux 
hémisphères du beau sexe” – attributed to Marquis de Bièvres 
English translation: I raise my glass to the fair sex of both 
hemispheres, and to both hemispheres of the fair sex.  





- Qu’ran, 30:19 
English translation: He brings the living out of the dead, and brings the 
dead out of the living [and brings to life the earth after its lifelessness. 
And thus you will be brought out]. (Abdul-Raof, 2006, 247).  
3. “Essendo adunque un Principe necessitato sapere bene usare la 
bestia, debbe di quella pigliare la volpe e il lione; perchè il lione non si 
defende da’ lacci, la volpe non si defende da’ lupi” – Machiavelli, The 
Prince, Capitolo 18 
English translation: “A prince being thus obliged to know well how to 
act as a beast should imitate the fox and lion, the lion cannot protect 
himself from snares, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves.” 
 
4. “Architect, n. One who drafts a plan of your house, and plans a draft of 
your money” – Ambrose Bierce  
5. “Dibia gworo ozo mana ozo gburu dibia” – Unknown, Igbo proverb 
English translation: An herbalist cured a certain disease and another 
disease killed the herbalist. 
(Isidienu, Department of Igbo, African & Asian Studies at Nnamdi 
Azikiwe University, Awka) 
English interpretation: Nobody will be able to know everything; there 






- Mao Tse-tung, The Little Red Book, Chapter 2; first appeared in 
Interview with Three Correspondents from the Central News Agency, 









English translation: We should support whatever our enemies 
oppose, and oppose whatever our enemies support.   
7.  
“ ” 
“Az ikh nem a trunk bronfn ver ikh an ander mentsch, un der anderer vil 
oykh a trunk bronfn”  
 
- Unknown, in Hebrew and Yiddish, Yiddish proverb 
 
(Shared by Johanna Kovitz of YiddishWit.com and originally taken from 
the text Der Oyster fun der Yidisher or The Thesaurus of the Yiddish 
Language by linguist Nahum Stutchkoff)  
 
English translation: When I take a drink I become another person, and 
the other person wants a drink, too.  
 
8. “ ” – Unknown, Hausa 
proverb 
English translation: Love yourself, another will hate you; hate 
yourself, another will love you. 
From: Jang, Tae-Sang. 2002. “Aspects of Poetic Balance and 
Cohesion in Hausa Proverbs.” Journal of African Cultural Studies 
15(2), 215-236. 
9. “Àgùtàn tó bá bá ajá rìn á jẹ ìgbẹ́, ajá tó bá bá ewúrẹ́ rìn á jẹ èpo iṣu.” –
Unknown, Yorùbá proverb 
English translation: A sheep that moves with dogs will eat feces and 
a dog that moves with goats will eat yam peelings.  
English interpretation: One’s behaviors reflect the behaviors of those in 
whom you spend your company.  
10. “ 
  
- Jubran Khaleel Jubran  
 
English translation: The sea never sleeps, and in the sleeplessness of 
the sea is a consolation to a soul that never sleeps.   














explicitly comparative type. Each sentence of this type includes qualifiers 
like “better,” “worse,” “more than” – or other added terms that make for a 
clear-cut ranking between the elements as options. Overall, the “AB” and 
“BA” elements in these sentences also seem to encompass a range of 
possible circumstances that have been reduced down to form strong 
generalizations about courses of action or people. Donald Tusk’s Address to 
the European Committee of the Regions in October 2017 contains the 
following example: “Because the force (A) of arguments (B) is always better 
than the argument (B) of force (A).” In the previous types, it was easy to 
distinguish how the clauses in a given sentence could be separated into two 
statements that were by themselves comprehensible. The comparative type, 
on the other hand, relies on the interaction between all of the elements to 
transmit the claim. In the above example, the term “force” is polysemous, 
with two different referents. Many other sentences of this type are more 
direct, and utilize monosemous A and B elements. A quote perhaps 
misattributed to Max Hennessy supplies an example, stating, “Lieber ein 
Ende mit Schmerzen als Schmerzen ohne Ende” (Dearer an end with pain 
than pain without end). A line from the novel Metella by George Sand serves 
as another exemplification: “La vie ressemble plus souvent à un roman qu’un 
roman ne ressemble à la vie” (Life resembles a novel more often than novels 
resemble life). Some examples do not include qualifiers to rank the elements, 
or to indicate some greater frequency of occurrence. The following Russian 









situational factors: “Молодец́ прот́ив овец́, а прот́ив молодца ́-- и сам 
овца”́ (A brave fellow against a lamb, but against a brave fellow – he is the 
lamb itself).  
 
Comparisons: A and B are better than B and A; or A and B are worse than 
B and A; or some form of ranking or measurement exists between two 
elements A and B  
 
1. “Lieber ein Ende mit Schmerzen als Schmerzen ohne Ende” – 
Unknown, German proverb 
English translation: Dearer an end with pain than pain without end. 
 
Another German example: “Allein ist besser als mit Schlecten im 
Verein: mit Guten im Verein, ist besser als allein” – Unknown, German 
proverb 
English translation: Better to be alone than in bad company: and 
being in good company is better than being alone. 
 
2. “Formidabilior cervorum exercitus, duce leone, quam lenonum cervo”  
Unknown, Latin proverb 
English translation: An army of stags would be more formidable 
commanded by a lion than one of lions commanded by a stag. 
3. “Молоде́ц про́тив ове́ц, а про́тив молодца́ -- и сам овца́” – Unknown, 
Russian proverb 
English translation: A brave fellow against a lamb, but against a 
brave fellow – he is the lamb itself. 
4. “Aon ghlainne, chan fheàirrde ‘s cha mhiste. Dà ghlainne, ‘s fheàirrde 
‘s cha mhiste. Trì glainneachan s’ miste ‘s chan fheàirrde.” – 
Unknown, Gaelic proverb from Caithness  
 
Translated by the Scottish Gaelic broadcaster Ruairidh MacIlleathain, 
from “Camhairle Ghallach (Litir Bheag 243)” – Learngaelic.scot  
 
English translation: One glass, not the better of it and not the worse 
of it. Two glasses, the better of it and not the worse of it. Three 










5. “是故勝兵先勝，而後求戰；敗兵先戰，而後求勝” – Sun Tzu, Art of 
War 
English translation: Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, 




- Abbas Mahmoud Al-Akkad, Egyptian writer 
English translation: If Death surprises me at anytime I will shake 
hands with him; I don’t fear Death as much as I fear illness…illness is 
an unbearable humiliating pain. But Death ends everything.  
 
(Translator and compiler of Arabic quotes: Ayeshah. 
Arabicquotes.co.uk). 
7. “Because the force of arguments is always better than the argument 
of force” – Donald Tusk, Address to the European Committee of the 
Regions, October 10, 2017 
 
8. “La vie ressemble plus souvent à un roman qu’un roman ne 
ressemble à la vie” – George Sand, Metella, Chapter 1  




  ھنیرش ایند ال ئو@ رت ؛ھنیرپ ھل ایند ،هړز ھل ېئو@
- Unknown, Pashto Proverb (Thorburn, 1876) 
      English translation: A son is from the heart, wealth from the liver;    
      wealth is dearer than a son 
English interpretation: The author does not offer an explanation of 






“Beser redn mit a yidene un trakhtn vegn got eyder redn mit got un 
trakhtn vegn a yidene.”  










(Shared by Johanna Kovitz of YiddishWit.com and originally taken 
from the text Der Oyster fun der Yidisher or The Thesaurus of the 
Yiddish Language by linguist Nahum Stutchkoff) 
 
English translation: It’s better to talk to a woman and think about 






This chiastic sentence type includes carefully placed negation like don’t and 
not. One such example comes from Confucius, Analects, Xue Er 16:  
子曰：不患人之不己知，患不知人也。  “I will not be afflicted at men’s (A) not 
knowing me (B); I will be afflicted that I (B) do not know men (A).”  
 
Taken together, this arrangement includes two clauses, with the second 
clause bearing all of the characteristics of a propositional statement, and the 
first clause bearing the characteristics of a negation—except they are not 
featured alongside the proposition or negation for which they are pairs. The 
absent proposition of the first clause would be: “I will be afflicted at men’s not 
knowing me,” to pair with its negation, “I will not be afflicted at men’s not 
knowing me.” The second clause could be taken as a proposition, “I will be 
afflicted that I do not know men,” and the absent negation would be: “I will 
not be afflicted that I do not know men.” Within the combination of these 
expressions are the more basic conditions: “I will be afflicted”/”I will not be 
afflicted” and “men’s not knowing me”/”I do not know men.”   









effect relationship becomes established in a similar way. Another more 
informal example is a line from the film Mean Girls, “I don’t hate you because 
you’re fat. You’re fat because I hate you.” The absent proposition and 
negation would be: “I hate you because you’re fat”/”You’re not fat because I 
hate you.” Within the context of the scene, this seems to arise as an 
epiphany for the speaker, although it is situated within a flash forward 
moment in which the characters are engaging in a dialogue centered on 
conflict resolution with one another. Still, many of these sentences seem to 
be constructed as responses to counter someone else’s statement, even if a 
specific speaker is not present or nameable. John F. Kennedy’s famous line 
from his 1961 Inaugural address follows this structure, encouraging 
Americans to “Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do 
for your country.” The song Love The One You’re With by Stephen Stills 
offers a different example: “And if you can’t be with the one you love, honey, 
love the one you’re with.” The remaining song lyrics reveal this to be a 
dialogue, in which the singer addresses someone who wishes ardently to be 
with the person he loves, so much so that he seems to be “angry” and “sad” 
due to an inability to woo her. In this instance, the reader or listener has 
access to more context and details of what prompted the singer’s response. 
Overall, examples of this type tend to be one-sided and may include an 










One-way Effects: A affects B, but B does not affect A; or A does not affect 
B, but B affects A 
1. “Не ме́сто кра́сит челове́ка, а челове́к -- ме́сто.” – Unknown, Russian 
proverb 
English translation: It isn’t the place [or “room”] that graces the 
person, but the person the place [or “room”].  
 
2. “Quand on n'a pas ce que l'on aime, il faut aimer ce que l'on a” – 
Roger de Rabutin, Comte de Bussy 
English translation: If we have not the thing we love, then must we 
love the thing we have.  
 
3. “Der Mensch gebärdet sich, als sei er Bildner und Meister der 
Sprache, während doch sie die Herrin der Menschen bleibt” – Martin 
Heidegger 
English translation: Man acts as though he were the shaper and 
master of language, while in fact language remains the master of 
man. 
4.  “子曰：不患人之不己知，患不知人也。 - Confucius, Analects, 
Xue Er 16 
 
English translation: “I will not be afflicted at men’s not knowing me; I will 
be afflicted that I do not know men.”  
 
5.  “I don’t hate you because you’re fat. You’re fat because I hate you.” – 
Mean Girls, American Film  
 
6. “Mal canı kazanmaz, can malı kazanır” – Unknown, Turkish proverb 
English translation: Property will not earn life, but life will earn property.  
English interpretation: Having good health comes before all other things. 
7.  
 
- Yusuf Idris, Egyptian physician and writer 
English translation: I asked her once: Why don’t you think of a goal for 
your life? She said: how can I when my goal in life is to live without thinking? 
 









8.  “…Non i titoli illustrono gli uomini, ma gli uomini i titoli” – Niccolò 
Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, Book 3, Chapter 38 
English translation: It is not titles that make men illustrious, but men who 
do that to titles.  
9. “Alla känner apan, men apan känner ingen.” – Unknown, Swedish proverb 
(Ström, 1981)  
English translation: Everyone knows the monkey, but the monkey knows 
no one.  
English interpretation: Famous people are known by all, but they don’t 
know everyone else.  
10.  “ هوی ھپ  لس  ھن  ،يZیک  ېلرل  ولس  ھپ  وی  ” – Unknown, Pashto 
proverb (Thorburn, 1876) 
English translation: One can be kept well by a hundred, not a hundred 
by one.  
English interpretation: The author does not provide an explanation of 
the proverb; however, the one-way relationship is clear through use of the 
negating term “not.” 
 
Multiple Effects 
Chiastic sentences of this type reveal mutually influencing or reciprocal 
relationships. Below is an example from John F. Kennedy’s 1963 Televised 
Address on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty:  
 
“Each increase of tension (A) has produced an increase of arms (B); each 
increase of arms (A) has produced an increase of tension (B).”  
 
Ronald Reagan would later express a similar sentiment in his Address to the 
41st Session of the United Nations General Assembly: “Nations don’t mistrust 
each other because they armed; they are armed because they mistrust each 
other.” This reciprocal type is not exclusive to political speeches or proverbs; 
they are pervasive in pop culture and found in informal contexts, such as on 









Swift’s song Look What You Made Me Do: “I don’t trust nobody, and nobody 
trusts me.” A number of examples explicitly refer to a subject or agent, which 
is not outrightly unusual or striking in an active sentence. Predictably, they 
have a content pertaining to interpersonal relationships; however, some such 
examples which incorporate inanimate objects will assign them human 
attributes, as in the Scottish Gaelic proverb: “Tuig thus’ an t-eathar, ‘s tuigidh 
an t-eather thu” (Understand the boat and the boat will understand you). 
Benjamin Franklin’s Poor Richard’s Almanack contains another similar case: 
“Keep care of thy shop and thy shop will keep care of you.” There are 
examples that are not overtly of an interpersonal nature, but still show a 
bidirectional flow of causation.  
 
Multiple Effects: A affects B, and B affects A; or A affects B and B affects A; 
can also include more elaborate reversals with repeating C, D, E elements  
 
1. “Cười người hôm trước, hôm sau người cười” – Unknown, Vietnamese 
proverb 
English translation: Laugh at others today; tomorrow, others will 
laugh at you. 
2. “  
” 
 
– Hillel the Elder, Ethics of the Fathers (Pirkei Avot, Chapter 2, 
Section 6) 
English translation: He also saw a skull floating upon the water. Said 
he to it: Because you drowned others, you were drowned; and those 











3. Né fe’ amor anti che gentil core, né gentil core anti ch’amor natura” – 
Guido Guinizzelli, Italian poet 
English translation: Nature neither created love before the gentle 
heart, nor the gentle heart before love. 
4. “Denka leer gij doende zijt en doende denk dan nog” – Guido Gezelle, 
Dutch writer 
English translation: Think before acting, and while acting still think. 
 
5. “Tuig thus’ an t-eathar, ‘s tuigidh an t-eather thu” – Unknown, Scottish 
Gaelic proverb  
English translation: Understand the boat and the boat will 
understand you. 
English interpretation: Take care to mind your things and in return 
they’ll serve you well.  
 
6. “Wer mit Ungeheuern kämpft, mag zusehn, dass er nicht dabei zum 
Ungeheuer wird. Und wenn du lange in einen Abgrund blickst, blickt 
der Abgrund auch in dich hinein” – Friedrich Nietzsche, from Jenseits 
von Gut und Böse  
English translation: He who fights with monsters should look to it 
that he himself does not become a monster. And when you gaze long 
into the abyss, the abyss also gazes into you.  
7. “I don’t trust nobody and nobody trusts me” – Taylor Swift, Lyrics to 
the song Look What You Made Me Do  
 
8. “Ἐγγὺς μὲν ἡ σὴ περὶ πάντων λήθη, ἐγγὺς δὲ ἡ πάντων περὶ σοῦ λήθη” – 
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book VII, 21 
English translation: Soon you will have forgotten everyone, and 
soon everyone will have forgotten you.  
 
9.  
- The Romance of Three Kingdoms, attributed to Luo Guanzhong 
English translation: The world under heaven, after a long period of 
division, tends to unite; after a long period of union, tends to divide. 
10. “Qui craint de souffrir, souffre déjà de ce qu’il craint” – Michel de 
Montaigne, Essais, livre 3 
English translation: Whosoever fears suffering already suffers from 












Chiasmus and Comparison 
 
Chiasmus is a vehicle for comparison, and in some ways covers more 
ground than both metonymy and metaphor. In the opening pages of Geary’s 
book on metaphor (2011), he notes that the poet Rimbaud pursued a 
“systematized disorder” for his poetic program. For Rimbaud, “the poet 
needed to see similarity (A) in difference (B) and difference (B) in similarity 
(A)” (2). Although Geary does not point out the chiasmus here, this is an 
effect that chiasmus also achieves by degrees. The chiastic examples in the 
charts above describe whether and how two elements may co-exist, as well 
as cause and effect relationships between elements. Four types highlight 
some similarity between A and B (i.e. the Equalizations, Part-wholes, 
Combinations and Multiple Effects types), and four types highlight some 
difference between A and B (i.e. Exclusions, Dissociations, Comparisons, 
and One-Way Effects). The categorizations of “same” and “different” (or “this” 
and “that,” if we are comparing to Wittgenstein) seem to prevail. Yet while 
these syntactic chiastic types might seem structurally as rigid as a child’s 
block puzzle, the elements that fit into the intractable wooden slots are 
incredibly malleable. The examples that fall into any one category are still 
quite different. Although putting these examples in categories is helpful for 
examining the chiastic form cross-linguistically, it unfortunately entails 









Fodor and Pylyshyn’s example “John loves Mary” and “Mary loves 
John” would belong to the last categorization of Multiple Effects. Many 
sentences with a subject and a direct object would fall into this category, but 
sub-types should exist to encompass multiple effects. Perhaps even further 
delineations are needed between abstract terms like “love” which have 
layers of complexity, and terms that refer to events or material circumstances 
in the world (i.e. “John kisses Mary” and “Mary kisses John”). It must be 
recognized that the term systematic, at least in regards to language, is also 
taken to be a descriptor of sentences or representations that do not have to 
be perfect reversals, but do incorporate the same elements (i.e. “John ate a 
banana,” “Mary ate a banana,” and “John and Mary both ate bananas”). The 
definition of systematic, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is “done 
or acting according to a fixed plan or system.”  
Applying this terminology to the subject of language and cognition, 
however, may be to completely misapprehend the flexible and ever-changing 
aspects of language usage: effective communication may depend in some 
part on an adherence to a methodological use of common forms and figures. 
But successful and memorable communication relies on more than following 
along with convention and formality. Language is just as fixed as it is 
unrestrained, and the challenge for those in Artificial Intelligence, for 
example, is to find the appropriate and humanlike balancing act that takes 
place between the two. Examining chiastic sentences shows the importance 









structures, inventive expression flourishes.  
Additionally, it must be noted that these chiastic types construct well-
formed sentences, but these sentences are only considered “well formed” 
due to changing elements of grammar, which contribute to the overall 
effect—i.e. verbs, conjunctions, and prepositions. Every example illustrates 
this, although we will focus on only one. The following quote will serve our 
purposes: “People can’t change the truth, but the truth can change people.” 
The reversal in this case pivots on the verb can’t/can, and the conjunction 
but. The point is that these seemingly systematic forms contain other 
structural elements, too, and these slight variations greatly affect meaning. 
Understanding these possible systematic forms may be important when 
considering some potential skills that artificial intelligence would have to 
possess to understand natural language. Below, I will briefly delve into 
current ways of addressing systematicity in artificial intelligence, followed by 
a discussion of chiasmus’ status as a trope and scheme (which has 
important implications related to embodiment and thus artificial intelligence).  
 
 
Implications for Artificial Intelligence  
Language is permutative, even if there are some preferred structures 
and rules that human beings adhere to in composing sentences.  









nuances of how humans innovate even given such restrictions. 
“Systematicity” is a subject that comes out of classical symbolist theories of 
how the human brain has a “language of thought” or symbol system – but it 
is no longer regarded as a plausible explanation of human intelligence; 
however, systematicity of language is still a concern of researchers 
investigating human cognition.  
Chris Eliasmith (2013) and colleagues utilize matrix multiplication to 
contend with systematicity and other “binding problems” that require bringing 
together semantically different parts to construct a new whole. In his program 
Nengo, which is software written in Python, and the accompanying hardware 
SPAUN (a “Semantic Pointer Architecture Unified Network), sentences can 
be input as Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) sequences—or linear, finite 
length vectors. Calculating a circular convolution of two vectors results in a 
more manageable entity—information that can later be decoded to get back 
to the original values. 
 Bayesian and predictive processing models, on the other hand, 
conceive of the brain as anticipating statistical regularities of the 
environment. Following this view, there are regularities and standardizations 
in language that the brain must process and implement in its own 
compositions.  Thus, it might be said that Bayesian predictive processing 
models are already equipped to address systematicity or any system in 









(2006) both connect the Bayes Theorem to argumentation or rhetoric more 
generally. This should be unsurprising, considering the origins of the 
theorem and its connection to inductive reasoning (and therefore 
argumentative reasoning). 
 Thomas Bayes was a reverend, who had read David Hume’s “On 
Miracles,” from An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in which 
Hume ponders miracles, and concludes that they are very uncommon 
events. Bayes’ undertaking was to figure out what evidence a person 
required to determine that an improbable “miracle” had occurred (Pearl 
2018). Bayes’ formula does not successfully account for miracles, but what 
Bayes instead invented was a formula for inductive reasoning. In deductive 
reasoning, a person begins with a guess and works at finding evidence to 
support that guess. With inductive reasoning, the person starts with an 
observation or data and comes to a supporting theory based on that. Below 
is Bayes’ formula:  
 
 
                                                 
 
 










The formula poses the question: what is the probability that a guess is 
true, given some piece of evidence – an observation “B”?   
“P(B|A) represents how much more likely evidence would be if the 
hypothesis turned out to be true rather than false  (if you do in fact have “B” 
given “A”)  
P(A) represents the degree of belief in the hypothesis  
P(B) represents the quality of the evidence”  (Zenker 2012). 
 
This helps in planning ahead, for example, with respect to weather; if 
someone’s cellar tends to flood and the forecast claims it will rain, that 
person might be inclined to check the cellar for rainwater. One important 
facet of the Bayesian research project is that it emphasizes an exploration of 
counterfactuals: it has become important not only to entertain a 
consideration of certain correspondences between events “A” and “B” in the 
world, but to also focus on possibilities that do not occur. If counterfactuals 
are indeed the sounding points that the mind negotiates with in perception 
and cognition, then there may be a need to develop a new view of both logic 
and semantics. In everyday language processing, decoding the meaning of a 
sentence can sometimes depend on possessing the knowledge of other 
possibilities, including logical opposites. For example, a chiastic Vietnamese 
proverb declares, “Cười người hôm trước; hôm sau người cười.” “Laugh 









Here, the second clause is a consequent of the first, and the two clauses 
from the Vietnamese proverb can be considered individually and together. A 
total of three scenarios can be entertained: 
 
1. A situation in which you laugh at others.  
2. A situation in which others laugh at you. 
3. When taken together, a multiple effect: a mutual disrespect.  
 
In spite of the array of available options, the reader needs to glean a further 
permutation from the sentence:  
 
4. You shouldn’t laugh at others, and they shouldn’t laugh at you. 
 
The meaning does not lie in the surface-level coding, but in the reader being 
able to infer this final moral lesson from social knowledge that goes beyond 
the sentence. The meaning is the totality of the possible arrangements, 
compared against each other and ultimately inverted; the takeaway of the 
Vietnamese proverb is the opposite of its superficial reading. The logical 
interpretation of the sentence would be p->q, but properly interpreting the 
sentence depends on the reader’s ability to tease out ~p^~q. Chiastic 
phrases make for a compelling study because of how logical opposites meet 
within them, and because they naturally either hinder or promote an 









artificial intelligence with the ability to decode chiastic phrasing would be 
better equipped to handle the challenges of language interpretation in 
general, given the demands it places on the reader. 
Outside of understanding chiasmus as a syntactical structure, it may 
also serve as an important facet of human cognition for other reasons – 
because of the chiastic structure of vision. The neuroanatomical structure the 
optic chiasma sits in the midbrain, and information from the left eye is 
conveyed to the right side of the brain while the information from the right is 
conveyed to the left. The hemispheres of the body are likewise cross-
configured this way, with the left side of the brain controlling the movements 
of the right and vice versa. These topics will be taken up again at the end of 
the thesis, in the section entitled, Models of the Brain: Metaphors, 
Architectures and Chiastic Applications.  
For now, the discussion will remain on chiasmus as a device in 
language, and how understanding its role as both a trope and scheme has 
important implications for embodiment and how human interpreters make 
meaning in spatially-defined ways more broadly. This carries with it some 
implications about how the study of chiasmus could impact artificial 
intelligence and replicating that meaning-making process. The next section 
in this paper considers how chiasmus compares to other tropes like 
metaphor, which has been demonstrated to tie into embodiment. Bringing 









“linguistic templates,” it is possible to see how both chiasmus and metaphor 
relate to the bodily aspect of balance and destabilization.   
 
Systematicity, Tropes and Schemes 
If chiasmus can be taken to be an effect of systematicity in language, 
then certain tentative observations can be made based upon this short 
survey: chiasmi may show how syntactic parts or elements may permute and 
come together to generate meaningful new articulations, and how more 
generally these syntactical units are capable of interacting in a number of 
previously unexplored and spatially defined ways. George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson (1980) argue that embodiment in the world imbues humans with 
linguistic “templates,” and this investigation of chiasmus might be an 
elaboration of those templates. O’Reilly and Harris (2017) posit that 
chiasmus (and antimetabole more specifically) are linked to the image 
schema of BALANCE. The image schema is a “cognitive entity based on 
relations that are best realized in formal terms, such as containment and 
relative position” (O’Reilly and Harris 2017). Although tropes and image 
schemata are distinctive, and O’Reilly and Harris place metaphor in the 
category of trope while placing chiasmus or antimetabole in the category of 
schema, there are several reasons why this delimitation might fail to 
appreciate how chiasmus helps to build metaphors—and why putting 
chiasmus in one category or another would entail ignoring its essential 









assessment in two respects: he not only views chiasmus as a trope, but one 
that is also incredibly destabilizing. Pelkey (2017) also points out how 
semiotic chiasmus can be destabilizing with his discussion of his hourglass 
type. For Ivo Strecker, “The internal dynamics of chiasmus . . . are very 
different [from metaphor], for the two parts of this trope are characterized not 
by consonance but by dissonance, not by stabilizing resemblance but 
destabilizing antinomy” (77). However, chiastic sentences like, “You are the 
world, and the world is yours” (or in Spanish, “Ustedes son el mundo y el 
mundo es de ustedes” – Twitter User @Sywende) are in fact balancing, as 
O’Reilly and Harris note; and yet there is a metaphor in this sentence which 
rests entirely upon the structure of the chiasmus. The metaphor and 
chiasmus are here inseparable, both as feature and form of the sentence. 
Thus, two conclusions can be drawn: chiasmus is both destabilizing and 
stabilizing, and can fill the role of both trope and schema.  
Across the body of his work, Pelkey seems to endorse this 
perspective, and also relates chiasmus to Fauconnier and Turner’s (2002) 
theories of conceptual blending. Simply defined, conceptual blending occurs 
when an association is drawn through between two radically unlike things, 
with differing frame structures whose identities and inputs are blended. 
Pelkey (2017) argues that the topics of conceptual blending, double scope 
networks and analogic cognition could be better understood through 
chiasmus. Double scope networks involve extracting elements from two 









together to form a third, harmonious entity. Turner (2003) explains this with 
the example of Jesus, who is unsinning – and becomes the sacrificial lamb 
for humanity, who are sinful (13). The crucifixion is the double-scope story or 
frame, involving one who is punished while simultaneously not responsible 
for any misdeeds. Pelkey (2017) argues that there is a grounded mechanism 
for coming up with such stories and conceptual blends—and it is rooted in 
the bodily aspect of possessing arms and legs, and an understanding of 
part-whole relations in the human form (147).  
 The chiastic exchange depends on the relation between two 
elements: they must in the first place be semantically capable of taking each 
other’s places (or alike enough that it would not be confusing to re-arrange 
them when considering the other elements in the sentence). Metaphor can 
also in turn depend in part on a chiastic move being made: in the first case it 
requires concentrating on certain shared qualities of the source and target. 
Black (1962) developed “interaction theory” to explain what occurs in 
metaphor. He uses the pervasive metaphor that “Man is a wolf” to elucidate 
his theory. Geary (2011) gives an account of Black’s “interaction theory” that 
is chiastic, elaborating that, “…in comprehending the ‘Man (A) is wolf (B)’ 
metaphor, what we know of wolves (B) interacts with what we know of man 
(A)” (146). For Black, “a metaphor activates two thoughts of two different 
things at the same time” (Geary 145-146). Black implements several 
metaphors in his own explication, referring to “screens,” which allow another 









similar, but with crucial differences. With metaphor, for instance, it is possible 
to apply the screen of “zoo” to the term “schoolyard”—to say that the “the 
schoolyard is a zoo,” but chiastically reversing such a phrase would make for 
an unsuccessful metaphor. An exchange of knowledge or “interaction” 
between the concept of zoo and schoolyard must still take place for the 
phrase “the schoolyard is a zoo” to be comprehensible, and yet “the zoo is a 
schoolyard” does not inspire the same visual imagery or descriptive thrust.  
          Chiasmus and metaphor are distinct, but they both rely on the 
interpreter’s ability to perform an exchange. For chiasmus, the elements 
must have greater interchangeability: they must be able to slot into the roles 
of the other elements. With metaphor, there is a partial semantic exchange 
that takes place: some aspect of the one element should be compatible with 
and layerable onto an existing aspect of the other element. “The schoolyard 
is a zoo” because of the wild behavior of its occupants, because of the mess 
left in the wake of its occupants or because it is enclosed like a pen. One or 
several of these exchanges can be made—between the children and 
animals, the effects of the activities of children and animals, or the physical 
design of the zoo and schoolyard. Like metaphor, chiasmus achieves a 
complex interaction of elements.  
 
Further Discussion and Conclusions 
Chiastic forms and figures are prevalent in the world and in language. 









speech and text to convince a listener or reader to adopt one point of view 
rather another. It can be seen as a short-form essay, which either rebuts 
other alternative perspectives, or brings them under its jurisdiction. It may 
also show the extent to which two perspectives are compatible or the same. 
X entwines with a history of logic, truth valuation and logical argumentation. 
The structures of chiasmus in some ways overlap with logical structures but 
still remain distinct from them. As a figure, X also has associations with 
Christianity, and the monotheistic ideology that spread, replaced other 
ideologies and shaped the thinking of Europe and ultimately the world. 
           This small survey reveals certain chiastic categories or configurations 
tend to appear cross-linguistically. Withholding judgments about whether or 
not chiasmus accurately characterizes systematicity is prudent, but there 
should be some overlap between these intelligible chiastic permutations and 
any fuller account of systematic forms in language. To investigate this fully, a 
much larger sample would have to be presented and it would be beneficial to 
extend the search to other languages and language families. 16 Chiasmus is 
inherently comparative, and for that reason it can be reductionist: it treats 
sameness and difference, but the many ways it effectuates a comparison is 
remarkable. Even a cursory assessment of chiasmus affirms the variation 
that can arise in such bounded forms. If chiasmus entwines with 
systematicity after all, then it is clear that systematicity does not entail fixity of 
                                               
16 As Pelkey (2013) writes, “countless examples of chiastic patterning appear cross-linguistically in ancient texts from early 
Semitic and Indo-European language families (Welch 1981) to classical Chinese (McLuhan 1972: 6, Lissner 2007:108-
109)….Symmetrical reversals are noted to play a role in the structure of texts at every linguistic level, from the phonological 
and the orthographic to ‘words, sentences, lines, stanzas, chapters, books’ and more (Nänny 1988: 51) - both in ancient and 









order and form, but rather a more loosely delimited structure with ample 
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Appendix: Eight Notable Chiastic Types 
 
Equalizations: A is the same as B, and B is the same as A 
11. “Beauty is truth, truth beauty” – John Keats, English poet, from “Ode 
on a Grecian Urn” 
12. “L’armi, qua l’armi:  io solo / Combatterò, procomberò sol io – 
Giacomo Leopardi, from the poem “All’Italia”  
English translation: The weapons, here the weapons: I’ll fight alone; 
I’ll fall alone. (Or “alone I’ll fall”). 
13.  
“Et rose, elle a vécu ce que vivent les roses” – François de Malherbe, 
French poet 
English translation: And rose, she lived as live the roses  
14. “Was vernünftig ist, das ist Wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist 
vernünftig.” – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, German philosopher, 
from Elements of the Philosophy of Right   
English translation: What is reasonable is real; and what is real is 
reasonable.  
15. “Ustedes son el mundo y el mundo es de ustedes” – User Sebastian 
Y. Wende (@sywende) on Twitter 
English Translation: You are the world, and the world is yours.  
16. “Выбор громадный, но я всё время был так пьян, что бутылки 
принимал за девиц, а девиц за бутылки” – Anton Chekhov, Letter to 
his sister M.P. Chekhov on April 25, 1887 
English Translation: The choice is enormous, but I was so drunk that 
I took the bottles for girls, and the girls for bottles. 
 
17. “Tala med bönder på bönders vis och med de lärde på latin” – 
Unknown, Swedish proverb  
English translation: Speak with farmers as farmers speak, and with 
the educated in Latin. 
 
18. “Kallaik kaNdAl nAyaik kANum, NAyaik kaNdAl kallaik kANum” – 
Unknown, Tamil proverb 
 
English translation: When you see a dog’s figure in the rock you 











19. “Ká lọ́ aṣọ mọ́ ìdí, ká lọ́ ìdí mọ́ aṣọ, kí ìdí ṣáà má ti gbófo” – Unknown, 
Yorùbá proverb 
English translation: Whether we tie a wrapper round the waist or tie 
the waist round a wrapper, to ensure the waist is not naked is what’s 
crucial. 
 
20. “        “  
      
- Unknown, Tibetan proverb 
English translation: It’s a clever thief who keeps finding things, but 
finding things too often makes one a thief.  
 
 
Part-wholes: A is part of B, and B is part of A; or A somehow describes or is 
a possession of B, and B describes or is a possession of A 
11. “Любите искусство в себе, а не себя в искусстве” 
English Translation: “Love the art in yourself, not yourself in the art”      




- Anis Mansour, Egyptian writer 
 
English translation: “The Pessimist: A rose has thorns. The Optimist: 
Thorns have a rose.” 
(Translator and compiler of Arabic quotes: Ayeshah. 
Arabicquotes.co.uk).  
 
13. “Wir brauchen ein europaisches Deutschland. Wir brauchen kein 
deutsches Europa” – Gregor Gysi, German politician  
English translation: We need a European Germany, not a German 
Europe. 
 
14. “Most countries have armies, but in Pakistan the army has a country.” 
– The Economist/Economist.com 
15. “Le langage est une peau: je frotte mon langage contre l’autre. 
Comme si j’avais des mots en guise de doigts, ou des doigts au bout 









Fragments d’un Discours Amoureux  
English translation: Language is a skin: I rub my language against 
the other. As if I had words instead of fingers, or fingers at the tips of 
my words. My language trembles with desire. 
16. “En mistök eru hluti af skapandi hugsunarferli og ef bú ert að reyna að 
skapa eitthvað nýtt gerir bú fjölda mistake” – Jón Gnarr, Icelandic actor 
English translation: But mistakes are part of a creative thinking 
process and if you try to create something new, you make a lot of 
mistakes. 
17. “Ea invasit homines habendi cupido, ut possideri magi squam 
possidere videantur” – Pliny the Younger 
English translation: “The lust of lucre has so totally seized upon 
mankind, that their wealth seems rather to possess them, than they to 
possess their wealth.”   
18. “Kai ba ya wuce wuya wuya bay a wuce kai” – , Unknown, Hausa 
proverb 
English translation: The head cannot pass the neck, nor the neck 
the head. 
 
From: Jang, Tae-Sang. 2002. “Aspects of Poetic Balance and 
Cohesion in Hausa Proverbs.” Journal of African Cultural Studies 
15(2), 215-236. 
19. “Απ' αγκάθι βγαίνει ρόδο κι από ρόδο βγαίνει αγκάθι” – Unknown, 
Greek proverb 
English translation: From a thorn a rose emerges and from a rose a 
thorn. 
20. “  
- Unknown, Tibetan proverb 
 
English translation: In a law-abiding kingdom, the king should 
command but once; too many commands will only make a king lose 
his kingdom.  
(Translator and compiler of Tibetan Proverbs: Lhamo Pemba).  
               
 
 
Exclusions: A excludes B, and B excludes A 
11. “Winners never quit, and quitters never win” – Unknown 
12. “知者不言，言者不知”- – Lao Tzu, Chinese philosopher, from The 
Tao Te Ching 
English translation: “He who knows does not speak of it; he who 
speaks does not know it”  










English translation: “What little Hans didn’t learn, adult Hans never 
will”    
14. “ Пока есть государство, нет свободы. Когда будет свобода, не 
будет государства” – Vladimir Lenin, from The State and Revolution 
English translation: So long as the state exists there is no freedom. 
When there is freedom, there will be no state.  
 
15. “halliddAga kaDle illa; kaDle iddAga hallilla” – Unknown, Kannada 
proverb 
English translation: There are no nuts when one has teeth, and 
there are no teeth when there are nuts. 
16. “ 
 
- Abbas Mahmoud Al-Aqqad, Egyptian poet  
English translation: So many words on the tongues of people with 
no meaning, and so many meanings in their heads with no words! 
(Translator and compiler of Arabic quotes: Ayeshah. 
Arabicquotes.co.uk). 
 
17. “Neque enim ingenium sine disciplina aut disciplina sine ingenio 
perfectum artificem potest efficere” – Vitruvius, De architectura, Book 
1, Chapter I, Sec 3 
English translation: For neither talent without instruction nor 
instruction without talent can produce the perfect craftsman. 
18.  
“τὸ φρικωδέστατον οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐθὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς͵ 
ἐπειδήπερ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν͵ ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν͵ ὅταν δὲ ὁ 
θάνατος παρῇ͵ τόθ΄ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν” – Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, 
translated by Robert Drew Hicks 
English translation: Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is 
nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come; and when 
death is come, we are not. 
 
19. “Tout ce qui n’est point prose, est vers; et tout ce qui n’est point vers, 
est prose” – Molière, from Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, 1670, Act II 
Section iv 
English translation: “Everything that is not prose is verse, and 
everything that is not verse is prose.” 
 
20.  Einstaklingsræktin mà ekki vera fólgin í því að rækta eigingirnina – 
Þórarinn Björnsson, Icelandic Educator 














Dissociations: A dissociates from B, and B dissociates from A   
11. “Your manuscript is both good and original, but the part that is good is 
not original and the part that is original is not good” – a quote 
misattributed to Dr. Samuel Johnson 
12. “La guerre, c’est un massacre de gens qui ne se connaissent pas au 
profit de gens qui se connaissent, mais ne se massacrent pas” – Paul 
Valéry 
English translation: The war is a massacre of people who do not 
know each other for the benefit of people who know each other, but 
do not massacre each other.  
13. “ 
” 
- Abbas Mahmoud Al-Aqqad, Egyptian poet 
 
English translation: Cruelty does not mean power, neither does 
compassion mean weakness; children – the weakest amongst the 
weak – are some of the cruelest in the world.  
 
Notes: This example is more complex, in that it dissociates cruelty 
from power and compassion from weakness, and also builds an 
association between weakness and cruelty.  
 
b. Another Arabic example: 
 
- Yusuf Idris, Egyptian doctor and writer 
English translation: When terrified, a man’s mind may stop and his 
body flee; or, the opposite may happen: his body petrifies and his 














– Sanskrit, from the Panchatantra or Pañcatantram by Vishnu 
Sharma, Verse 325 from Mitra Bheda or the Loss of Friends. Passage 
above from Dr. Naveen Kumar Jha’s Pañcatantram. 
 
English translation: If the king is like a vulture but surrounded by 
swan-like courtiers, he must be served well; if a swan-like king is 




15. “Qui stultis videri eruditi volunt stulti eruditis videntur” – Quintilian, De 
Institutione Oratoria, Book X, Chapter VII, 21 
English translation: Those who wish to seem learned among fools 
are merely regarded as fools among the learned.  
 
16. “Dieser absolute Bereicherungstrieb, diese 
leidenschaftliche Jagd auf den Wert ist dem Kapitalisten mit dem 
Schatzbildner gemein, aber während der Schatzbildner nur der 
verrückte Kapitalist, ist der Kapitalist der rationelle Schatzbildner” – 
Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Chapter 4 
English translation: This absolute enrichment instinct, this 
passionate hunt for value, is common to the capitalist and the 
hoarder, but while the hoarder is only the crazy capitalist, the capitalist 
is the rational hoarder.  
 
17. “; תומכח ערעייז  ןרעטלע  יד  ןלייצרעד  גנוי  ןענַײז  רעדניק  יד  ןעוו   
 . ןטַײקשירַאנ ערעייז  רעדניק  יד  ןלייצרעד  טלַא  ןענַײז  ןרעטלע  יד  ןעוו   
 
“Ven di kinder zaynen yung dertseyln di eltern zeyere khokhmes; ven 
di eltern zaynen alt dertseyln di kinder zeyere narishkaytn” 
- Unknown, in Hebrew and Yiddish, Yiddish proverb 
 
(Shared by Johanna Kovitz of YiddishWit.com and originally taken 
from the text Der Oyster fun der Yidisher or The Thesaurus of the 










English translation: When children are young, their parents talk 
about how smart they are; when parents are old, their children talk 




る。  ”- Unknown, Japanese proverb 
English translation: Feed a dog for three days and he will remember 
your kindness for three years. Feed a cat for three years and she will 
forget your kindness after three days. 
 
This translation in The Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs, edited by 
Jennifer Speake and J.A. Simpson.  
 
19. “Neg rich se milat, milat pòv se neg” – Unknown, Haitian proverb 
English translation: The rich black is a milat, the poor milat is a 
black. 
[*Milat is a term referring to both color and class—denoting lighter 
skinned Haitians who are upper class].  
 
20.  “       
.   - Unknown, Tibetan proverb 
                  English translation: Less comprehension, more pride; more  
                 comprehension, less pride.  
 






Combinations: AB and BA, or A and B; B and A  
11. “Je lève mon verre au beau sexe des deux hémisphères, et aux deux 
hémisphères du beau sexe” – attributed to Marquis de Bièvres 
English translation: I raise my glass to the fair sex of both 
hemispheres, and to both hemispheres of the fair sex.  














English translation: He brings the living out of the dead, and brings the 
dead out of the living [and brings to life the earth after its lifelessness. 
And thus you will be brought out]. (Abdul-Raof, 2006, 247).  
13. “Essendo adunque un Principe necessitato sapere bene usare la 
bestia, debbe di quella pigliare la volpe e il lione; perchè il lione non si 
defende da’ lacci, la volpe non si defende da’ lupi” – Machiavelli, The 
Prince, Capitolo 18 
English translation: “A prince being thus obliged to know well how to 
act as a beast should imitate the fox and lion, the lion cannot protect 
himself from snares, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves.” 
 
14. “Architect, n. One who drafts a plan of your house, and plans a draft of 
your money” – Ambrose Bierce  
15. “Dibia gworo ozo mana ozo gburu dibia” – Unknown, Igbo proverb 
English translation: An herbalist cured a certain disease and another 
disease killed the herbalist. 
(Isidienu, Department of Igbo, African & Asian Studies at Nnamdi 





- Mao Tse-tung, The Little Red Book, Chapter 2; first appeared in 
Interview with Three Correspondents from the Central News Agency, 
the Sao Tang Pao and the Hsin Min Pao from September 16, 1939 
English translation: We should support whatever our enemies 
oppose, and oppose whatever our enemies support.   
17.  
“ ” 
“Az ikh nem a trunk bronfn ver ikh an ander mentsch, un der anderer vil 
oykh a trunk bronfn”  
 
- Unknown, in Hebrew and Yiddish, Yiddish proverb 
 
(Shared by Johanna Kovitz of YiddishWit.com and originally taken from 
the text Der Oyster fun der Yidisher or The Thesaurus of the Yiddish 
Language by linguist Nahum Stutchkoff)  
 
English translation: When I take a drink I become another person, and 
the other person wants a drink, too.  
 
18. “ ” – Unknown, Hausa 
proverb 









yourself, another will love you. 
From: Jang, Tae-Sang. 2002. “Aspects of Poetic Balance and 
Cohesion in Hausa Proverbs.” Journal of African Cultural Studies 
15(2), 215-236. 
19. “Àgùtàn tó bá bá ajá rìn á jẹ ìgbẹ́, ajá tó bá bá ewúrẹ́ rìn á jẹ èpo iṣu.” –
Unknown, Yorùbá proverb 
English translation: A sheep that moves with dogs will eat feces and 
a dog that moves with goats will eat yam peelings.  
20. “ 
  
- Jubran Khaleel Jubran  
 
English translation: The sea never sleeps, and in the sleeplessness of 
the sea is a consolation to a soul that never sleeps.   







Comparisons: A and B are better than B and A; or A and B are worse than B 
and A; or some form of ranking or measurement exists between two 
elements A and B  
11. “Lieber ein Ende mit Schmerzen als Schmerzen ohne Ende” – 
Unknown, German proverb 
English translation: Dearer an end with pain than pain without end. 
 
Another German example: “Allein ist besser als mit Schlecten im 
Verein: mit Guten im Verein, ist besser als allein” – Unknown, German 
proverb 
English translation: Better to be alone than in bad company: and 
being in good company is better than being alone. 
 
12. “Formidabilior cervorum exercitus, duce leone, quam lenonum cervo”  
Unknown, Latin proverb 
English translation: An army of stags would be more formidable 
commanded by a lion than one of lions commanded by a stag. 
13. “Молоде́ц про́тив ове́ц, а про́тив молодца́ -- и сам овца́” – Unknown, 
Russian proverb 
English translation: A brave fellow against a lamb, but against a 
brave fellow – he is the lamb itself. 
14. “Aon ghlainne, chan fheàirrde ‘s cha mhiste. Dà ghlainne, ‘s fheàirrde 
‘s cha mhiste. Trì glainneachan s’ miste ‘s chan fheàirrde.” – 










Translated by the Scottish Gaelic broadcaster Ruairidh MacIlleathain, 
from “Camhairle Ghallach (Litir Bheag 243)” – Learngaelic.scot  
 
English translation: One glass, not the better of it and not the worse 
of it. Two glasses, the better of it and not the worse of it. Three 
glasses, the worse of it and not the better of it.  
 
15. “是故勝兵先勝，而後求戰；敗兵先戰，而後求勝” – Sun Tzu, Art of 
War 
English translation: Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, 




- Abbas Mahmoud Al-Akkad, Egyptian writer 
English translation: If Death surprises me at anytime I will shake 
hands with him; I don’t fear Death as much as I fear illness…illness is 
an unbearable humiliating pain. But Death ends everything.  
 
(Translator and compiler of Arabic quotes: Ayeshah. 
Arabicquotes.co.uk). 
17. “Because the force of arguments is always better than the argument 
of force” – Donald Tusk, Address to the European Committee of the 
Regions, October 10, 2017 
 
18. “La vie ressemble plus souvent à un roman qu’un roman ne 
ressemble à la vie” – George Sand, Metella, Chapter 1  




  ھنیرش ایند ال ئو@ رت ؛ھنیرپ ھل ایند ،هړز ھل ېئو@
- Unknown, Pashto Proverb (Thorburn, 1876) 
      English translation: A son is from the heart, wealth from the liver;    













“Beser redn mit a yidene un trakhtn vegn got eyder redn mit got un 
trakhtn vegn a yidene.”  
- Unknown, in Hebrew and in Yiddish, Yiddish proverb 
 
(Shared by Johanna Kovitz of YiddishWit.com and originally taken 
from the text Der Oyster fun der Yidisher or The Thesaurus of the 
Yiddish Language by linguist Nahum Stutchkoff) 
 
English translation: It’s better to talk to a woman and think about 





One-way Effects: A affects B, but B does not affect A; or A does not affect B, 
but B affects A 
4. “Не ме́сто кра́сит челове́ка, а челове́к -- ме́сто.” – Unknown, Russian 
proverb 
English translation: It isn’t the place [or “room”] that graces the 
person, but the person the place [or “room”].  
 
5. “Quand on n'a pas ce que l'on aime, il faut aimer ce que l'on a” – 
Roger de Rabutin, Comte de Bussy 
English translation: If we have not the thing we love, then must we 
love the thing we have.  
 
6. “Der Mensch gebärdet sich, als sei er Bildner und Meister der 
Sprache, während doch sie die Herrin der Menschen bleibt” – Martin 
Heidegger 
English translation: Man acts as though he were the shaper and 
master of language, while in fact language remains the master of 
man. 
4.  “子曰：不患人之不己知，患不知人也。 - Confucius, Analects, 
Xue Er 16 
 
English translation: “I will not be afflicted at men’s not knowing me; I will 
be afflicted that I do not know men.”  
 
5.  “I don’t hate you because you’re fat. You’re fat because I hate you.” – 
Mean Girls, American Film  
 
6. “Mal canı kazanmaz, can malı kazanır” – Unknown, Turkish proverb 











- Yusuf Idris, Egyptian physician and writer 
English translation: I asked her once: Why don’t you think of a goal for 
your life? She said: how can I when my goal in life is to live without thinking? 
 
(Translator and compiler of Arabic quotes: Ayeshah. Arabicquotes.co.uk). 
8.  “…Non i titoli illustrono gli uomini, ma gli uomini i titoli” – Niccolò 
Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, Book 3, Chapter 38 
English translation: It is not titles that make men illustrious, but men who 
do that to titles.  
9. “Alla känner apan, men apan känner ingen.” – Unknown, Swedish proverb 
(Ström, 1981)  
English translation: Everyone knows the monkey, but the monkey knows 
no one.  
 
10.  “ هوی ھپ  لس  ھن  ،يZیک  ېلرل  ولس  ھپ  وی  ” – Unknown, Pashto 
proverb (Thorburn, 1876) 
English translation: One can be kept well by a hundred, not a hundred 





Multiple Effects: A affects B, and B affects A; or A affects B and B affects A; 
can also include more elaborate reversals with repeating C, D, E elements  
11. “Cười người hôm trước, hôm sau người cười” – Unknown, Vietnamese 
proverb 
English translation: Laugh at others today; tomorrow, others will 
laugh at you. 
12. “  
” 
 
– Hillel the Elder, Ethics of the Fathers (Pirkei Avot, Chapter 2, 
Section 6) 
English translation: He also saw a skull floating upon the water. Said 









who drowned you, will themselves be drowned.  
 
 
13. Né fe’ amor anti che gentil core, né gentil core anti ch’amor natura” – 
Guido Guinizzelli, Italian poet 
English translation: Nature neither created love before the gentle 
heart, nor the gentle heart before love. 
14. “Denka leer gij doende zijt en doende denk dan nog” – Guido Gezelle, 
Dutch writer 
English translation: Think before acting, and while acting still think. 
 
15. “Tuig thus’ an t-eathar, ‘s tuigidh an t-eather thu” – Unknown, Scottish 
Gaelic proverb  
English translation: Understand the boat and the boat will 
understand you. 
 
16. “Wer mit Ungeheuern kämpft, mag zusehn, dass er nicht dabei zum 
Ungeheuer wird. Und wenn du lange in einen Abgrund blickst, blickt 
der Abgrund auch in dich hinein” – Friedrich Nietzsche, from Jenseits 
von Gut und Böse  
English translation: He who fights with monsters should look to it 
that he himself does not become a monster. And when you gaze long 
into the abyss, the abyss also gazes into you.  
17. “I don’t trust nobody and nobody trusts me” – Taylor Swift, Lyrics to 
the song Look What You Made Me Do  
 
18. “Ἐγγὺς μὲν ἡ σὴ περὶ πάντων λήθη, ἐγγὺς δὲ ἡ πάντων περὶ σοῦ λήθη” – 
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book VII, 21 
English translation: Soon you will have forgotten everyone, and 
soon everyone will have forgotten you.  
 
19.  
- The Romance of Three Kingdoms, attributed to Luo Guanzhong 
English translation: The world under heaven, after a long period of 
division, tends to unite; after a long period of union, tends to divide. 
20. “Qui craint de souffrir, souffre déjà de ce qu’il craint” – Michel de 
Montaigne, Essais, livre 3 
English translation: Whosoever fears suffering already suffers from 


























Merleau-Ponty’s Chiasm: A Theory of Perception  
 
Abstract: One of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s important contributions to 
philosophy is the multi-faceted concept of the chiasm, which appears in the 
unfinished work The Visible and the Invisible. As a term, chiasm has a range 
of rich associations, and in the context of his work has been interpreted in a 
variety of different ways. The following is an argument that Merleau-Ponty’s 
chiasm is a five-fold bodily relation and that a closer reading of his work 
reveals a richer theory of perception. For Merleau-Ponty, the chiasm is a 
defining perceptual logic, rooted in how the eyes form “one sole Cyclopean 
vision” (VI 141) and how the hands or hemispheres each have their own 
tactile sense, but connect and compensate for each other through the body. 
There are three other bodily relations he explores, including the relation 
between world and flesh. Flesh is a primal element, the nonmaterial 
potentiality for things, and all material is chiastically realized through flesh, 
through differentiation and expression. Another bodily relation Merleau-Ponty 
explores is that of social interaction, the dynamic between One and Other, in 
which there is a risk of one view dominating when the chiastic relation is 
ignored. The last is a linguistic relation, with a chiastic chain connecting all 
situational usages of terms and “meaning” is always in flux. Turning to earlier 
texts to further the analysis, the intent is to show the depth and richness of 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory and its applications to present issues in cognitive 
science.   
 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty was a French phenomenologist born in 1908, 
and influenced by prominent figures of the preceding generation like Husserl 
and Heidegger. He had an interest in Gestalt psychology, and his first forays 
into examining the human condition are accomplished through a taking up of 









development,” in which “he moves from analyzing scientific consciousness 
(The Structure of Behavior) to a phenomenological analysis of behavior as 
lived (Phenomenology of Perception)” and then beyond that in The Visible 
and the Invisible. His early work examines an eclectic array of subjects — 
including human behavior and social interaction, perception and mind, and 
linguistic and artistic expression. In his later work, all of these converge as 
the various aspects of a central bodily relation: the chiasm. His unfinished 
text The Visible and the Invisible concerns this pivotal concept. A chiasm 
may refer to any crossing point and the term has been used to define a 
range of phenomena. It is centrally important that, from among the number of 
options that he could have selected to convey the occurrence of an 
intersection or intertwining, Merleau-Ponty chose the chiasm. Merleau-Ponty 
may have derived the term chiasm from its usage in anatomy, where it refers 
to how the optic nerve fibers decussate. 17 Regardless of whether this was 
intentional or not, what he lays out in The Visible and the Invisible is a 
description of binocular vision and the chiastic nature of perception. This will 
be more deeply explored below in the section of this paper on perception, 
but there are several reasons that it may be the case that Merleau-Ponty had 
been attending to the anatomical structures in his use of the term chiasm.    
When Merleau-Ponty died, Descartes’ La dioptrique (1637) was open 
on his desk, an essay on optics that describes how refraction works and 
                                               
17 It is important to note that I am not reducing Merleau-Ponty’s concept of chiasm to just its physical structure. There is an 
explicit description of the optic structure in his text, as well as several references that point to this physical structure being 









discusses the crossing of the optic nerve (Toadvine 2019). Merleau-Ponty 
also referred to Descartes’ repeatedly in his working notes and specifically 
mentions La dioptrique (1637). A sketch by an unknown artist taken from 
Tractatus de homine brings to life the content of Descartes’ work on vision. 
This illustration that accompanied his explanations of the eye and optic nerve 
can be seen below: 
                        
Figure 1. A sketch by an unknown artist from Descartes’ Tractatus de homine (1677), found on page 124. Although 
Merleau-Ponty was reading a different text, La Dioptrique, the descriptions in this essay are of these same optical 
structures. 
 
The chiasm is a literal referent, but also rife with metaphorical extensions. 
The term brings unity and coherence to the work Merleau-Ponty produced 
over the course of his career. Even in his earliest published texts, precursors 
to the chiasm begin to emerge as Merleau-Ponty ponders human behavior, 
grapples with the mind-body dichotomy, considers the special talents of 
artists, ruminates on language, and envisions a new perceptual logic. In 
Merleau-Ponty’s final account, the chiasm signifies the reversibility between 
the perceptible world or the “visible,” and the perceiving subject or “invisible” 
that is consciousness — it is a concept of perception (i.e. vision) and yet 
much more. While Merleau-Ponty devoted his attention to five chief topics in 









accounts for all sensual being and aspects of the senses, beyond visual and 
tactile sensation. As Merleau-Ponty stated early on in the work: “My body 
does not perceive: but it is as if it were built around the perception that 
dawns through it: through its whole internal arrangement, its sensory motor 
circuits…” (VI/9). 18 
 Tracing the development of the chiasm throughout all of Merleau-
Ponty’s texts helps to clarify its purpose. Merleau-Ponty rejected empiricism, 
along with the effort to reduce every phenomenon to certain primitives that 
could be definitively pinned down, but he seems to conceive of the chiasm in 
all of its many extensions as the way of accessing an “ultimate truth” (VI 
155). However, this is not a truth that can be defined with any sort of 
constancy; the laws of identity do not hold, with an object being defined as 
itself and therefore deemed different to all other things. According to 
Merleau-Ponty, there also cannot be a synthesis of the things. There is 
instead the reversibility of the chiasm – which admits of a diversity emerging 
out of the same flesh, or primal element. Flesh is a complex concept that 
requires deeper attention in the sections of this paper that follow, but it is 
through flesh that the chiasm can occur at all. The chiasm involves a process 
that both preserves and separates—it transforms flesh and bestows upon it a 
material presence and alterity. Two beings are knowable to each other, 
                                               
18 Merleau-Ponty said in his working notes, “Each ‘sense’ is a ‘world,’ i.e. absolutely incommunicable for the other senses, and 
yet constructing a something which, through its structure, is from the first open upon the world of the other senses" (217). He 
brings together all of the senses in his description of the chiasm, but his attention throughout The Visible and the Invisible was 
primarily on the visual and the tactile, which he considered separable but ultimately mutually engaged through the chiasm. 
He does not include full chapters on the other senses, or attend to them at length in the way he does with visual and tactile 
sensation. The whole phenomenological tradition that Husserl saw as beginning with Descartes, and which is the starting 










because Other shares a common essence but is not reducible to Self. The 
agent or perceiver also engages with objects by recognizing their stable and 
yet re-combinative properties that come to the fore through flesh.  
Irigaray (1993) and Hughes (2017) have suggested that the 
reversibility of the chiasm refers to the exchangeability or substitutability 
between the perceiver and the object, and the One and Other. This 
reversibility would not allow for a full appreciation of difference. 19  For 
reasons that will be expanded upon below, Merleau-Ponty’s réversibilité 
need not entail the replacement or substitution of an object or individual. 
Even in the réversibilité of an article of clothing, there is the usefulness of its 
distinct sides, if only employed in the manner to which each might have been 
intended. So too, the chiastic reversal may rather be a productive way of 
treating diversity as it pertains to socialization, as well as phenomenology of 
mind and body. It may be a way of escaping the entrapment of the subject-
object and mind-body dichotomies.  Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm arguably 
supplies the “new paradigm” that Mensch (2010) explains was required to 
grant “some continuity allowing us to transition” between world and 
consciousness. Within the editor’s foreword to The Visible and the Invisible, 
Claude Lefort points specifically to a passage that defines the chiasm as the 
“ultimate truth.” Lefort insists that this ultimate truth “upon which The Visible 
and the Invisible comes to an end is also that from which the work draws its 
origin: the truth does not constitute a stopping point” (VI/xxx). The ultimate 
                                               
19 Irigaray is a French feminist philosopher whose research is focused on how language plays a role in the oppression of 









truth must always be imminent, as the world and people change, and 
signification (which is intricately tied up with these objects) must likewise 
shift. This perspective differs drastically from other more common 
approaches in Western philosophy, which deems the vast array of 
phenomena in the physical world as fixed and discoverable through science. 
The chiasm complicates this considerably, not departing from it entirely – but 
proposing a view more wrapped in relativity of the body and its positions in 
space. Closely examining Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the chiasm provides 
several useful insights with respect to understanding embodiment and the 
human condition.  
The chiasm is a complex bodily relation, originating in perception and 
branching to all other aspects of Being. Much of Merleau-Ponty’s work 
discloses an expectation that a cross-disciplinary effort will prevail and 
elucidate the mysteries of the perceptual process, and his concept of chiasm 
represents his last effort to contend with those mysteries. The chiasm refers 
to the nature of the bond between all perceiving and non-perceiving things, 
and also encompasses language and human social engagement. Merleau-
Ponty elaborated on this in his working notes for The Visible and the 
Invisible: “The chiasm is not only a me other exchange (the messages he 
receives reach me, the messages I receive reach him), it is also an 
exchange between me and the world, between the phenomenal body and 









as a thing ends as consciousness of the thing, what begins as a ‘state of 
consciousness’ ends as a thing” (215).   
Re-interpreting this concept and its role in Merleau-Ponty’s theories of 
perception, language and society reveals potential new applications of his 
work, and demonstrates how his theory might complement and augment 
more recent theories of the perceptive mind. Such an exploration of the 
chiasm opens up the possibility of a major paradigm shift and re-envisioning 
of models of the mind. Through metaphorical extensions, the chiasm also 
alters our understanding of linguistic signification and social relationships. 
The chiasm defines five important bodily relations: between the eyes, 
between the arms which engage in touching and touching oneself, between 
Self and World. With social interaction, the chiasm bridges Self with Other, 
and also manifests through linguistic and artistic expression. This work is 
important because Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the chiasm is complex, and 
through interpretations and deeper analysis of its features, it may be possible 
to glean lessons applicable to a wide range of fields, including but not limited 
to cognitive science, linguistics and sociology. It may result in richer theories 
of perception, signification and interpersonal relationships.   
 
On the Chiasm  
In another note for The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty 
asserted that the chiasm finds a basis in human anatomy: “The other’s 









Sartre) is not to be retained. We have to say: Being is this strange 
encroachment by reason of which my visible, although it is not superposable 
on that of the other, nonetheless opens upon it, that both open upon the 
same sensible world------And it is the same encroachment, the same junction 
at a distance, that makes the messages from my organs (the monocular 
images) reassemble themselves into one sole vertical existence and into one 
sole world” (216). This passage concerns the mind-body and me-other 
dichotomies that Merleau-Ponty sought to eliminate, but the other urgently 
important aspect of the chiasm under consideration here is its foundation in 
the organs of sight, and more specifically in the crossing nerve fibers that 
route contralaterally to produce vision. Muller (2017) also briefly calls 
attention to the chiasm as an anatomical referent in an article that shows 
continuity of themes between the The Structure of Behavior (1942) and The 
Visible and the Invisible.  
             What Merleau-Ponty continuously hints at throughout The Visible 
and the Invisible and even in Phenomenology of Perception (1945) is a 
cross-hemispheric process of perception — one that he perhaps could not 
fully articulate at a time prior to more intensive research programs that 
undertook studies of split-brain patients and hemispheric specialization.20 In 
                                               
20 In 1960, Michael S. Gazzaniga began to study with R.W. Sperry at Caltech, and his research on split-brain patients 
represented efforts to better understand the roles of the cerebral hemispheres and their specialized roles in linguistic and 
perceptual processing. Much was already known about this topic, and the role of the left hemisphere in speech production 
and processing.  
In the1800s, the anatomist Broca discovered a region of the brain in the left frontal lobe dedicated to speech production, and 
later the anatomist Wernicke discovered a region in the left temporal lobe dedicated to speech processing. It was noted that 
damage to these crucial areas of the brain resulted in different types of aphasia. For a more complete overview on the history 
of aphasia, see the Handbook of Clinical Neurology, Vol 95. on the History of Neurology, chapter 36 History of aphasia: from 
brain to language by Paul Eling and Harry Whitaker.  Gazzaniga confirmed the importance of the left hemisphere to language 









spite of the fragmentary and incomplete nature of Merleau-Ponty’s work, it is 
possible to piece together his core ideas and find within his writings a more 
elaborate theory of perception, which descriptively points to a “crisscrossing” 
of the “touching and the tangible”  –  “two systems… applied upon one 
another, as the two halves of an orange” (VI/133). The imagery of the orange 
is salient, as an orange in fact contains many segments, but Merleau-Ponty 
divides the fruit into halves to explain not only the relation between the 
touching and the touched, as when one hand caresses another—but also the 
relation between seer and world, the viewer’s “prepossession of the visible” 
(VI/133).21 
            Merleau-Ponty sought an alternative to positivist attempts that tried to 
establish conclusively a primitive relation between me-other, mind-body, and 
the identities of the objects processed as “monocular images”. He also 
turned to specialized sciences and mathematics to inform his 
phenomenology.22 The concept of the chiasm has roots in Euclidean 
geometry and the vesica piscis, which is a structure involving two circles that 
overlap. Merleau-Ponty even goes so far as to describe the “body as a 
visible thing contained within the full spectacle” as a “reciprocal insertion…. 
two circles, or two vortexes, or two spheres, concentric while I live naively, 
and as soon as I question myself, the one slightly decentered with respect to 
                                               
grasping context, and examining the holistic structure of a scene, while the left hemisphere excels with language and 
particular details or parts of a scene.  
21 Within the same paragraph, Merleau-Ponty also reminds us that, “a delimitation of the senses is crude.” Although he 
speaks of two halves and two systems, his imagery with the orange (which has multiple segments) is a subtle way around this 
delimitation (VI/133). 









the other. . . .” (138). The chiasm has a well-defined structure in mathematics 
and anatomy, but for Merleau-Ponty it is not just a rigid structure.  
            Merleau-Ponty presented several key components of the chiasm in 
its perceptive role: 
1) The chiasm is the connector of the visible and the invisible -- it is 
an essential relation bound in flesh. 
2) It deals with the coordination between the two eyes making “one 
sole Cyclopean vision” (141), 
3) and the relation of the hands, which each have their own “tactile 
experience” but connect to “one consciousness” through the body 
(141).  
4) It delineates a relation of logic and language accounting for objects 
and their opposites, without any need for negation,  
5) and this applies also in the case of subject-object distinction—
specifically to the problem of Self and Other.  
Each of these components demands further elaboration. The visible 
and the invisible refer to the perceptual world and the mind, respectively, and 
Merleau-Ponty argued that both are united in the same flesh. By flesh, 
Merleau-Ponty does not simply mean the flesh of the human body, physical 
matter or any type of material; it is an ambiguous concept that invites much 
interpretation. Tentatively, we can liken flesh to a shared essence—the force 
that all things hold in common that permits the chiasm to exist—for its 
exchange to be made at all. The first section of the paper below examines 
some readings of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh, and what follows 
thereafter expands upon the four main facets of the chiasm to articulate 











The Concept of Flesh, the Chiasm and Perception 
 There are many potential interpretations of flesh, as Merleau-Ponty is 
not argumentative or traditional in his way of writing; his often circuitous and 
fragmentary style allows for a wide range of theories as he covers 
perceptual, linguistic and social phenomena. In an introduction to a collection 
of articles on flesh and chiasm, Evans and Lawlor (2000) proposed that flesh 
could be a metaphor for social institutions.  Merleau-Ponty’s application of 
flesh comprises more than intersubjectivity, however: it entwines the 
perceptual and social aspects of experience. Throughout The Visible and the 
Invisible, Merleau-Ponty utilizes flesh primarily in discussions of the natural 
world involving its depth and thickness, but flesh encompasses all that is 
perceptible, including the self; “the presence of the world is precisely the 
presence of its flesh to my flesh, that I ‘am of the world’ and that I am not it” 
(VI 127). Flesh might be taken as the element that self and world mutually 
consist in, and out of which several divergences, offshoots and possibilities 
emerge: the self is just one projection of the flesh, and all of these 
projections are chiastically connected. Mensch (2010) and Muller (2017) 
both define flesh as an element. Dastur (2000) refrained from assigning a 
stable referent to flesh, and yet concluded that it must be the “final notion” 
which “one succeeds in reaching after having traversed every region of 
being” (35). Flesh could be the totality of all living beings and all 
configurations of the world. Given this perspective, Merleau-Ponty’s concept 









principles, and yet he explicitly states in his notes section that the concept of 
flesh is not a hylozoism, even if at times he appears to be suggesting that 
the whole universe is alive and in confluence with itself.  Instead, flesh is 
something other than life—although life can exist through flesh. So, what 
then is flesh, and can a stable referent ever be assigned to this concept? 
 Muller (2017) insists that any account of flesh will have to contend 
with how “the sensible-sentient structures of the human body” can exist 
along with the “autonomy of nature” (188). Any viable explanation of flesh 
must deal with how diversity and distinction arises through its sameness. 
Drake (2005) ponders the issue, considering that for Merleau-Ponty, “While 
the body differentiates itself from the world of objects in terms of our 
experience of it, it must also be of the same order as those objects for 
perception to occur” (57). The chiasm is Merleau-Ponty’s answer to this 
conundrum: it is a relation that both differentiates and individuates flesh while 
binding it. Abram (1996) reasoned that flesh is a “matrix that underlies and 
gives rise to both the perceiver and the perceived as interdependent aspects 
of its own spontaneous activity” (66). Conceptualizing flesh as a matrix or 
grid may be appropriate, given the mathematically based assertions in 
Merleau-Ponty’s note section of The Visible and the Invisible. Muller (2017) 
takes issue with Abram’s overall interpretation, however, claiming that flesh 
as Abram develops it leaves no place for the “necessary divergence that 
makes perception possible,” because Abram treats bodies and world as 









formless but capable of taking on many forms, and it is only clear from 
Merleau-Ponty’s note section how its differentiation is realizable through the 
chiasm. Merleau-Ponty states that, “I call it flesh…in order to say that it is a 
pregnancy of possibles, Weltmöglichkeit (the possible worlds variants of this 
world, the world beneath the singular and the plural), that it is therefore 
absolutely not an object, that the blosse Sache mode of being is but a partial 
and second expression of it” (250). The phrase blosse Sache can be 
translated as the “bare thing” and according to Roberta Lanfredini (2014), it 
is “a unit in itself concluded” or – the sphere of the material thing.23 Blosse 
Sache elicits the shape of an unfinished chiasm—the partial or second 
sphere that projects from another underlying original. It is also noteworthy 
that Merleau-Ponty referred to blosse Sache as a second expression, 
because this idea of a second expression appeared in Merleau-Ponty’s 
earlier works. As Hass and Hass (2000) point out, acts of expression for 
Merleau-Ponty are vital to his treatment of mathematical proofs and his 
notion of truth.  Hass and Hass focus on a crucial passage from the “The 
Cogito” chapter in Phenomenology of Perception, which is relevant in this 
discussion and interpretation of flesh (179). In “The Cogito,” Merleau-Ponty 
wrote about a geometrical theorem of the triangle:   
When I prove a conclusion, I commit the first structure [i.e., the image 
of a triangle] to a second one, the “parallels and secant” structure. 
How is that possible? It is because my perception of the triangle was 
not, so to speak, fixed and dead, for the drawing of the triangle on the 
paper was merely its outer covering; it was traversed by lines of force, 
                                               
23 Lanfredini’s original wording is: “una unita in sé cochiusa” or a unit in itself concluded – and “la sfera della cosa materiale” 









and everywhere in it new directions not traced out yet possible came 
to light. In so far as the triangle was implicated in my hold on the 
world, it was bursting with indefinite possibilities of which the 
construction actually drawn was merely one. The construction 
possesses a demonstrative value because I cause it to emerge from 
the dynamic formula of the triangle. It expresses my power to make 
apparent the sensible symbols of a certain hold on things… It is an act 
of productive imagination. (PP 443/386) 
 
The reason this passage is so striking and pertinent has to do with Merleau-
Ponty’s reference to indefinite possibilities, and how the geometer works 
through a construction of a second structure: there is no “truth” or proof 
realizable in fixity, but instead truth is an effect of perception. These same 
ideas and processes are apparent in Merleau-Ponty’s notations about flesh. 
Hass and Hass remark that, “For Merleau-Ponty, reaching the conclusion of 
a proof, or grasping some essential step along the way, ‘an act of 
expression’ both ‘transcends and transfigures’ the initial situation” (179). This 
transcendence and transfiguration manifest themselves through the chiasm: 
they are an opening and a progression from some possibility of flesh to a 
second expression or projection, and it is all the work of an embodied 
perceiver. Equipped with this view of mathematical proofs, and Merleau-
Ponty’s above clarifications on flesh, it can be concluded that flesh may 
indeed be construed as a matrix or medium, through which the perceiver can 
explore the pregnancy of possibles from his limited vantage point—although 
flesh can never be assigned a stable referent, since flesh by its very nature 
is unstable. These ideas are continuously reiterated in Merleau-Ponty’s early 









regarding how the perceiver engages with these “possibles” and forms a 
second expression or projection. Bannon (2001) defines flesh as a “relational 
ontology,” though it is most than just a “relation between bodies” – it is a 
relation that bodies actively help to construct.  
             As early on as 1942, with the publication of The Structure of 
Behavior, Merleau-Ponty constructed a plausible suggestion of how 
organisms intelligently interface with their world, which would almost appear 
to be in dialogue with the modern theories of perception that shall be 
touched on at the end of this work. Merleau-Ponty wrote of action, perception 
and the importance of the organism maintaining equilibrium, ruminating that, 
“For the most part preferred behavior is the simplest and most economical 
with respect to the task in which the organism finds itself engaged; and its 
fundamental forms of activity and the character of its possible action are 
presupposed in the definition of the structures which will be the simplest for 
it, preferred in it (147). He drew the conclusion that “…the internal 
determinants of this equilibrium are not given by a plurality of vectors, but by 
a general attitude toward the world” and that “…the organism measures the 
action of things upon it and itself delimits its milieu by a circular process 
which is without analogy in the physical world” (148).  In part, Merleau-
Ponty’s puzzling “circular process” may be his fledgling notion of what he will 
eventually call the chiasm, but either way these remarks affirm Merleau-
Ponty’s early commitment to the idea of an organism ascribing structure to 









the body, as it involves the recognition of some initial structure and an 
extracting of information to re-produce and create new structures.24 No two 
human beings produce the same expressions. Merleau-Ponty believed there 
was an individually calibrated system, which he variously discussed in his 
later works as a “system of equivalents” or “system of equivalencies” that 
was responsible for determining how and why each person differs so 
drastically from the next in composing expressions. This he particularly 
applied in his discussions of artists, who painted rich scenes that seemed to 
capture so much more than what could be accessed in the initial spectacle. 
Merleau-Ponty attributed the genius of artists to their bodily experience and 
unique ways of bringing together objects in a picture. In chapter 6 of 
Phenomenology of Perception, entitled “The Body as Expression and 
Speech”, Merleau-Ponty again employed the phrase “system of equivalents” 
in his treatment of “bodily presence” and the identity of objects:  
I am not well able to visualize, in my mind’s eye, the existence of the 
fireplace as the flat projection….On the contrary, I perceive the thing 
in its own self-evident completeness and this is what gives me the 
assurance that, in the course of perceptual experience, I shall be 
presented with an indefinite set of concordant views. The identity of 
the thing through perceptual experience is only another aspect of the 
identity of one’s own body throughout exploratory movements; thus 
they are the same in kind as each other. Like the body image, the 
fireplace is a system of equivalents not founded on the recognition of 
some law, but on the experience of a bodily presence (198).  
             Within Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty deemed the 
                                               
24 Muller (2017) and Landes (2013) both offer compelling evidence of the continuity between Merleau-Ponty’s early work in 
The Structure of Behavior and his later work in The Visible and the Invisible; Muller primarily focuses on “flesh,” whereas 









body to be “a ready-made system of equivalents and transpositions from one 
sense to another” and “the seat or rather the very actuality of the 
phenomenon of expression (Ausdruck)” (273). The first of these passages 
appears to insist that objects are identified through the system of 
equivalents, which is different for each person and depends on bodily 
orientation, while still being more precise than “expression”, in that it implies 
that everyone has a sort of perceptual thesaurus, or perceptual logic, that 
balances or rectifies the diversification of like-objects. The “system of 
equivalents” also entails other intelligent and complex capabilities.  
            Merleau-Ponty’s posthumous The Prose of the World further solidifies 
the signification of “system of equivalents,” as he uses powerful but 
disturbing imagery to describe this phenomenon. In a passage on artistry, 
Merleau-Ponty reflects on how “The painter re-arranges the prosaic world 
and, so to speak, makes a holocaust of objects, just as poetry melts ordinary 
language. But in the case of works that one likes to see or read again, the 
disorder is always another order. It is a new system of equivalences which 
demands this upheaval and not just any one, and it is in the name of a truer 
relation among things that their ordinary ties are broken” (63-64). Each 
person shatters and distorts the world, only to impose another structure on 
it—to reconfigure the world according to her own vision. Such an extreme 
statement may seem to be favoring subjectivity, and discarding any “true 
relation” that can be delineated in an objective regard, but a note of 









as Merleau-Ponty explains that: 
since there are such structural modifications of the quality by space 
(transparency, constancies) as well as by the other qualities, we must 
understand that the sensible world is this perceptual logic, this system 
of equivalencies, and not a pile of spatio-temporal individuals. And 
this logic is neither produced by our psychophysical constitution, nor 
produced by our categorical equipment, but lifted from a world whose 
inner framework our categories, our constitution, our ‘subjectivity’ 
render explicit … (247-248).  
 
          In essence, Merleau-Ponty conceives of there being compatibility 
between the perceiver and the perceived, and so the “system of 
equivalencies” for each person is an integral aspect of some greater 
perceptual logic that superintends all. The “system of equivalencies” is a 
derivative of the perceptual logic, and constrained by it, but the very 
existence of such a “system” requires there to be transcendence—a 
divergence from the sensible world that manifests through each individual. 
Merleau-Ponty often assessed this as a “magical” or mysterious 
phenomenon, and yet his use of these nonscientific adjectives does not 
invalidate the very clear details he provides; he had some idea of how this 
transcendence was achieved, how each person negotiated his or her own 
“system of equivalencies,” and where this system is located. For Merleau-
Ponty, the chiasm is perhaps the underlying structure of this perceptual logic, 
and also the structure of this “system of equivalencies” – as it demonstrates 
the creation of a new expression that must in some way copy features of an 
original while also departing from its point of nascence.  









with perception, and address the perceiver’s situation as a participant in the 
flesh of world, a transcendent realization of all its possible incarnations, and 
as a being that has a “system of equivalencies” at its disposal. Foremost, the 
literal referent of chiasm cannot be overlooked. Figure 1 displays a sketch of 
the anatomy of the human brain and the optic chiasm, which may be the 
locus or at least a fundamental component that permits perceivers to 
establish a “system of equivalencies.”   
 
                                                          
                                       Figure 1. The optic chiasm, also referred to as optic chiasma. 
 
Routing cross-hemispherically, the chiasm grants the perceiver one unitary 
vision of the world rather than two separate pictures, but each hemisphere 
processes visual data differently: the right hemisphere generates more 
complex 3D representations, while the left hemisphere produces more 
simplistic and sometimes 2D representations. This is not to forge a 
dichotomous account of the hemispheres, because ultimately both 
hemispheres process the same material things; however, the left and right 
hemispheres have disparate cortical functions, even though they have a 









this discussion is that the hemispheres seem to accomplish a 
‘transcendence’ and ‘transfiguration’ akin to what Merleau-Ponty lays out in 
Phenomenology of Perception and subsequently revisited in The Visible and 
the Invisible in his writings on mathematical proofs, flesh and expression. In 
typical visual processing, the hemispheres can generate at least two distinct 
accounts of the world: one that is fuller and richer, and a second expression 
that is much sparser. This seems to be a natural contender as the site of a 
“system of equivalencies,” as the hemispheres differ in their expressive skills 
and functionality. 25 
           The right hemisphere predominates in 3D processing, and the left 
hemisphere processes what under this interpretation might be considered 
the second expression of the objects, one that is somehow a partial copy. In 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty stipulated that,  
I have visual objects because I have a visual field in which richness 
and clarity [or neatness] are in inverse proportion to each other, and 
because these two demands, either of which taken separately might 
be carried to infinity, when brought together, produce a certain 
culmination and optimum balance [or maximal point] (PP/371).  
 
Coping with the two demands between richness and neatness might be the 
work of the hemispheres in the brain. The left hemisphere contends with a 
neater or sparser picture of the world and has the ability to define objects 
through verbal expressions. When inspecting an image of a knight, the left 
                                               
25 Although here I speak of the hemispheres of the brain, it is crucial to emphasize that each hemisphere is connected to the 
opposite side of the body. For me, there need not be a distinction between the hemispheres of the brain and body – they are 









hemisphere can declare “knight,” while the right hemisphere mutely flounders 
for the term, but succeeds in noticing the context—the richer details of the 
image (Sidtis et al. 1981; Gazzaniga 2015, p. 243). Nikalaenko (1997) 
inactivated the right and left hemisphere successively to demonstrate their 
different perceptual abilities. His study disclosed how each of the human 
brain hemispheres independently coped with the task of drawing everyday 
objects, and proved that the right hemisphere better attends to details. These 
outcomes are shown below, but many other studies have also confirmed that 
3D processing relies on the right hemisphere, and that the right hemisphere 
presides more over shape-information.26 This is significant because it may in 
some ways be evidence of how the human brain contends with the 
“richness” and “neatness” that Merleau-Ponty hints at in his philosophical 
analysis of perception—if one hemisphere of the brain deals with richer 
visual input than the other. 
                    
                 
                                               
26 Dövencioglu, Ban, Schofield and Welchman (2013) studied the dorsal and ventral visual streams in the brain to gain insight 
into the phenomena of disparity and shading, which enable human beings to process 3D information. They also showed that 
“3D pictorial information provided by shading relies on a quite different generative process that is subject to different 
constraints and prior assumptions.” Thompson et al. (2011) offered further evidence that 3D processing differs from other 
forms of visual processing. Pathologies like prosopagnosia additionally demonstrate how visual processing of shape-
information can be disturbed when there is a lesion in the right hemisphere. Patients with this rare condition claim that faces 









Figure 2. Images from Nikolaenko’s (1997) study, which also appear in McGilchrist (2009). The first image shows 
the artistic talent of the left hemisphere in brains with right hemispheric deactivation. The second image is a sample 
of subjects’ reproductions when both hemispheres are active, and either the left or right hemisphere is active.  
 
              V.S. Ramachandran (2011) describes a case study of one his 
patients called Nadia—an autistic seven-year-old girl who could not 
communicate, but possessed superior talents as an artist. Nadia skillfully 
drew a horse in full gallop, including 3D details like the rippling and straining 
of muscles. Ramachandran hypothesizes that this savant gift is the result of 
a functioning region of cortical tissue in Nadia’s right parietal lobe, which he 
claims allowed Nadia a greater facility with “isolation” – something that 
occurs when an “artist emphasizes a single source of information—such as 
color, form, or motion—and deliberately plays down or deletes other sources” 
(221). Nadia’s sketch is more elaborate, like the sketches of those belonging 
to the subjects with right-hemisphere only activation. The sketches of the left 
hemisphere-only subjects from Nikolaenko’s study have more in common 
with the simplistic drawing of the normal eight-year old child seen below in 
Figure 3. 
 
                                       
 
 Figure 3. Nadia’s sketch on the left, compared to a drawing of Da Vinci’s, and that of a normal eight year-old child 











Each of the above images show that the hemispheres possess different 
expressive aptitudes—one richer, and one more simplistic. Expression 
(which amounts to a “system of equivalencies”) occupied much of Merleau-
Ponty’s professional focus, and yet the applications of his work have been 
largely overlooked, even now that he has begun to attract more attention 
from scholars in neuroscience and cognitive science. Although he was 
unaware of the different expressive aptitudes of the hemispheres, it likely 
would have been of interest to him, and should factor more in modern 
theories of perception.      
           Evans and Lawlor (2000) note that, “balancing between maximum 
clarity and maximum richness regulates the entire field of human activity and 
constitutes the stability of our relation to the world…. [and] the hallmark of 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, the balance between unity and plurality, identity 
and difference, stability and novelty, is therefore reflected and based in the 
balance between clarity and richness that he finds at the level of perception” 
(7). Within this particular publication, Evans and Lawlor’s do not provide an 
extensive analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s text to prove their argument. They are 
here most focused on the concept of balance, which is implied but not 
explicitly emphasized in the passages on “richesse” and “netteté” (or 
richness and neatness) in The Phenomenology of Perception. It is in other 









several passages elucidate his more precise views on the matter. In a 
discussion of meaning and perception, Merleau-Ponty reflects: 
 
Whether a system of motor or perceptual, our body is not an object for 
an ‘I think’ – it is a grouping of lived-through meanings, which moves 
towards it equilibrium. Sometimes a new cluster of meanings is 
formed; our former movements are integrated into a fresh motor 
entity, the first visual data into a fresh sensory entity, our natural 
powers suddenly come together in a richer meaning, which hitherto 
has been merely foreshadowed in our perceptual or practical field, 
and which has made itself felt in our experience by no more than a 
certain lack, and which by its coming suddenly reshuffles the elements 
of our equilibrium and fulfills our blind expectation (PP/177).  
 
 
Finding balance in the data is the work of an engaged body, and occurs 
through perception. Arriving at a meaningful result is not reaching a dead 
end, but a new entry point that continues the whole dynamic process. 
Merleau-Ponty further elaborates on the process at a later point in 
Phenomenology of Perception, explaining that in normal vision,  
An oblique position of the object in relation to me is not measured by 
the angle which it forms with the plane of my face, but felt as a lack of 
balance, as an unequal distribution of its influences upon me. The 
variations in appearance are not so many increases or decreases in 
size, or real distortions. It is simply that sometimes the parts mingle 
and become confused, at others they link up into a clearly articulated 
whole, and reveal their wealth of detail. There is one culminating point 
of perception which simultaneously satisfies these three norms, and 
towards which the whole perceptual process tends (PP/352).  
 
Referring to this point of culmination connects this passage into the one 
about richness and neatness, the “two demands” that “produce a certain 
culmination” (PP/371). It is possible that the hemispheres of the body and 









          Significantly, many modern theories of perception seem to seek 
explanations of how the brain stores information, and these theories take 
inspiration from prior methods that computer software engineers have used 
to compress data. In computer systems, compressing involves reducing 
large files into smaller files without information loss. This is often necessary 
for transferring or uploading high-resolution images. After omitting some 
pixels to cut down the size of the file, the lower quality images can be used 
to re-constitute the original. All that need be done is to take the pixels from 
that low quality image and use what remains to guess at the values of the 
missing pixels. Predictive coding is a formulation for compressing 
information. Linear predictive coding began as a method of data 
compression, and then later was coopted into a model for vision by Rao and 
Ballard (1999).  
          More recently, linear predictive coding has inspired other theories that 
embrace a predictive processing and specifically Bayesian explanation of 
cortical function (Friston 2005; Howhy 2013; Clark 2017). Predictive 
processing in the brain involves reliance on priors, or past experiences that 
allow the agent to optimally estimate future states of the world and calculate 
the likelihood of some occurrence. Other data compression strategies are 
also evident in neural networks designed to perform like a human brain. The 
robot SPAUN (or “Semantic Pointer Architecture”) and its accompanying 
software Nengo uses a data compression strategy: scalar or vector values 









the sum of their parts or complexities. It is currently thought these 
compressions could either be generated primarily from the bottom-up (as in 
SPA) or in a top-down manner (as in many predictive processing models). In 
SPA there is an initial value of the perceptual input that is then encoded into 
a second value based on an assumption that the visual areas convey the 
perceptual signal to the basal ganglia, thalamus, motor areas and to the 
prefrontal cortex. Conversely, for different predictive processing models, the 
dorsal or ventral medial prefrontal cortex will generate predictions that are 
then shared with the lower cortical areas, including the motor and visual 
areas. Perhaps, if something similar to compression does take place in the 
human brain, the “compressions” are simply generated simultaneously along 
with the more elaborate picture: at least, this thinking seems to be most in 
line with Merleau-Ponty’s reasoning about a “system of equivalencies” and 
may fit with the phenomenological and scientific evidence.  
            That is not to say the brain lacks a probabilistic, predictive 
mechanism, however; cross-disciplinary evidence continues to emerge in 
favor of such a perspective, and in fact Merleau-Ponty speaks of the 
probable in The Visible and the Invisible. Within the first sections, he remarks 
that, “the real, after all, is only the less improbable or the more probable” 
(VI/40). Merleau-Ponty refers to an experience of venturing along a beach 
and mistaking a clayey rock for a piece of wood, only to determine upon 
closer inspection that it was a misperception, or dis-illusion—“a loss of 









theory of perception in part complements a predictive theory of mind, for he 
argues that perceptions are “possibilities that could have been, radiations of 
this unique world that ‘there is’”, and that “false” perception is but a “mutilated 
or partial truth” (VI/42). How does the mind perceive this “partial truth”? 
Schwiedrzik et al. (2014) reports that the left occipital cortex contains a 
single node involved in adapting to new or changing percepts, whereas the 
right dorsal medial prefrontal cortex “generates predictions about the 
upcoming stimulus” (1161). A fuller explanation of the neuroanatomical 
underpinnings of perceptual prediction will continue to be sought after, but 
Merleau-Ponty’s work underscores the importance of chiastic processes in 
mind and body –  a “system of equivalents” that seems to have a role in the 
activity of expression and must originate first in perception.   
Eye, Consciousness and the Pregnancy of Possibles 
We have already briefly entered into a discussion of the optic chiasm and 
how the eyes are the “channels of one sole Cyclopean vision” (VI/141). What 
a person ultimately sees is not two distinct images, but one unified and rich 
view of the world. To Merleau-Ponty, “…a human body is present 
when…between one eye and the other…a kind of crossover occurs, when 
the spark of the sensing/sensible is lit” – “quality, light, color, depth, are there 
only because they awaken an echo in our bodies and because the body 
welcomes them”  (OE/125). While this seems like a grandiloquent description 
of vision, Merleau-Ponty’s notes show progress towards the development of 









“pregnancy” broadly to encompass this aspect of flesh and compatibility 
between the seer and the seen, and in his ruminations on the “system of 
equivalencies.” These incomplete notes are, to this interpretation, a keystone 
of Merleau-Ponty’s thesis in The Visible and the Invisible:  
Profound idea of a pregnancy that is not only that of the forms 
privileged for reasons of geometrical equilibrium-but also according to 
an intrinsic regulation, a Seingeschick of which the geometrical 
pregnancy is but one aspect. It is in this way I want to understand 
‘empirical pregnancy’ – Understood in this way, it consists in defining 
each perceived being by a structure of a system of equivalencies 
about which it is disposed, and of which the painter’s stroke—the 
flexuous line—of the sweep of the brush is the peremptory evocation. 
It is a question of that λόγος that pronounces itself silently in each 
sensible thing, which we can have an idea of only through our carnal 
participation in its sense, only by espousing by our body its manner of 
‘signifying’…. (VI/207-208).  
  
The “pregnancy” that Merleau-Ponty spoke of throughout his work is a crucial 
idea, because it not only refers to objects with which interaction is possible – 
a “good” form that attracts the eye, and invites the action of the agent. But it 
is also, as Merleau-Ponty said, to “break forth” – like a needle poking through 
paper, and permanetizing a moment of perception, which becomes 
irreversibly and unalterably defined (VI/208). Merleau-Ponty conceived of the 
structure of the world and any empirically observable phenomena as but one 
aspect of vision, which coexists alongside another aspect of perception—a 
logic or “system of equivalencies” of each sensible thing, which is determined 
by how each body participates in the activity of signification. Each “breaking 
forth” or “pregnancy” is an instant of this activity: “every painting, every 









transcendence” (VI/208). “Pregnancy” is a term that bears some similarities 
to the term “affordance” as developed by James J. Gibson: “the affordances 
of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes” (1979). Nevertheless, this “pregnancy” differs in that it suggests a 
much deeper confluence between the perceiver and perceived, one which 
for Merleau-Ponty makes up the “miracle of consciousness” and:  
consists in its bringing to light through attention, phenomena which re-
establish the unity of the object in a new dimension at the very 
moment when they destroy it. Thus attention is neither an association 
of images, nor the return to itself of thought already in control of its 
objects, but the active constitution of a new object… (PP/35).  
             The eyes and the optic chiasm are vital to constituting the object, not 
just because they are the primary organs of visual sense, but also because 
the eyes are capable of processing two distinct objects but somehow must 
impose just one interpretation on the world. Merleau-Ponty explored this 
subject through diplopia or double vision in The Phenomenology of 
Perception – which occurs when a person’s eyes are unable to focus on a 
single location in space. Diplopia is a disorientating condition, which reduces 
the perceiver’s ability to navigate around and interact with objects.  The 
coordination of the eyes and cooperative effort is required for normal vision. 
Binocular rivalry is a phenomenon of perception that happens when 
attending to two pictures—one seen with the left eye and one seen with the 
right. The perceiver will blank out one of the pictures, and although two 
images are present, only one can be seen. How the eyes and mind 









endorse the perspective that the goal of perception is to give the agent a 
complete picture of the world, and this sometimes entails occluding 
improbable stimuli—blocking out one image that would not probabilistically 
appear along with another.  
                Predictive processing approaches tend to embrace the thesis that 
the perceiver has a pre-conceived or “prior” expectation of what the world will 
hold. Merleau-Ponty’s perspective may align in some ways with a predictive 
processing approach, if only because he claimed that, “The precise and 
entirely determinate world is… posited in the first place, no longer perhaps 
as the cause of our perceptions, but as their immanent end” (PP/36). 
Instead, the mind may be the cause, and Merleau-Ponty remarked that we 
have to “ask how the very idea of the world or of exact truth is possible, and 
look for its first appearance in consciousness.” He used the example of the 
moon on the horizon, which both has a measurable size and also appears to 
the perceiver as “enormous” (PP/36). This is the same idea that he later 
reiterated as he wrote of the “empirical pregnancy” as one aspect of some 
greater “intrinsic regulation” in The Visible and the Invisible: the “empirical 
pregnancy” is that the moon has a measurable size, yet to the perceiver its 
size also depends on something else. There is yet another aspect of 
consciousness that is engaged in its own, somewhat distinct perceptual 
process, which Merleau-Ponty named as “signification.” In the contexts in 
which Merleau-Ponty employed “signification,” the term seems to be similar 









some quality or appearance of the world and an almost passive receptivity, 
where as “signification” involves active interpretation and responsiveness to 
the world—a co-creation of it. Dastur (2000) reminds us that for Merleau-
Ponty, each individual or the “for-itselves have to form a ‘system’; they have 
to be open to one another as so many partial perspectives confirmed in the 
same common world” (36). The “empirical pregnancy” may represent this 
opening to the common world, but to truly understand perception, this other 
elusive aspect of consciousness that Merleau-Ponty began to elucidate must 
be understood as well—and this is not just “subjectivity,” as Merleau-Ponty 
pointed out—it is a central feature of perception, which grants a deviation 
from the “empirical pregnancy” that should not be ignored.  
            As some proponents of predictive processing might suggest, it could 
follow that a deviation from an “empirical pregnancy” or the actual state of 
the world is the effect of prior exposures to a situation or stimulus. That is to 
say that the mind could have certain predefined expectations that lead to a 
wrong interpretation as the perceiver encounters the conditions of a new, but 
similar object or situation, and responds just as it did in the past, at least until 
the perceiver re-assesses the actual. Howhy (2013) discusses the rubber 
hand illusion, in which a perceiver assigns tactile feeling to a visible rubber 
hand during a virtual reality simulation while his own hand is out of sight. The 
perceiver relies entirely on visual cues that override the other actual sensory 
input to his real hand (150). This also holds true in some cases of optical 









The perceiver will be heavily influenced by prior experience and exposures. 
Merleau-Ponty is more focused on the generative capabilities of the 
perceiver, however—how the perceiver not only experiences more than a 
mere “empirical pregnancy” of the world, but also actively creates 
alternatives to that “empirical pregnancy” through signification. Merleau-
Ponty did not see this as the work of just the visual organs or mind, either: he 
viewed it as the total engagement of all senses of the body, including touch.  
 
Touch and Proprioception  
Husserl assigned special importance to tactile sensation, as self-caressing is 
for him a much different experience than seeing oneself. It is possible for a 
person to touch his own arm, and have the sense of it in both the limb that is 
receiving the physical contact and in the fingers that are carrying out the 
action; it is not however possible to see and be seen in the same way, 
because a person’s reflection lacks its own perceptual ability. Nevertheless, 
Merleau-Ponty parted ways with Husserl’s perspective, and claimed that 
such a “delimitation of the senses is crude” (VI 133). Merleau-Ponty saw the 
senses as much more interwoven and chiastic, positing that: 
There is a circle of the touched and the touching, the touched takes 
hold of the touching; there is a circle of the visible and the seeing, the 
seeing is not without visible existence; there is even an inscription of 
the touching in the visible, of the seeing in the tangible— and the 
converse; there is finally a propagation of these exchanges to all the 
bodies of the same type and of the same style which I see and 
touch— and this by virtue of the fundamental fission or segregation of 
the sentient and the sensible which, laterally, makes the organs of my 
body communicate and founds transitivity from one body to another 









Movement and gesticulation are part of tactile sensation for Merleau-Ponty, 
as he regarded “the movement of one’s own body” as being “to touch” what 
“lighting is to vision” (PP/367). In the working notes of The Visible and the 
Invisible, Merleau-Ponty went one step further and insisted that “perceive” 
and “move,” or “Wahrnehmen” and “Sich Bewegen” are synonymous, and 
yet he established that there is a “vision-touch divergence” which comes 
from the “fact of our organization” (VI/255-256). This particular passage 
perhaps convolutes and frustrates his own aims to explicate what touch is, 
for Merleau-Ponty also establishes language as the foundation of thought, 
and similarly links movement to perception in the same way. “Language… is 
to the I think what movement is to perception,” Merleau-Ponty asserts 
(VI/257). For the sake of simplification, Figure 4 attempts to illustrate all of 
the chiastic connections and comparisons that Merleau-Ponty made within 
this part of his text. 
 
                                  









developed in his working notes of The Visible and the Invisible. This model points to a co-functioning of 
tactile movement and language, in coordination with a co-functioning of visual perception and what 
Merleau-Ponty refers to as thinking. Note that this model is structured this way to hint at the hemispheric 
attributes of brain and body, with the left in blue and the right in red. The left hemisphere in a neurotypical 
adult is associated with “approach behavior” or action, and most often these areas of the brain correspond 
to language processing and production. The right hemisphere in a neurotypical adult most often 
specializes in 3d visual perception as well as spatial reasoning skills.  
 
           The above diagram attempts to show the interconnectedness of all of 
these aspects of Being for Merleau-Ponty, while also still distinguishing 
between them: every visible can be touched, “every vision takes place 
somewhere in the tactile space. There is double and crossed situating of the 
visible in the tangible and of the tangible in the visible; the two maps are 
complete, and yet they do not merge into one. The two parts are total parts 
and yet are not superposable” (VI/134). It is through touch and movement 
that a person is primarily able to express him or herself, and through written 
or spoken language: perception and thinking, however, do not require the 
same bodily action within the world, although having a tactile world is a 
requisite or condition of perception. Through movement, touch and 
language, individuals are able to go beyond the “empirical pregnancy” 
discussed in the previous section of this paper. Touch enables human 
beings to shape the world and create anew, while movement allows for the 
perceiver to adjust perspective, and language is a chief instrument of 
expression and signification. In refining his thoughts on this, and the 
exchange seen in Figure 4, Merleau-Ponty wrote that: 
one would see that the essential is the reflected in offset (refléchi en 
bougé), where the touching is always on the verge of apprehending 
itself as tangible, misses its grasp, and completes it only in a there is--
--- The wahrnehmen-sich bewegen [perception-movement] implication 









not only the inherence in a spatio-temporally individuated this. 
Moreover a spatio-temporally individuated this is an Unselbstàndig: 
there are only radiations of (verbal) essences, there are no spatio-
temporal indivisibles. The sensible thing itself is borne by a 
transcendency. (VI/260).  
              
In view of this passage, it may be that Figure 4 is a rough sketch of the 
chiasm – “the whole cycle” of perception and action. While Merleau-Ponty’s 
notes are far from clear, what he seems to be arguing is that both tactile 
sense and language strive to come to grips with a “there is” that is not 
attainable. Instead, what is attainable amounts to “radiations” or offshoots; 
the individual inevitably falls short of grasping some source or specific 
indivisible, because there is no fixed point of origin. There is never a 
complete merge in the sense of touching and being touched, even though 
the self is tangible, because Being is transitory in space and time. In 
language, the signifier and signified are entwined in a similar way—every 
signified is a “radiation” without a fixed origin, without a singular material 
referent. In the notes that precede this passage, Merleau-Ponty included a 
list of “fragments” making up the “whole of our experience of sensible being, 
at the top of which he put “touching---touching oneself.” He stated at the start 
of this paragraph that, “phenomenology is…the recognition that the 
theoretically complete, full world of the physical explanation is not so” (256). 
The problem is that perceivers believe they have a well-defined “touching” 
and “touched” – and Merleau-Ponty’s goal was to expound that this is not the 









spatio-temporal indivisibles.  
          Merleau-Ponty emphasized that it was “necessary to translate into 
perceptual logic what science and positive psychology treat as fragments of 
the In Itself” (256). The phrase “perceptual logic” has already been briefly 
introduced in the section above on flesh and the “system of equivalencies,” 
but to reiterate, Merleau-Ponty stipulated that, “…we must understand that 
the sensible world is this perceptual logic, this system of equivalencies, and 
not a pile of spatio-temporal individuals” (247). The “system of 
equivalencies,” where it resides within “touching—touching oneself” must be 
connected to all other senses, but it is particularly entwined with how the 
perceiver identifies objects through language, and not only because “it 
seems in the first place impossible to concede to either words or gestures 
[an aspect of touch] an immanent meaning” (Philosophy of Language/199). 
One other reason Merleau-Ponty came to this conclusion has to do with the 
comparability of these processes. The phenomenon of chiasm where it 
concerns touching oneself requires recognition of an aspect of body, both 
that of difference and non-difference of the self: one right hand feels the left 
hand as “other” and part of the same. “To touch oneself, to see oneself, is to 
obtain such a specular extract of oneself” (VI/255-256). This principle applies 
in Merleau-Ponty’s theory of language and identity, which endeavors to 
illuminate that any identifiable element or term must ultimately be 
exchangeable for that which seems different from it, or diametrically opposite 











Logic, Language and Identity  
              Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel (2014) sheds light on this, and states that, 
“To think identity within opposition, or opposition within identity is what the 
chiasm renders possible” (107). Through the chiasm, Merleau-Ponty rejected 
axiomatic-deductive theories of meaning and truth-functional logic, which rest 
on the supposition that a propositional statement is either true or false: two 
truths cannot be simultaneously held. There can only be conflict between a 
proposition and its negation. The aforementioned proposition and negation 
can also be represented as a thesis and its antithesis. Post-structuralist 
thinker Jacques Derrida examined this topic in another way, but hints of 
Merleau-Ponty’s influence can be found in his work (Toadvine 2019).  
Jacques Derrida searches for an escape from the impasse between the 
thesis and antithesis, and finds it not in synthesis—but in a state called 
“différance.” For Derrida, différance “is immediately and irreducibly 
multivalent” and any definition of what is must therefore be deferred (283-
284). Différance separates in space and time—“the primordial constituting 
casualty, the process of scission and division” (284). It is the lacuna or void, 
which permits signs to stand in relationship to the signs that diachronically 
come before and after them. Différance is similar to the chiasm—insofar as it 
describes a crossing, an ephemeral moment between past and future, but 









between proposition and negation. Nevertheless, aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s 
chiastic project are similar to Derrida’s work, and there may also be some 
similarities between Merleau-Ponty’s theories and those of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s in Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein was a student of 
Gottlob Frege, a German philosopher who pushed to create a reductionist 
and simplified formal system of logic to ward against the imprecisions of 
language. While Wittgenstein supported these aims early on, in his later 
career, he rejected the tenets of analytic logic—including the notion that a 
proposition does not in any way coincide with its opposite, and that the 
conditions of both can be stably defined. In renouncing both a Fregean and a 
traditional view of logic, Wittgenstein reflects that, “Frege compares a 
concept to a region, and says that a region without clear boundaries can’t be 
called a region at all” (38). Wittgenstein presents the case that the concept is 
in fact “not closed by boundary” (37). The image of the boundary is 
something that Wittgenstein continues to incorporate throughout 
Philosophical Investigations, as he pursues a departure from analytic logic. 
The boundary appears in Wittgenstein’s reflections on the language game, in 
which terms are like “chess pieces” with the constantly shifting aspect of their 
deployment. A boundary might “be part of the game, and the players are 
supposed, say, to jump over the boundary; or it may show where the 
property of one person ends and that of another begins; and so on. So if I 
draw a boundary-line, that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for” (147). 









accomplishes nothing; he ruminates that “we can draw a boundary for a 
special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable? Not at all. No 
more than it took the definition 1 pace = 75 cm to make the measure of 
length ‘one pace’ usable” (37). For both Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, 
language or the significance of terms must be tied up in their lived usages.  
           Merleau-Ponty’s perspectives are in line with Wittgenstein’s and 
Derrida’s thinking, and it is not simply because he embraces holism or 
synthesis as an alternative to forms of logical analysis; he sides with Paul 
Valéry, a French poet, in the notion that “language is all,” that there is “no 
dialectical reversal from one… to other; we do not have to reassemble them 
into a synthesis: they are two aspects of the reversibility which is the ultimate 
truth.” For Hans-Georg Gadamer, who also shares Valéry’s perspective, the 
phrase “language is all” applies to an agent’s ability to make sense of being. 
Madison (1996) elucidates this further, in stating that “all that is and can be 
for us is by means of language,” and “language must be viewed not as a 
finite system of sign-symbols, but as an infinite medium of possible 
meaningfulness” (83).27 Merleau-Ponty advanced the notion of the unification 
of opposites—that a proposition and its negation are chiastically entangled 
and ceaselessly in flux but also surpassable.  
               This may sit poorly with anyone undertaking a serious investigation 
into these matters, because at first blush, this vision seems to thrust 
analysis, synthesis and “meaning” into undiscoverable and unsatisfactory 
                                               
27 Madison, Gary. Being and Speaking. 1996. In John Stewart (ed.) Beyond the Symbol Model, 69-98. New York: State 









obscurity, but Merleau-Ponty’s thesis in The Invisible and Visible and other 
later works presents a way around this conundrum: “meaning” is 
discoverable through the body and spatial arrangement. The body’s 
engagement in the world determines the truth of a proposition: as “truth” is 
relativistic, identity comes to the fore through the taking up of a position. 
Philosophers Lakoff and Johnson (1980) developed this thesis differently, 
positing that embodiment and human motor capabilities imbue each person 
with linguistic “templates” and these linguistic templates are construed in 
spatial terms: hence, it is possible to say “he’s a lowlife,” or “doing that is 
beneath me.” Such statements depend on a spatial ideation. Merleau-
Ponty’s thesis stands apart from the central arguments of Lakoff and 
Johnson, however; while “meaning” for him derives from a bodily 
participation in the world, it is reached in a specific way. The chiasm is not 
just a spectrum on which the proposition lies at the furthest point from its 
opposition: the chiasm is the process of the perceiver, who takes up the 
proposition and not only traces the distance to the opposition, but also 
actively forms the identities of both while simultaneously challenging them. 
The perceiver is the shaper of the identities, and each perceiver has the 
aptitude to go beyond them through creative expression — through artistry 
and descriptive language, which amplifies or alters and does not precisely 
repeat: 
Each partial linguistic act, as an act common to the whole of the given 
language, is not limited to expending its expressive power but re-









and received meaning, the power that speaking subjects have of 
going beyond signs towards their meaning (PM/103).  
But Merleau-Ponty envisaged language as “more than simply the vehicle of a 
sum of differences in significations” (PM/103). Merleau-Ponty forged another 
metaphor in his notes in The Visible and the Invisible that casts language or 
the “verbal” as a “specular” – it is the “mirror” of meaning that recaptures and 
reflects it – sharing identities through flesh, while also achieving a doubling 
and splitting effect (VI/255-256). “Language is not the servant of meaning 
and does not govern meaning. There is no subordination or anything but a 
secondary distinction between them”(PM/112). This relation or mirror effect is 
apparent in every facet of Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm: “Understanding—
speaking, “touching—touching oneself,” and “seeing—seeing oneself” 
(VI/255-256). It also applies in the case of how Merleau-Ponty apprehended 
“Self” and “Other.”  
Self and Other 
Another important aspect of the chiasm is the bodily relation between self 
and Other. “The flesh is a mirror phenomenon,” according to Merleau-Ponty, 
and he repeatedly cited the myth of Narcissus in his notes and within the 
completed portions of The Visible and the Invisible to make sense of Self 
and Other (VI/255-256). He maintained that, “there is a fundamental 
narcissism to all vision” (VI/139). The myth of Narcissus warns what might 
happen to the Self left unfulfilled in the Other: stagnancy, isolation, and self-









detrimental outcomes for both parties. The Self might believe he has 
understood the Other, but he may be merely projecting his own experiences 
and will onto the other, whereas the Other falls victim to loss of agency or 
erasure. Other can become a mere reflection into which the Self dives 
headfirst—seeking ideas that only embodies their views, while not only 
overlooking Other, but also new possibilities. The story of Narcissus might 
seem to be one that features a solipsistic world view, where the Self 
becomes the only known reality, and yet Merleau-Ponty insisted that it is 
precisely the solitude of Self and inaccessibility of Other that defeats 
solipsism: for Other must be a zone demarcated as “not mine” (VI/79). 
Merleau-Ponty did not consider the relationship between Self and Other to 
be a rivalry—in which other is a “scourge, the continued threat of an absolute 
reversal… capable of crushing me with a glance into the dust of my world” 
(82).  
              Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty’s writings about politics show how the 
competition of two perspectives results in the potential for social strife and a 
me-other rivalry. Merleau-Ponty was a Marxist who supported the Soviet 
regime through his political essays. An essay that he published in 1950 in 
Les Temps modernes (and later included in his 1960 publication Signs) 
focuses on this subject. Within the essay, he stated that, “one can in no case 
make a pact with one’s adversaries… every political position that is defined 
in opposition to Russia and localizes criticism within it is an absolution given 









changed after he learned of the growing number of concentration camps in 
the USSR and the failure of communist theory put into practice there. This 
change of sympathies ended his friendship with Jean Paul Sartre. Despite 
experiencing some strife in his personal life, Merleau-Ponty still insists in the 
notes of The Visible and the Invisible that there is a “co-functioning” of me-
other and not just a rivalry (VI/215). This is significant, because it 
underscores a fluctuation in Merleau-Ponty’s views over time and shows that 
he was not exempt from experiencing difficulties in his own relationships—
that he is not just idly proposing a confluence between self and other. For 
Merleau-Ponty, the Self-Other chiastic relation is a vital bodily relation and 
one that is indispensable for understanding one’s own identity and place in 
the world.   
             While the possibility of rivalry certainly exists, it is only through the 
existence of Other that Self can be affirmed. “Both Self and Other share a 
sensible world, and the experience of “being outside of myself, [being] in the 
world, among others…feeds my reflection” – it is through this experience that 
every individual finds himself. (VI/49). Still, there is an asymmetry of 
experience that Merleau-Ponty recognized, which leads to “trouble” as Taylor 
Carman (2008) puts it: Other is “not a problem,” but there are aspects of 
Other that can never be grasped (146). Carman concludes, “Sociality is an 
essential structure of my experience inasmuch as it discloses a horizon of 
others whose point of view in the world cannot be collapsed into my own, nor 









of Self, but rather just another possible expression of flesh joined in the 
chiasm.  
Conclusions  
The chiasm is much more than a metaphor in the work of Merleau-Ponty. As 
it buds as a concept throughout Merleau-Ponty’s early texts and finally 
comes into full bloom in The Visible and the Invisible, the chiasm 
encapsulates a whole theory of perception, intended to challenge insular and 
dichotomous thinking about not only the phenomenon of perception, but all 
aspects of Being. Merleau-Ponty’s endeavor to define every feature of the 
chiasm remains incomplete, but he gave enough insights to accomplish 
several of his ambitions. One of the reasons that studying Merleau-Ponty’s 
chiasm is important is that it may alter how those in cognitive science 
currently theorize about perception. He contributed greatly to dismantling the 
mind-body dichotomy through introducing the alternative notions of flesh and 
chiasm. His project offers some support for the argument that perception is 
much more complex, and must incorporate more than “empirical pregnancy” 
– more than what is obvious and measurable in vision. His consideration of a 
“system of equivalencies” that manifests primarily through expression (and is 
unique to each perceiver) is an overlooked contribution of his scholarship, 
especially as the development of this idea spans over several of his texts. 
The structure of the chiasm that Merleau-Ponty envisions, and the links he 









Merleau-Ponty’s proposal about logic and language provides an alternative 
to the logic of analytic philosophy, and his views on meaning may bear some 
similarities to those of Wittgenstein and Derrida. Lastly, Merleau-Ponty’s 
chiasm relates to not only perception, but also the social aspects of 
experience, and Merleau-Ponty cautions against a fundamental narcissism 
which he locates in vision. There is a risk that one person’s perspectives can 
overpower that of Other, but to acknowledge the chiastic intertwining is also 
to recognize its possible perils. It may inform individuals in times of conflict 
and remind them not to impose their views on others – in other words, it 
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Models of the Brain: Metaphors, Architectures and Chiastic 
Applications 
 
Abstract: When theorizing about visual processing or perception, the 
dominantly held view is that the brain is hierarchical, and that information is 
either conveyed through the brain in a “bottom up” or “top down” manner. To 
explain very simplistically: visual input is either primarily relayed from 
occipital region of the brain up to the prefrontal cortex, or in the case of 
generative and predictive-based theories, the perceptual content is 
generated first in the prefrontal cortex and then conveyed down to the 
occipital region. This paper begins to establish the reasons why it might be 
limiting to metaphorize or describe the brain as a hierarchy. The focus is also 
on other metaphors or descriptions of how the brain stores information, all 
with the goal of criticizing how the metaphors might influence and limit 
theoretical models in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. All of the 
following approaches are discussed: Representational Theory of Mind and 
corresponding logic-based efforts to produce a computer with human 
intelligence; Connectionism and other descendants in deep-learning, 
specifically the neural architecture SPAUN (or Semantic Pointed Architecture 
Unified Network); and Bayesian approaches to mind, which have found 
momentum along linear predictive coding and Hidden Markov models. The 
second part of this investigation focuses on the chiasm, a term from the work 
of philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Drawing on his incomplete work, 
along with neuroscientific literature on the hemispheres of the brain and 
body, the chiasm is proposed as a better descriptor for the brain-body 
architecture. Considering the roles of the hemispheres and how they 
complement each other in functionality may augment theories about how to 
build more humanlike artificial intelligence.  
 
 
Some philosophers reject conceptualizing the mind as a machine, 
while others champion mechanical theories and computational models of the 
mind——and yet even if the latter group prevails, and there proves to be 
computationally determinate processes, or a learning algorithm that 
adequately characterizes the activity of human mind and body, it may still be 









machine metaphors. 28 The problem is not whether or how the brain might be 
machinelike, but rather that in adopting that position, it has become a 
practice to turn to processes that have a prior use with machines, and to 
then apply those related general principles to explaining what human minds 
and brains do.   
Metaphors are indispensable instruments of theorization, as they 
allow scientists to contend with hard to examine phenomena by comparing 
them to readily observed phenomena. The mind is one such candidate for 
such metaphorization, which has been subject to imprecise description 
because its dynamism arises from a brain and body about which discoveries 
are still being made. The long history of metaphorizing the mind has also 
contributed to its enigma, as mind has historically been associated with an 
invisible or spiritual aspect of Being. In the last century, the view of mind has 
changed, and developed a stronger correlation with the human brain; the 
brain is the physical matter encased in the skull, while mind stands as a 
descriptor of its core processes. For some, mind encompasses much more 
than the brain, and extends to both body and world.  
The mind continues to be problematized by the language used to 
define it, specifically when metaphors or descriptions reinforce a mind-body 
dichotomy. Other problems also arise when theoreticians appropriate a 
process from machine learning to explain a mental process, or emphasize 
                                               
28 Anthony Chemero is one philosopher who proposes a radical embodied cognitive science, which moves away from 
computational models of cognition. On the flip side, Daniel Dennett is just one proponent of the opposite view—even going 
so far as to metaphorize the mind as having folders, as is the case with computers. Chemero’s (2009) publication Radical 
Embodied Cognitive Science explains his views; Daniel Dennett’s recent (2017) publication From Bacteria to Bach and Back: 









hierarchization of the brain without considering lateralization or cross-
hemispheric processes. This paper explores how machine metaphors for 
mind influence both theory and application, with a twofold purpose: to reveal 
the constraints that these metaphors place on inquiry, and to propose an 
overlooked metaphor and model of mind worthy of closer inspection, the 
chiasm.  
The first section of this paper begins by delineating two types of 
metaphors that develop in the science more broadly: metaphors that affect 
how a scientist 1) construes a process or 2) forms associations. This part of 
the discussion also highlights a few core features of the mind and brain that 
complexify the machine-brain metaphor, focusing on the issues of 
representation, memory storage and the hierarchical organization of the 
brain. The section entitled “Building a Brain and the issue of Hierarchies” 
below elaborates on hierarchization.  
The central sections of the paper examine three approaches to 
artificial intelligence with 1) a general treatment of the symbolist approach; 2) 
a more particular look at connectionism, and the specific neural network 
paradigm called Semantic Pointer Architecture; and 3) predictive processing 
and related Bayesian approaches. These sections consider how these three 
approaches work in concert with the metaphorization types of section one — 
how the metaphorization types emerge in and impact the three approaches 
to artificial intelligence. With respect to the symbolist approach, the main 









logical operations. This perspective has been widely criticized in cognitive 
science. 29 Although subtle, it involves metaphorization to say that thought is 
akin to logic—to take logic from one domain, that of argumentation, and 
apply it to the topic of human thought more generally. Like the symbolist 
approach, Semantic Pointer Architecture from its foundations is inspired by 
software engineer Harold Lawson’s use of the term pointer to describe a 
process in programming language to store information. While Chris 
Eliasmith’s fully developed SPA (Semantic Pointer Architecture) is different 
than Lawson’s, there are some very basic ways in which they are the same – 
in which pointer has been lifted from its domain in computing and applied to 
the brain. This is also the case with predictive processing, as efforts to model 
the brain as a prediction-computing entity came after the development and 
use of linear predictive coding. Bayesian approaches likewise have the 
Markov Model, and Hidden Markov Model, which have been grafted onto 
other theories of how the brain might work. While there are certainly many 
advantages to exploring how each of these mathematical models could 
indeed reflect what the brain does, there can also be drawbacks and those 
will be discussed more fully. 
 The last section of this paper describes the chiasm from the 
unfinished writings of phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty and explains 
its possible usefulness in characterizing mind and brain. It is a term that 
encompasses the structural attributes and the generative characteristics of 
                                               
29 For an overview of the history and thorough explanation of the criticisms of the symbolist approach, see the text Mindware 









the brain. The term chiasm most generally means crossing. Perception 
occurs in a chiastic way, through two eyes which relay information to the 
opposite brain hemisphere via the optic chiasma and hemispheres of the 
body.  
Metaphorizing and creating new models of the mind is an important 
topic to consider, for a multitude of reasons—the first of which is that those in 
artificial intelligence want to develop an artificial system which engages in 
human-level cognition. More importantly than that is the desire for 
researchers in a variety of different fields to have a deeper understanding of 
the brain, both to better cope with pathologies of the brain and to accurately 
characterize its processes. Metaphorization can both help and hinder these 
goals.   
 
 
Metaphor, Structure and Processes of Mind   
 Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and Johnson (2007) both treat the “mind 
as machine” metaphor and concentrate on its usefulness: in the first case, 
the machine is a graspable object, which can be tinkered with and 
understood in terms of its full range of components. So far, science does not 
have complete and robust evidence to offer to explain how the matter of the 
brain produces mind. Lakoff and Johnson detail a few other metaphors for 
thought in Philosophy in the Flesh (1999) – thought as motion, thought as 









calculation. They show how analytic philosophy helped to construct these 
metaphors and how as a tradition, analytic philosophy embraces the view 
that concepts have constitutive parts and that those constitutive parts 
provide the definition of the concept. In the view of the analytic philosopher 
Frege, thoughts are objective and separable from mind — they are akin to 
objects in the world. This is one of the reasons that the mind-machine 
metaphor is so entrenched, because of the need to assign the mind a literal 
referent in the world — or an objective character. According to Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999), the mind-machine metaphor is also built on the other 
metaphors for thought as previously discussed. 
 Metaphors all serve a purpose to the user, in making abstract 
concepts easier to grapple with and comprehend. Broadly defined, metaphor 
is a literary device that draws a comparison between two unlike objects or 
concepts. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) refer to the pair as the source and the 
target—the source being a concept domain that is more firmly rooted in 
experience and embodiment, and the target a more abstract concept. In the 
Shakespearian example, “Life is but a walking shadow,” the source is the 
shadow, which can be experienced when standing within the spotlight on a 
stage. Life is a more abstract concept, covering the experiences that people 
undergo as they are born, grow and die. Every source taps into the physical 
experience of having a body, or embodiment—and the target can be better 









Scientific metaphors serve a particular purpose in elucidating physical 
processes or phenomena that have yet to be deeply examined. 
Metaphorizing can involve taking one process and its related set of terms 
and applying it to a new process or concept.  Taylor and Dewsbury (2018) 
use an example common in biology, where genes are metaphorized as 
“blueprints.” They determine this notion to be misleading and problematic, 
because it primes an expectation of a “one-to-one correspondence” between 
“particular ‘genetic instructions’ and phenotypic outcomes in organisms,” but 
environmental and other factors also affect how organisms develop. Another 
problematic example is the metaphor “greenhouse gases.” The reason the 
metaphor works as a descriptor is because greenhouses take in and trap 
heat waves, yet a problem arises because “greenhouse” also denotes large 
glass houses that store a variety of growing foliage. This builds a positive 
association. A greenhouse is a place where life flourishes, but “greenhouse 
gases” trap heat in Earth’s atmosphere by absorbing and emitting infrared 
radiation. The term “greenhouse gas” does not evoke a sense of urgency or 
need to change pollutive habits, and a prime reason for that is the positive 
association of “greenhouse” supersedes a newer, negative one. 
As seen in the above examples, metaphors can be instructions: they 
delineate how to construct a physical representation of something that is not 
easily observed. Metaphors also come with built-in biases and associations, 
which are determined by the experiences the users have had with the 









the target, as seen in the case of the greenhouse metaphor. With metaphors 
related to the mind, there are added layers of complication: mind historically 
accounts for multiple phenomena, and yet also has a specific physical 
correlate in the brain. For a number of reasons, the definition of mind should 
not be reduced to brain, but the brain can be considered a component of the 
mind. Mind and brain metaphors often coincide, but will be carefully 
distinguished. 
 
The blueprint-gene metaphor above has affected how biologists conceive of 
a process at work in the human body. The greenhouse-gas metaphor, on 
the other hand, transferred a host of unwanted associations while also 
attempting to describe a process. These problems are also apparent with 
mind-brain-machine metaphors, which fall under three prime categories: 
 
 
1. The first category concerns the issue of representation and mental 
processing. Representational theory of mind assumes that the mind retains 
information in a form which is comparable to symbolist programming: thought 
is a different programming language altogether with its own symbol set. The 
assumption is that computers manipulate symbol sets to carry out basic 
functions, and minds must work the same way. These ideas have been  
repeatedly challenged by philosophers in cognitive science, but these 









prevalence of the mind-machine metaphor. Such theories may also reinforce 
a mind-body dichotomy simply by insisting that the mind-brain uses a 
separate symbol set from those seen in natural language. The brain is 
involved in nonverbal activities related to spatiality and simulation, but this 
need not require applying a symbol set that is exclusive to the mind.  
 
2. Memory storage. If the mind does not retain information via a system 
like the one described above, then how does it process and presumably 
store information about the world? How does it manipulate data at all? 
Different data compression strategies that have proven effective for use with 
machine learning algorithms have become richer theories of the mind-brain. 
This is another issue of pinpointing the mind’s possible process(es).  The 
metaphor here is a layered one: the mind is a machine that compresses 
data. Compression is a method of extracting data from an informationally 
rich source for the purposes of storing or transmitting the important or 
sparser details of that source. The informationally rich source can then be re-
constructed from these sparser details. Mcanlis and Haecky (2016) 
summarize data compression in two points: “reduce the number of unique 
symbols in your data (smallest possible “alphabet”) and “encode more 
frequent symbols with fewer bits (fewer bits for more common “letters”) (3). 
There are many different compression strategies for consideration. Whether 
an algorithm involves matrix multiplication or executes probability 









layer and removing or manipulating the elements to avoid overwhelming the 
system. 30 These are effective for machine learning, but compression is 
another metaphor for mental process worthy of further critical examination. 
Specific compression processes will be elaborated upon in the sections on 
connectionism and neural networks, Predictive Processing, and Bayesian 
approaches to machine learning and cognition.  
 
3. Hierarchization. Another metaphor that pervades the literature on the 
human brain and artificial intelligence is one describing structure: the brain is 
often deemed a hierarchy. It is necessary to elaborate on why, but here it is 
important to note that this metaphor is problematic because of the 
associations that come with the term hierarchy. Hierarchy has Greek roots, 
from hieros and arkhēs: sacred ruler. This metaphor prompts visions of 
political offices and or leadership roles in the brain that might ultimately be 
misleading, or fail to appreciate the role of lateralized processes.  
 
Before contending further with all three of these issues, the problem of 
hierarchization must be more thoroughly addressed.   
 
                                               
30 There are also neural networks which attempt to retain the initial inputs at each layer, i.e. Recurrent Neural Networks – 
however, using these networks to develop a machine’s repertoire of sophisticated concepts from the basic inputs is a 
challenge. Stramandinoli et al. (2017) report that their project is unique in attempting to instill higher order concepts in a 
neural network at all. Although suffering some limitations of all connectionist or neural networks, Stramandinoli et al. 
implemented a partial recurrent neural network with the humanoid robot iCub. They used a combination of motor, 
perceptual and linguistic inputs—but they limited such higher order concepts to action commands, at first training the 










Building a Brain and the issue of Hierarchies  
In the last decade, competing views of the brain have exerted 
considerable influence on artificial intelligence, and artificial intelligence has 
also shaped those views—but it is difficult to produce an accurate model of 
an organ that has not fully been probed. In 1949, Donald Hebb recognized 
that “neurons that fire together wire together” and a direct way to study the 
brain entails analyzing each one of those connections or wires. At Harvard 
University, Sebastian Seung and other researchers devote their energies to 
Connectomics, mapping out more than 100 trillion synaptic connections in 
the human brain. No current imaging technology can offer a complete and 
detailed picture of the brain, and algorithms cannot skillfully catalogue the 
images of the synaptic connections that Seung’s team seek to identify. The 
process will take a long time to complete because of its need for discerning 
human interpreters. One long-standing and influential discovery about the 
brain is that it seems to consist of a hierarchy, in which the prefrontal cortex 
resides at the top, and the occipital cortex at the bottom. Pyramidal neurons 
that extend over a vaster cortical range might be instrumental in controlling 
top-down processing (Friston 2009). This is reinforced by data from 
pathologies and injury, as damage to the prefrontal cortex chiefly affects 
personality and behavior. While significant frontal lobe damage in the case of 
stroke or other injury often results in coma or vegetative state, the renowned 









the left frontal lobe and then recovers. Pierced through the skull by an iron 
rod, Gage slipped into a coma and later awakened with substantial 
personality, mood and behavioral changes. According to Harlow (1868) 
Gage’s relatives and acquaintances found him so altered that they said he 
was no longer the same man. Tobia (2015) explains the incident, analyses it 
and challenges such an insular view of personality and identity. 
Nevertheless, the prefrontal cortex is strongly correlated with identity and 
behavior, and the compositional nature of the brain further solidifies evidence 
of hierarchization in the brain. Compositionality relates to how, in perception, 
the lower visual areas process smaller elements like dots and lines, and the 
more complex structure of a scene is processed in other cortices, especially 
the right parietal lobe. If the occipital lobe processes more simplistic minutiae 
of a scene, and the parietal lobe grapples with the complexities, then the 
chain of command in the brain should be clear.  
It is not a foregone conclusion, however, that hierarchy is the best 
metaphor for the brain. In the past, the brain has been conceived as a 
“global neuronal workspace,” akin to a democracy (Dehaene 2014). The 
brain is variously construed as a decentralized system and a centralized one, 
but the latter seems to be the more widely championed perspective. Using 
the term hierarchy might involve assigning greater importance to one part of 
the brain than another. Menon (2012) defines three core neurocognitive 
networks, including the Central Executive Network, the Salience network, 









the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex. As the 
executive areas of the brain, these regions would be involved in planning 
and decision-making, like any functional executive office. The Salience 
Network includes the anterior insula, the fronto-insular cortex and the 
anterior cingulate cortex. As the term salience suggests, these areas of the 
brain are active during attentional tasks, and guide the executive network in 
determining where to focus its resources. The Default Mode Network 
encompasses the posterior cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, medial 
temporal lobe and angular gyrus. Default Mode inspires imagery of a 
computer, placed on a particular setting for its web access options, or any 
number of default settings. In the brain, the Default Mode Network handles 
the mundane cognitive tasks, similar to those functions that Dreyfus (2014) 
might refer to as expert “skillful coping” – i.e. driving or riding a bike, but only 
after the person has thorough practice and no longer expends so much 
mental energy concentrating on the task.  
The problem of metaphorizing the mind then becomes more 
compounded; brains and minds are not only machines, but the parts of these 
machines must co-function in a particular and rigid command  structure. With 
these issues in hand, it is possible to delve into the converging theories 
across fields, and to see how these metaphors impact upon theory and 
application. One possible effect of emphasizing hierarchization of the brain is 
that the importance of lateralization can be overlooked. According to 









understudied aspect of brain dynamics. In part, this is due to the limitations 
of present neuroimaging technologies and a need to rely upon individual 
cases of pathology or split-brain studies for data. Cross-hemispheric 
processes are crucial in perception, however; in vertebrates, the optic 
chiasma produces normal stereoscopic vision. Routing of visual information 
proceeds through this crossing structure within the midbrain, such that the 
left hemisphere receives input from the right visual field and the right 
hemisphere receives input from the left field. The same proves true with 
auditory and tactile stimulation, with each brain hemisphere receptive to 
inputs or events on the opposite hemisphere of the body. This chiasmic 
structure of the human brain and body is the subject of the final section of 
the paper, but before it is possible to appreciate why the term chiasm might 
be favorable and better facilitate present attempts to describe cognition, it is 
necessary to navigate historical and contemporary attempts in cognitive 
science and machine learning.  
 
 
Representational Theory of Mind and Symbolist Machine Learning   
George Boole created the form of logic known as Boolean starting in 
1840, culminating with his book An Investigation of The Laws of Thought 
(1847). The laws of thought he developed were rigorous formulations of 
logic. Boole mathematized logic by developing logical operators and 









purpose of the work was to systemize human thought, and yet it found later 
implementation in 1936 when Alan Turing envisioned a hypothetical machine 
that could utilize a Boolean logic symbol set. Thought, logic and machine 
learning have this shared history – one that makes machine-metaphors for 
mind deeply entrenched.  
Symbolist approaches in machine learning and cognitive science view 
the mind as manipulating a symbol set and producing action through a series 
of rule-based executions. These approaches have proven shortcomings in 
application, which have hindered developments in artificial intelligence, but 
their biases still inform more modern and tenable theories. Analytic 
philosophers Fodor and Pylyshyn have historically championed symbolist 
approaches to machine learning. As a whole, analytic philosophers are 
characterized by their preference for analysis, for breaking down complex 
subjects into more minute parts. Using the tools of logic is one method of 
performing such analysis. The Analytic school of thought has been around 
since the beginning of the twentieth century, although arguably analytic 
philosophers also existed in the ancient world, with Aristotle being one 
possible candidate for preferring an analytic approach. Aristotle developed 
taxonomies and other systems of categorization and analysis applied to a 
range of topics—from flora and fauna to less tangible things, like ethics. 
Fodor and Pylyshyn, on the other hand, analyzed the mind and its 









Fodor (1975) suggested that the mind has three important faculties 
related to representation: productivity, or the ability to generate an infinite 
number of expressions from its symbol set; systematicity, the principle that 
some of these expressions would be intricately related through their way of 
using that symbol set in building complex representations—and 
compositionality, or compositional structure: it would entail atomistic parts 
combining into those complex representations. These three aspects make up 
Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind—which assumes the existence of 
mental states or propositional attitudes that are either true or false from the 
perspective of the agent, and can be expressed in the language of thought, 
or so-called “Mentalese” – a symbolic language system with explicit rules 
that have some characteristics of first order logic. As delineated in Fodor’s 
early work, the language of thought or “Mentalese” is consistent with 
symbolist programming language, and Computational Theory of Mind is an 
important variant of Representational Theory of Mind. Symbolic artificial 
intelligence or what Haugeland (1985) dubs “GOFAI” (“Good Old Fashioned 
Artificial Intelligence”) found extension through these theoretical 
perspectives, and these perspectives in turn solidified habits in artificial 
intelligence design.  
The rigidity of formal logic and of symbolist algorithms makes for a 
poor model of mind, however; human minds are flexible and adaptive, 
whereas these systems are not. Most symbolist attempts to program a 









interview experts and then design their own model to respond the way that 
the experts would. IBM’s DeepBlue is an example of a chess-playing 
program with human-level sophistication and a symbolist architecture, but it 
lacks the ability to switch to any other tasks or even a different game (Clark 
2014). With these programs and approaches to cognition, the most 
significant problem is encapsulated in its core metaphor: that the human is a 
machine which operates on a language of thought, and this thought takes 
the shape of logical formulation. In this context, the term thought 
indiscriminately encompasses all of perception, intention and deeper 
reasoning. In the earlier work of Fodor (1975), thought is an innate language, 
one that pre-exists and forms the foundation for spoken language.  Logical 
reasoning seems to be a skill that children acquire around the age of five, 
however, rather than an innate ability; when presented with two hiding 
places, and one object to hide in either location A or B, very young children 
cannot reach the logical assumption “If not A, then B” (Carey 2017). Still, the 
hardware of computers is modeled on this idea about thought and logic, 
which reduces human intelligence to a series of yes or no moves. Transistors 
turn on or off rapidly to reflect this series of logical moves.  
The base level of animal perception could rely on these types of 
reductionist calls, perhaps when making judgments about objects in motion. 
Only the barest minimum of information must be retained to distinguish each 
object from another as they complete their journey. Fodor and Pylyshyn 









between the world and its perceptual representation begins with only a highly 
restricted sample of the objects and states of affairs being represented. A 
plausible first approximation suggests that percepts are initially represented 
as indexed objects, or as this or that” (115). This too is true of the frog, as it 
scans its environment for flies to eat. Any object in motion that travels along 
the path of a fly is likely to be food, and the frog responds to it as such, 
regardless of whether the object is actually a morsel of nourishment or 
something it would typically avoid. 31 Nonetheless this kind of automaticity of 
behavior seems to be correlated not only with instinct, but also the hard won 
prize of experience. For the human being, greater levels of automaticity can 
be achieved through a process of repetitive exposure and practice. As 
Dreyfus has noted, the beginning driver lacks the perceptive and motor 
command to skillfully cope with certain situations requiring instantaneous 
action. The expert driver on the other hand can execute such moves without 
a total engagement in the process.  
Logic is a closed system, one with many uses, but if even this base 
level of perception depended solely on a logical, rule-based function, it would 
be difficult for the human perceiver to adaptively navigate new situations that 
did not adhere to the rule. Following a logical implication such as “If X, then 
Y” can be too confining a solution to problems in a changing landscape. If X 
is a car that pulls into the intersection with an expert driver, Y should be any 
range of outcomes, rather than a fixed outcome. The expert driver could 
                                               









stop, pull off to the side of the road, attempt to speed up to avoid the 
oncoming car, or carry out another action that would be situationally 
dependent. For machines, cut and dried rule-based executions are useful, as 
they allow for consistency rather than unpredictable behavior—yet this type 
of automaticity differs drastically from the fluid automatic responses of 
humans. Dreyfus’ work homes in on the paradox of modeling even 
perceptual abilities of the human mind with machines under this paradigm. 
Automaticity happens when a person becomes acquainted with a great 
range of situations, and painlessly copes with the variables thrown his way; 
automaticity is the end point rather than the starting point for sophisticated 
behavior.32 With a symbolist approach to machine learning, automaticity is 
an inherent aspect of the model’s being, indispensable to its complete 
operation.  
One of the other problems with the metaphor which likens logic to 
thought is how it lumps all of perception, action and intention together. 
“Perception” is a complex term with historically many definitions. The 
phenomenologist Edmund Husserl believed that intention must be present in 
perception, while philosophers like Dreyfus argue that perception is 
automatic and does not require intent. Dreyfus uses the term “skillful coping” 
to refer to an agent’s capacity to navigate the world fluidly without 
                                               
32 It is arguable that for species success, certain hardwired instructions or logical connectives are automatically present from 
the time of birth. For example, baby gulls will peck at red spots, regardless of whether they are red spots painted onto a 
decoy object, or red spots on a mother bird’s bill. The baby gulls already have the expectation of receiving food, without ever 
having a prior experience that allowed them to draw that conclusion. This may also be seen in human nursing offspring, 
which know how to suckle without having any prior knowledge of it. For more sophisticated behaviors, however, automaticity 









consciously considering every move. Occasionally an agent must ponder 
every move and needs maximum concentration to complete a task, however; 
this is no longer skillful coping. For Dreyfus, this is what happens to every 
novice, or an expert thrown into an unusual and challenging circumstance. 
Logic grants little space for flexibility, and no protocol for scaffolding learning, 
the way that Vygotsky has demonstrated that human beings learn. The 
machine that relies heavily on logic is instantly an expert, prepared to solve 
narrow problems.  
Probability is more computationally flexible than a closed system like 
logic. Quick perceptual responses could be the result of a probabilistic 
function of the mind, which entails computing the statistical likelihood of an 
object’s identity, based on only its most important attributes. The frog homes 
in on the flight patterns of a moving object, and because the object has 
enough attributes of a fly, the frog responds to it accordingly. A model of 
mind based in probability does not involve set and fixed parameters, but 
rather casts the perception and action of the organism as reliant upon 
approximations or degrees of certainty. The degrees of certainty are 
determined by past experience, or the posterior probability. These are the 
underpinnings of Bayesian approaches to modeling the mind, which will 
occupy the focus of a later section of the paper. Bayesian models have a 
complex history, one that begins with Thomas Bayes in the 18th century and 
eventually entwines with compression strategies for saving digital files. 









first it is necessary to touch upon a few prevalent connectionist and neural 
network models.  
 
 
Connectionism and Neural Networks  
Frank Rosenblatt developed the multilayer perceptron in 1957 and 
published a paper about it subsequently in 1958. The purpose of the 
multilayer perceptron was to form a model of human perception, based on 
research from neuroanatomy and the brain’s synaptic connections. The 
multilayer perceptron is an algorithm, and consisted of three layers in its first 
incarnation: the input layer involves the visible or known data—a value that is 
extracted, and then weighted at a hidden layer. Each input receives a weight 
to correct for any errors at the sampling stage. The activation function is then 
applied to that value, and this is the determinant of what the model does with 
the data it has collected, or the output layer. Simple connectionist models 
came under fire because of the need to add an ever-growing number of 
layers and nodes, which would need to vastly exceed those in the human 
brain to handle the same demands. As Clark (2014) points out, a challenge 
was to “discover connectionist methods that support the multiple usability of 
bodies of stored information” (85). Early connectionist systems could only be 
trained to cope with easy tasks, and they were unable to apply what they 
learned in new situations without connections specifically tuned for that 









these early connectionist systems cannot handle the full productivity of 
natural language.  Simple problems could be solved with few layers, but for 
the more complex tasks and issues like language processing and production, 
a more complex model would be required. These more advanced 
connectionist systems are referred to as neural networks.  
Neural Networks can be similar in build to Rosenblatt’s earlier model: 
inputs are converted to weighted values and then mapped onto a vector 
using a sigmoid activation function, or S-curve. In many newer neural 
network models, these values tend to fall between a range of -1 and 1, 
based on an assumption about the firing of neurons in the brain. A value 
lower than 0 imitates the threshold under which a neuron would not fire, and 
a value greater than 0 imitates an electrical discharge in response to a 
stimulus. With these architectures, there can be a one-to-one 
correspondence between a neuron and the thing to which the neuron is 
responding. In more sophisticated architectures, there are distributed or 
richer one-to-many correspondences. In the latter case, the neurons or units 
in the network process the features of an object, instead of the objects 
themselves. Encoding in more advanced networks entails combining units, 
as in a convolutional neural network. Convolutional neural networks multiply 
vectors to form complex representations.  
Chris Eliasmith (2013) warns about the potential hazards of metaphor 
and emphasizes the need to be cautious with their usage, but his 









(“Semantic Pointer Architecture Unified Network”) both take inspiration from 
the term pointer. Eliasmith draws upon the rich history of the connectionist 
model, and provides a detailed overview of where his work stands in relation 
to all other sophisticated models, but the pointer becomes a metaphor 
around which Eliasmith’s theory and application develop. The software 
engineer Harold Lawson invented the term pointer in 1964 to originally refer 
to a value that stored the address of another value in computing memory. 
Barsalou (1999) established a theory of concepts, defining them as semantic 
pointers, and his influential work is cited in Eliasmith’s text. Eliasmith’s 
software Nengo computes circular convolutions of Discrete Fourier 
Transform (DFT) sequences, which are linear and finite length vectors. There 
are initial values that when multiplied produce or “encode” another value, 
which makes “pointer” an appropriate term or descriptor for these particular 
encoding processes. The term “pointer” might not best characterize all of the 
processes of the biological human brain, however; there is a major 
assumption about how the brain stores information that underlies Eliasmith’s 
(2013) application.  
The assumption is that concepts point – that they have an arrow-like 
constitution or take aim at a specified target. Pointers show the way from one 
location or state to another location and state: they have a starting point and 
end point. At first blush, there seems to be no reason to take issue with this 
metaphor, especially as it has led to notable successes in machine-vision, 









outputs, and ways in which these inputs combine into higher order or 
abstract concepts, or break down into more simplistic ones. Information goes 
into the mysterious box between someone’s ears, and other information 
comes back out.  With Eliasmith’s accompanying model of the brain, 
complex visual or other perceptual input is encoded and stored in short term 
and long term memory in higher order regions of the brain; input to the visual 
cortex travels to the basal ganglia and thalamus, the motor areas and 
prefrontal cortex. The Nengo software includes a protocol for encoding, and 
then “dereferencing” or decoding—working backwards from the encoded 
content to the initial input, as presumably the higher order regions of the 
brain might do.  
There are two possible issues at stake with this metaphorization: 
pointers in computer science describe a compression strategy, or a way of 
taking a larger value or file size and reducing it down to a smaller, more 
manageable entity. Envisioning the brain as a computer that engages in 
compressing information has two outcomes: it means foremost that the term 
pointer has effectively been chasing its own tail, finding first usage in 
computer science, then in cognitive science, before volleying back to 
machine learning. The second outcome is that this flirts with reinforcing the 
mind-body dichotomy, by assigning distinct properties to objects as they exist 
in the world, and objects as they exist in the mind. This criticism is not 
reserved for this model alone, as finding the right compression strategy of 









this model can also be critiqued for its hierarchization scheme. Eliasmith 
defines the neuroanatomical framework that might coincide with the 
processes he designed for his mechanistic mind with a particular hierarchy: 
the bottom-up flow of information in the brain proceeds from the occipital 
lobe up to the prefrontal cortex. 33 Not every model emphasizes this flow, 
and in fact Bayesian models argue in favor of the opposite approach: top-
down signals instead influence what the agent perceives. There may be 
flaws to each perspective, and that suggestion is the focal point of the next 
sections immediately below.  
 
Bayes’ Theorem, Predictive Coding, and a Model of Perception  
Thomas Bayes developed a theorem for inverse probability, 
posthumously published in 1763, in response to Hume’s “Of Miracles” from 
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). Pearl and Mackenzie 
(2018) offer a detailed historical account of Bayes in a recent book on the 
topic of cause-and-effect, which they aim at a broad audience. Pearl explains 
that Bayes’ reaction to Hume was to generate an important question: “How 
much evidence would it take to convince us that something we consider 
improbable has actually happened?” (97). Miracles are improbable events, 
and Bayes evaluates these and other events based on a certain criterion. He 
                                               
33 Eliasmith also adds a potential place for top-down processing in his work, and predictive processing—yet his attentions and 
his model emphasize bottom-up processing. Working, long term and short term memory are also carefully distinguished in 









sought a probable correlation between observable event “B” and a 
hypothetical cause of that event, “A.”  
                                     
                                                Figure 1. Bayes Theorem.  
 
The probability that there is a correlation between a possible cause A 
and possible effect B is equal to the probability that B is in fact the effect of 
A, multiplied by the probability that A occurred at all, then divided by the 
probable evidence or outcome B. The frequency or repeated occurrence of B 
is one important factor, and improves the likelihood of some future 
occurrence.  Overall, this is a formula for induction: collocating all of the 
available data B results in establishing, strengthening and confirming a 
robust hypothesis.  
Bayesian and predictive accounts of the mind both began as 
computational methods of forecasting what may occur. Under these 
theoretical models, anticipating what might happen is the primary activity of 
the mind or brain. Norbert Wiener developed one early predictive theoretical 
model in the 1940s to calculate the future flight paths of enemy airplanes. 
Peter Elias refined the strategy for processing transmitted signal in 1955, 
and researchers at Bell Labs thereafter made advances with applications in 
sending and processing speech through digital channels (Atal 2006). In 









adaptive predictive coding to reduce the bit rate transmission of speech 
signal (Atal 2006). Linear predictive coding came next, and involves a 
process of sampling continual speech signals at discrete times. The formants 
of speech sounds are estimated and filtered from the signal, leaving what is 
called buzz and residue. All of these are converted into values that are 
readily transmittable. The buzz and residue can later be reconverted into the 
source signal, and the formants into a filter so that they can be recombined. 
34  
In the 1970s and 1980s, the linear predictive coding compression 
strategy was extended for use with digital images and MPEG-4, or video 
files. The basic idea and application of predictive coding was to remove 
some of the data from the original signal or file, then to later reconstitute the 
full file through predictive estimation. Anyone who has ever attempted to 
send a picture or video online will have experience with some form of 
compression. If the file size is too big, some email providers cannot send 
them, and a higher resolution image will need to be converted into a JPEG, 
which has fewer pixels per inch. Compression extracts data to make file 
sizes easier to manage, store and transmit. With speech signal, the formants 
are filtered out, and with digital images, pixels are likewise removed and re-
estimated. Predictive processing did not initially offer an account of the mind 
or brain.  
                                               









Rao and Ballard (1999) first theorized that a predictive algorithm could 
adequately characterize human cortical activity. Their model is conceived as 
a hierarchy of networks, with neuronal populations divided into prediction 
and error units. Each prediction unit has a one-to-one correspondence with 
an error unit. These units are arranged into layers, with the higher levels 
representing the prefrontal cortex and the lower levels representing the 
primary visual cortex. The higher levels deal with the more complex features 
in perception, and predict the overall structure of the visual scene, inferring 
the more simplistic details that the primary visual cortex would supply (i.e. 
the edges, lines, dots). In machine learning, the model can be actualized in a 
neural network if its units are set up like autoencoders. An autoencoder can 
be distinguished from the encoder-decoder scheme described in the 
previous section on neural networks. With standard encoding, scalars or 
vectors can come to represent the parts of objects, and multiplying them 
results in two things: a compression, because by multiplying, this data is 
effectively being pooled and compactly organized; and the network’s own 
representation of the given object or input. The target or expected outcome 
of such a process is to create that compression, which is a secondary model 
of the input, but does not perfectly match up with the input itself. 35The 
autoencoder on the other hand engages in compression, but not for the sake 
of producing a new model of the input. Instead, the autoencoder compresses 
and decompresses the data to reconstruct the initial input as closely as 
                                               
35 An exception is a neural network that retains the initial input at every layer, i.e. a Recurrent Neural Network, but these are 









possible. Spratling (2017) provides a brief overview of Rao and Ballard’s 
algorithm and how it works as a viable model of perception.  
Predictive Processing models such as Rao and Ballard’s have also 
influenced new Bayesian frameworks. Bayesian frameworks have an 
underlying view — that Bayes’ Theorem formulaically captures the basic 
faculties of the human mind and that the key to understanding the mind lies 
in better understanding probability. As the next section makes clear, 
Bayesianism extends far beyond Bayes’ original formula, but the formula is 
still a grounding point of the theory. There are possible shortcomings to this 
approach. It cannot be overlooked how Bayes’ theorem closely aligns with 
induction. Where the Bayesian approach is considered alongside the topic of 
argumentation, Zenker (2012) states that inductive reasoning and the 
Bayesian approach go hand in hand. More specifically, he states, “The 
Bayesian approach to natural language argumentation is a quasi natural 
choice, firstly, for the study of any argument which seeks to support, or 
undermine, a claim on the basis of statistical data. After all, on the Bayesian 
approach, the standards appealed to – that is, those of inductive logic 
(emphasis mine) —will, in one way or another, be part of the reconstructive 
apparatus and thus be available in argument evaluation (5-6). Bayesianism 
proposes that the mind engages in an inductive process: it generates a 
conclusion based on the prior available evidence, and then only seeks new 
evidence where necessary. Deduction is the opposite process: it starts by 









corroborate it. More simply put, induction begins with a sampling of data and 
then seeks a rationale for that data based on probable correlation, while 
deduction begins with a general hypothesis and then takes specific evidence 
into account—and both are vital components of human intelligence. At the 
very least, Bayesianism runs the risk of seeming reductionist, because of 
how it narrows the focus to induction. Deductive reasoning might be covered 
under a related but distinct process for some Bayesian theoretical 
approaches. For example, deductive reasoning might go hand-in-hand with 
what Friston describes as active inference, which will be described in more 
detail below but broadly involves processes of trial and error. However, 
induction would almost fundamentally entwine with perception if embracing a 
Bayesian view of mind, and this might push deduction into the background.  
Bayesian and predictive processing models also ultimately contend 
with the same metaphor that other neural network architectures use: 
compression is taken to be one of the core processes of the biological brain. 
Although methods of compression work very differently across different 
models, the suggestion is that that brains take richer multisensorial 
experiences in the world and construct a more manageable truncation of 
those experiences or inputs. Predictive processing found its first applications 
as a method of compressing data, and for the aforementioned reasons in the 
previous section, there may be a greater issue at stake in accepting 
compression as a metaphor for mental representation and memory. 









network system, thereby alienating those layered representations from the 
initial input or embodied, real world experience. This could subtly prop up the 
mind-body dichotomy. The autoencoder might circumvent this problem, 
because of how it attempts to match its input exactly.  There may be other 
reasons to criticize or praise Bayesian and predictive processing models, 
however; the next section elaborates on both and their present prominence 
in both cognitive science and machine learning.  
 
Predictive Processing and Bayesianism  
Predictive Processing and Bayesian approaches to machine learning 
and cognition have proliferated rapidly, gathering support and also finding 
applications across different disciplines (Pearl 2018; Friston 2017; Clark 
2015; Zeevat 2015; Oaksford and Chater 2010; Zenker 2012). The 
theoretical neuroscientist Karl Friston drew inspiration from both Rao and 
Ballard’s research and from physics to construct a more in-depth and 
compelling model (2005). From Friston’s perspective, the mind strives to 
achieve accuracy in interpreting its world: it does this by noting statistical 
regularities in the environment and forming hypotheses based on those 
regularities. The mind amasses and exploits data, recognizing patterns and 
co-occurring events. This becomes the prior distribution of data that the mind 
retains, and to which it assigns a higher probability weight whenever 
encountering a future, similar circumstance. For example, if there are dark 









experience once allows the mind to retain a posterior probability about the 
weather conditions that resulted in specific events. This in turn influences 
how the person will respond the next time he encounters dark clouds: he 
might grab an umbrella or choose to stay indoors.  
Friston (2009) postulates that the mind acts to reduce free energy, or 
entropy: it seeks to achieve optimization in its assumptions about the world 
to avoid early expiry. According to Friston (2017), the mind is a “statistical 
model of the world it inhabits.” Friston divides the faculties of mind into 
perception and active inference, both of which depend on beliefs or internal 
states of the system and observations about the world, which can cause 
those states to change. The data itself determines the initial patterns or 
regularities that are available for processing, until the agent forms those 
strong associations, and gains a grip on them—to the point that some priors 
will even override new incoming data. According to Friston’s model, the 
predictive process begins in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex, and 
predictions are conveyed down to the sensory motor areas, and the visual 
cortex via alpha waves and pyramidal neurons. 36 This top-down process 
continues uninterrupted until predictions go awry, and bottom-up error 
feedback must alter the future expectations of the system. When an agent 
requires more information about the environment, or takes a calculated risk 
to obtain maximal reward and avoid error, he engages in active inference. 
                                               









Any strategy that the agent deploys during active inference is termed a 
policy, as shown in Figure 2 below.  
In cognitive science but also in machine learning, Bayesian networks 
are considered generative models. Machine learners that make use of Naïve 
Bayes “naively” assume that every new variable or piece of evidence should 
be incorporated into the model.37 These learners generate and try out the 
different possible variations or states of the system. In some cases, the 
greater probability of one event can inversely affect the probability of 
another. This creates interdependencies, or chains between the possible 
states.  The MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo) algorithm fits well with the 
Bayesian approach to perception, and many proponents of the approach use 
Hidden Markov Models to explicate how this might unfold. In a Hidden 
Markov Model, each internal state of the system is an unknown variable, with 
transition probabilities and emission probabilities that must be realized 
before a shift occurs and another state can be assumed (Jurafsky and Martin 
2018). Observations about the world may influence whether the internal state 
will remain the same, or if an alteration will take place. This allows parallel 
processing and would presumably happen at every successive neural layer 
in the hierarchy, unless an event disrupted the smooth flow of the process.  
                                               
37 There are other protocols by which the model can drop some of these variables or attributes, so that the system does not 









     
 
Figure 2. Left: A simplistic Hidden Markov Model; S1 and S2 represent internal states.  
Right: Friston’s (2017) model of active inference and policy selection.   
 
Bayesian approaches stress a hierarchical structure of the brain and 
the role of priors in perception at each level. The brain predicts and forms a 
picture of what is “out there” based on prior exposures, and shares that 
picture with each lower region of the brain until encountering “surprisal” – or 
a moment when what is “out there” does not match with the prediction, and 
the entire picture must be updated. Minimizing prediction error amounts to 
generating internal models that are flexible enough to allow for statistical 
variation in input. Simultaneously, these internal models must be accurate 
without overfitting to the point of rigidity. As defined by Friston (2010), 
“perceptual divergence” or Kullback-Leibler divergence is “a non-
commutative measure of the non-negative difference between two probability 
distributions.” Howhy (2013) provides a simpler explanation -- that perceptual 
divergence “measures the difference between the hypothesis currently 









“perceptual divergence” is reduced but not completely dissolved, the person 
gets a statistically sound rendering of the world. 
A prime challenge that remains for the Bayesian and predictive 
accounts of the mind is that they have yet to be implemented as an algorithm 
that effectively simulates what the human mind can do. There are no 
successful models that demonstrate proof of concept; and in deep learning, 
other predictive algorithms have notoriously fallen short of accomplishing 
human-level sophistication with language processing and production. 38 Kull 
(2018) touched upon predictive methods and deemed them inappropriate for 
contending with semiosis. Huettig and Mani (2016) also suggest that 
predictive processing may not be essential for language processing, for a 
number of reasons: 1) Current predictive processing frameworks lack 
specificity in treating processing of language. 2) Studies on the would-be 
biological markers of linguistic error processing (higher frequency brain 
waves) are not consistent, 3) Although research shows that individuals can 
detect and exploit statistical regularities in language, further work needs to 
be done to elucidate how predictive mechanisms accomplish this across a 
wide range of contexts. 4) Predictive processing has not been proven to be 
essential for language processing. 
In spite of this, predictive algorithms and specifically Bayesian 
approaches have become increasingly widespread in the field of natural 
language processing. Zeevat (2015) argues in favor of a Bayesian approach, 
                                               
38 Recurrent Neural Networks, specifically LSTM (or Long Short Term Memory) and the algorithms Word2Vec and GloVe are a 









and insists that “most of the priors for vision are directly usable in NLI [or 
natural language interpretation]. It follows that [human language interpreters] 
can find the most probable interpretation for a natural language utterance as 
reliably as they can find the most probably perceived scene for a visual 
signal”(4). Some iterated learning paradigms also apply Bayesian principles 
to investigate the issue of how repetitive learning and re-use of sound 
systems will result in languages with systematicity—or sound sequences 
which can be combined and rearranged. Griffiths and Kalish (2007) analyzed 
the linguistic behavior of learners in a chain, with every successor generating 
data to pass on to the next learner. The researchers assumed that learners 
use a Bayesian inference framework to pool their own data and biases with 
the data of the previous learner. Kirby et al. (2014) expanded this work to 
gain a better understanding of iterated learning evolution and how 
unstructured languages become more structured.  There are also other 
proponents of Bayesianism, including the contributors to Zenker (2012), who 
have advocated to apply Bayesian methods to studying argumentation, or 
optimal persuasiveness.  
In cognitive science, Bayesianism continues to build momentum and 
support from a diverse group of theoreticians. For Clark (2013) the Bayesian 
approach represents a unified account of cognition, action and perception – 
“a model of key aspects of neural functioning that makes structuring our 
worlds genuinely continuous with structuring our brains and sculpting our 









evidence to build an argument in favor of a Bayesian theory of perception. 
One phenomenon that reinforces the theory is binocular rivalry; when 
attending to two pictures, one seen with the left eye and one seen with the 
right, the mind will blank out one of the pictures and render a single image. 
Seemingly, the mind recognizes the improbability of the co-occurrence of the 
items within the two pictures and selectively focuses on one or the other. 
Another phenomenon that Howhy notes is an optical illusion involving light. 
Through prior exposures, human agents have an expectation that light 
sources come from above, and seem to automatically apply this rule to 
interpreting visual scenes. This affects perception of depth and dimension, 
as exemplified in the image below. The circles perceived as concave are the 
ones that are shaded darker on top and lighter on the bottom; the circles 
perceived as convex are lighter on top and darker on the bottom. These are 
only two-dimensional images, and yet due to prior experiences in the world, 
the mind supplies the agent with a vastly different picture. 
                   
                                      Figure 3. The Concave/Convex Illusion. 
Such phenomenological examples make for a compelling case — and yet 
there are times when due to shading, the mind also favors an improbable 
interpretation of a scene. The Pulfrich Effect, named for German physicist 









agent watches a video. This is most easily observed when the video 
captures two swaying pendula traveling along perpendicular paths, although 
other visual stimuli can also cause the effect. In the Pulfrich Effect with the 
two pendula, an illusion occurs in which the suspensions seem to intersect 
and go through one another. Fodor and Pylyshyn (2014) comment on the 
Pulfrich Effect and other visual phenomena, stating that, “the question 
remains why some such reliable environmental regularities come to be 
instantiated in the perceptual architecture while others do not” (115). One 
possible explanation of the Pulfrich Effect is that the lens introduces a 
temporal gap in information being relayed in the brain. The shading of one 
eye prevents that retina from processing the visual signal at the same rate, 
and the latency causes the brain to arrive at two different interpretations.  
 Overall, Bayesian approaches offer a promising theoretical landscape, 
with room for transplanting the best features of other theories, as well as 
fresh growth. A current undertaking in machine learning is to intermesh the 
probabilistic scheme of a Markov network with one based in logic—as in the 
hybrid models discussed by Domingos (2015). Bayesianism and every other 
theoretical approach to mechanizing human minds can afford to do some 
self-critical weeding, however; if the intent is to model precisely the biological 
human brain, it might not only be necessary to pool the resources of all 
diverging perspectives, but also to acknowledge the counterproductive 
metaphors that pervasively affect theorization. These metaphors have a 









machine learning, clinging to the metaphors also occludes certain facets of 
mind and brain.    
 In the predictive processing and Bayesian views, the brain is 
conceived as a compression algorithm, and then alternately as a Markov 
Model with experience-defined interdependencies. The model of the human 
brain that pairs with this Markov Model is one in which visual cortex fills a 
subordinate role to the prefrontal cortex—like an underling in an office who 
handles the menial tasks and reports back to the boss when he spots a 
discrepancy in the paperwork. Although this may seem in line with the 
findings about the compositional nature of the brain, it fails to appreciate 
some aspects of the brain that will be explored in the culmination below, 
which deals with another metaphor: the chiasm.    
  
The Chiasm   
A chiasm broadly defined is a meeting of two opposing ends, or a 
crossing-point.  It relates to the Greek term chiazein – to write chi or an “X” – 
and therefore has a literal, or physical referent. However, chiasm can also be 
a descriptor of ideological crossings, where any thesis and its antithesis are 
described — or through chiasmus, a rhetorical device in which an ABBA 
reversal of sentence elements may occur. In this way, chiasm blends both 
the physical or literal and the metaphorical through its many applications. 
One of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s legacies to cognitive science is the multi-









relations: the first is the relation between the eyes, which through the optic 
chiasma allows for one “sole cyclopean vision,” as Merleau-Ponty observes 
in The Visible and the Invisible (141). The second is the relation between the 
arms, hands and the bodily hemispheres. Out of the possibility of reflexive 
touch, Self and Other can be distinguished. The bodily relation between Self 
and Other is a third facet or type of chiasmic relation: Self from Other are at 
once distinct and connected, and the chiasm here reveals how problematic 
or harmonious interactions can develop through their social entwinement. 
The fourth type is a relation of language and semantics, as meaning arises 
from embodiment and involves positional attributes of space. All possible 
meaning is already contained with the possibilities of the human body. Last 
and most important, all of these relations are cast from a primal element that 
Merleau-Ponty refers to as flesh.  
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes two core aspects of the mind in The 
Visible and the Invisible: that it 1) is a cross-way of the senses, and 2) shares 
an essential unity with the rest of the world through flesh. Flesh is beyond 
the strictly material, but through the chiasm and expression, it is at the same 
time every aspect of the material world diversely enrobed. In more simplistic 
terms: it involves all of the different relations mentioned above (Grausso 
2019). Abram (1996) defines the term flesh as a matrix and uses it to defend 
his own hylozoism or perspective that all life is equally important in status—
that is, trees and wildlife have the same value as human beings. However, 









all living beings. Toadvine (2009) emphasizes the chiasm and shows why 
the concept of flesh cannot be taken as a hylozoism. For Toadvine, the 
chiasm is the reflexivity of flesh, through which the human forms an 
expression of nature that is simultaneously a divergence from the original 
and yet linked to it. Recognizing difference entails an appreciation of 
individuation. Merleau-Ponty seems not to be advocating for either 
perspective, but rather proposing the chiasm as an essential relation, which 
ultimately both absolves and creates the tension between Self and Other.  
Within a single human being, several chiasmic relations are possible, 
all branching from Merleau-Ponty’s five facets or relations. In terms 
associated with artificial intelligence, the chiasm could in part be viewed as 
an interconnectedness of the inputs, hidden states and outputs of an 
intelligent system—not only the complete entwinement of its perceptual, 
internal and motor functions, but also its immersion within a compatible world 
of which it is a part. These ideas feature in a broad range of theories on 
embodiment and the brain, many of which have the shared goal of 
overcoming Cartesian dualism and producing the best model of mind to 
replicate within artificial intelligence. The chiasm, like many other models, 
has many potential metaphorical extensions—but it also refers to the literal 
structure of the optic chiasma, and the contralateral wiring of the 
hemispheres of the brain and body. One of the metaphors discussed in the 
previous sections is compression. The process of compressing data might be 









and a richer representation. Each theory is based on a particular view of how 
compression occurs in the brain, but they all seem to agree that more 
complex representation happens in the prefrontal cortex while the visual 
cortex handles the sparser details. It may also be that this happens 
chiasmically, without recourse to typical compression methods. For visual 
stimuli, the right hemisphere is king of complexity and richness, while the left 
hemisphere supplies a sparser interpretation. With auditory stimuli, the 
opposite is true: the left hemisphere manages nuanced speech processing, 
while the right hemisphere is attuned to more simplistic expressive sounds, 
like screeches or grunts. The hemispheres also produce different outputs 
when approaching a task. Split brain studies have shown that the right 
hemisphere focuses on the fuller perceptual context of the situation, but 
turns out to be mute. It cannot report the term “knight” when it sees a picture 
of one, but it can grasp the greater context in which “knight” would appear 
and infer “knight” from other contextual clues (Sidtis et al. 1981; Gazzaniga 
2016, p. 243). 
Split-brain research also reveals substantial differences in how the left 
and right hemispheres perform visual search tasks. Kingstone et. al (1995) 
showed that the left hemisphere of split brain patients will focus on individual 
features of a search target. Gazzaniga (2016) reports that if looking for a 
specific person, the left hemisphere in a split-brain patient might concentrate 
on the person’s hair or other physical feature. The patient’s right hemisphere 









individual until finding the target. The right hemisphere insists on identifying a 
whole entity, whereas the left simplifies the task by selectively sampling parts 
of the whole. Findings from decades of research on split-brain patients 
strongly support the idea that the hemispheres of the brain adopt differential 
visual processing strategies, though it is difficult to assess how this applies in 
normative cases, as the right hemisphere tends to dominate in non-split 
brain patients performing visual attention allocation tasks.39  
In a recent publication, Gazzaniga (2018) uses the split brain research 
he conducted over the course of decades to explore topic of the machine-
brain metaphor. He begins with a broader historical account of the issue, 
including Descartes’ reflections about automata, which were on display in 
French parks during the time that the philosopher concluded that the mind 
must be something other than a physical system. As Gazzaniga describes 
the mind-body dichotomy through the centuries, he comes to his own 
chapter of studying brain pathologies. Gazzaniga proposes that the brain is a 
robust rather than optimal system, one which functions as a layered 
architecture made up of different modules, with the ability to sustain damage 
to a module without completely disrupting consciousness. He also proposes 
the concept of complementarity from physics may be useful in understanding 
the brain and the mind – as both a physical system, and one which 
manipulates symbols to (in the form of language and mental representations) 
to self-monitor and direct future action. The concept of complementarity 
                                               
39 The studies of Zuanazzi and Cattaneo (2017) indicate that the left hemisphere and right hemisphere may also carry out 









originally refers to the topics of the macrocosmic and microcosmic universe 
— the first with the more standard laws of physics, and the latter which 
involves shifting quantum dynamics. Gazzaniga argues that the brain and 
mind are similar complementary aspects of human intelligence that enable 
survival advantage.  
In closing, Gazzaniga (2018) also comments on the machine-brain 
metaphor again, and reminds the reader, “…machines are by-products of 
human brains—brains are not the by-products of machines” (229). He 
implements a metaphor of his own in describing the brain, referring to 
“bubbles” or processes that are taking place in the different modules of the 
layered architecture, with a salience network helping the organism to decide 
where to direct its attention. He makes several rich points based on his 
research, which shows that the left hemisphere and right hemisphere can 
operate independently, as separate minds, after the corpus callosum has 
been divided.  
Gazzaniga calls the brain a robust rather than optimal system 
because it continues to function when it has sustained damage from stroke 
or other traumatic brain injury, but “optimality” is another buzz word in 
machine learning and neuroscience. 40 In Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty remarked that, “I have visual objects because I have a visual 
field in which richness and clarity are in inverse proportion to each other, and 
because these two demands, either of which taken separately might carry to 
                                               









infinity, when brought together, produce a certain culmination and optimal 
balance in the perceptual process” (371). Optimality for the human brain 
could amount to a balance between richness and clarity – and so 
compression may have no role, because Merleau-Ponty’s answer is not to 
contend with all of the data in the universe, or a sparse sampling of that data 
– but rather to work with both, and then to favor a balance between the two. 
From a Bayesian view, it might be said that the chiasmic brain offers a 
“representation” that is not a vector, guaranteeing little or no overfitting – but 
multiple different projections that go to the bounds of all possibility and then 
settles on a temporary model that fits the available data. These projections 
are always accompanied by an awareness of that balancing alterity – those 
other arrangements. When it comes to evolution, there are advantages to be 
reaped from such an approach. Seeing the monster in the shadows is not 
just a failure of someone’s perception. It may be due to a quick judgment and 
perhaps even predictive process negotiated by the left hemisphere of the 
brain, which grasps at partial-structures and creates possible outcomes from 
them. It would be this mechanism that would save the perceiver if indeed 
that shadow turned out to have teeth. For Merleau-Ponty, expression is 
another facet of the chiasm, and it goes hand-in-hand with these quick 
judgments, because it involves the person or organism’s ability to create a 
new perceptual content—that is, to develop its own monster in the absence 









Hemispheric deactivation research reveals that the right and left 
hemispheres have expressive faculties. The right and left hemispheres are 
not equally talented artists. When going it solo, the left hemisphere produces 
more simplistic sketches of everyday objects, while the right hemisphere 
captures the objects in richer detail (Nikolaenko 1997). The asymmetry of the 
fusiform gyrus may in part explain these differential skills. The right parietal 
lobe might also responsible for the talents of its respective hemisphere, as 
Ramachandran (2011) notes in his case study with Nadia, an artistic savant 
with autism. These aforementioned brain regions have also be theorized to 
have a role in autism, dyslexia and metaphorization, which points to the 
possibility that the right hemisphere supplies some type of linguistic input to 
the left hemisphere related to spatiality. 41 Research involving dichotic 
listening also demonstrates the hemispheres’ differential aptitudes with 
processing sound (Asenova 2018).  
Another metaphor that the previous sections focused on was the mind 
as a hierarchical system. In general, the term hierarchical could stand to be 
replaced. If the right parietal lobe is implicated in constructing rich 
metaphorical comparisons, and the anterior cingulate cortex (which is closer 
to the prefrontal cortex) is involved in making comparisons during mismatch 
trials, which holds a place of higher command? 42 Imbalanced power 
structures may have a deep hold on our human ability to conceive of 
                                               
41 In a humanlike machine with two distinct but interconnected processors, this could potentially be achieved if the “right 
hemisphere” defined a function for the left. In turn, the left hemisphere could write the functions of the right hemisphere.   
42 The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is active during Picture Word Interference tests and mismatch tests. It plays an 
important role in attentional processes, which may be the only reason to in any way rank it above the right parietal lobe, as 









alternatives to hierarchy, but the term multi-layered might better convey the 
organization of the brain. Furthermore, lateralization is of equal importance, 
and should come into consideration when designing an artificial architecture 
that seeks to replicate an embodied human being.  
Thinking in terms of hierarchy and top-down processing may lead 
those using a Bayesian model to fail to fully appreciate human error. There is 
a certain resonance to Alexander Pope’s aphorism “to err is human”, even if 
human beings strive for accuracy in interpreting their world. A Bayes Optimal 
explanation posits that the mind constructs an estimation of what to expect 
when navigating through daily life. This should serve the organism in making 
good choices, but action-selection does not always follow the optimal route. 
Whether due to an effect of what the Ancient Greeks referred to as akrasia—
a weakness of the will—or due to a predisposition that emerges through an 
individual’s prior experiences—humans often commit errors. Making 
mistakes can result in a future improvement in action-selection, but being 
prone to error also has marked advantages. Errors, under this model, could 
be what grant human beings the ability to surpass an animal tendency to 
over-rely on tried and true behavior and take calculated risks. Humans are 
also inventive with language and deliberately or inadvertently engage in 
unconventional behavior, producing new terms that work their way into the 
lexicon.  
While set parameters and standardization are important, and tried-









potentially better problem solving techniques that yield greater long term 
returns. Imagination, error and what Merleau-Ponty calls expression all 
require deviation – the ability to see the world in more than one way. This 
ability may be naturally seated within the chiasmic structure of the brain, 
which produces two (or more) different ways of perceiving the world. If the 
left hemisphere perceives only partial visual input from the world, it is only 
contending with the partial data, which might be a valuable asset for 
breaking down and reconfiguring the elements in a visual scene. It might 
also be this valuable asset that somehow informs the right hemisphere 
whenever engaging in the arts, and creating new visual concepts that have 
never been seen before. There are also potential evolutionary advantages of 
hemispheric differentiation, especially with respect to coping with threat: if 
the right hemisphere receives more visual data, it is slower, but the left 
hemisphere can make faster acting decisions based on the limited data it 
takes in. The right hemisphere does the same with auditory input: since it 
does not have the demands of processing a full range of articulation, it can 
concentrate on the sounds produced by anything that goes “bump” in the 
night.  
 At present, the brain is viewed primarily as a two-way system, with 
inputs and outputs—information streaming through the retinas and into the 
visual cortex, or flowing down from the prefrontal cortex. Emphasizing the 
chiasm is a departure from this, as it conceives of the hemispheres as 









landscape and its auditory medley while also being open to the world. One 
risk of this view of the chiasm might be to dichotomize the hemispheres as 
two parts of a system. The tendency to dichotomize the hemispheres is most 
apparent in discussions about human talent and aptitudes, and a general 
notion that any person can be a right-brained or left-brained individual. In a 
recent book The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the 
Making of the Western World, McGilchrist claims he wishes to avoid 
dichotomizing the hemispheres, but then proceeds to set up a power 
dynamic between the hemispheres. McGilchrist (2009) states that his 
metaphor of “master” and “emissary” derives from a philosophical parable in 
the works of Nietzsche, but the tale he weaves is strikingly reminiscent of the 
fairytale The Shadow by Hans Christian Andersen, in which a man’s Shadow 
eventually assumes his whole identity. For McGilchrist, the right hemisphere 
is the master, as it copes with richer details of the visual scene, contends 
with semantic information related to the natural world, and proves important 
to mathematical reasoning and the arts. The left hemisphere is an emissary 
that is scheming for itself and its own interests: it is concerned with man 
made things, and it deals with less visual information. 43 When a person 
experiences a stroke that damages part of the right hemisphere, the person 
may tell outrageous stories to explain away stimuli, presumably because of 
an over reliance on the left hemisphere. McGilchrist argues that the left 
                                               
43 The semiotic square and analyzing marked/unmarked relations might be relevant to this discussion. The left hemisphere 
could be considered marked. As Pelkey (2017) explains, the “left” has a sinister association across some cultures (171). While 
these associations may be ingrained, this is one of the reasons that recognizing the chiasm might be important—because it 
helps call into question such binaries or dichotomies, or at least acknowledge where they may exist and when they are useful 









hemisphere has set man on an unfortunate path, guiding him towards selfish 
behavior and detachment from the natural world.  
Such a perspective of the hemispheres is problematic for the same 
reasons that the term hierarchization is problematic: both insist upon a 
possible imbalanced dynamic or power structure between regions of the 
brain just by virtue of the associations that can be made with the term 
master. To deem the right hemisphere of the brain a master is also to 
hierarchize, and to set up the left as not only other but also somehow lesser. 
While the point of McGilchrist’s original analysis and updated (2019) analysis 
seems to be to show how the emissary has taken over for the master (and 
thereby upset the original power dynamic), the fact of using the language of 
power dynamics is problematic—simply because it may detract from how the 
hemispheres need to work in tandem for a person to function (at least after 
this person is of a certain age and to an extent the roles of the hemispheres 
have been determined through the forming of strengthened neural 
connections). Even though McGilchrist’s final analysis fully appreciates the 
unique contributions of each hemisphere), to anthropomorphize and assign 
ranks might still run the risk of being misleading, for the same reason that 
using the term “greenhouse gas” when describing climate change is 
misleading. The information presented about greenhouse gases shows how 
harmful they can be, but “greenhouse” still bears with it a positive 
association, as discussed above. Likewise, the terms “master” and 









idea about the hemispheres of the brain, despite McGilchrist’s wonderful and 
detailed explanations of each.  
The potential to dichotomize and hierarchize—to conceive of all 
structures as having a particular and restrictive order—is a part of a greater 
and pervasive issue, one that can be traced back to Western logic. The 
proposition and its negation are the ultimate dichotomy around which 
discourse proceeds. In natural language, chiasmus is a structure with a 
reversal: the reversed elements can be a proposition and a negation, or two 
clauses with the structure “AB” and “BA.” In their meeting, the semantics of 
the sentence shift to convey a new message and the result is sometimes 
even a tautology. Through the interactivity of distinctive parts, these 
sentences become more than the sum of their parts.  
Within neuroanatomy, the chiasm may seem to be reducible to two 
hemispheres; it would be tempting to contrast and dichotomize them, but 
Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy shows how this is avoidable—how the 
chiasm is more than the sum of its parts. The chiasm extends from the 
hemispheres, to the entire body, and to the field of vision. As Landes (2013) 
observes in a discussion on expression and the chiasm: “Lived experience is 
unaware of any absolute distinction between the seer and seen” (172). In 
perception, too, the seer is unaware of any absolute distinction between the 
hemispheres. The chiasm produces an experience that transcends the 
distinction and advances towards a completion, a coming together that is 









The above theory of the chiasm delineates a possible way that brain 
handles this visual information and how the hemispheres’ co-existence 
results in better engagement with the world—both for survival advantage and 
analysis of the environment. For perception’s sake, the chiasm delivers 
optimal richness of visual information through the right hemisphere, while 
also providing a means of productive deviation through the left: the sparser 
visual information can be exploited in situations that call for faster action. 
These perspectives also complement Goodale and Milner’s (1992) findings 
about the brain possessing two visual systems, corresponding to the ventral 
and dorsal streams.  For auditory processing, the right hemisphere focuses 
on simpler sounds while the left manages more complex vocalizations and 
noise patterns. The chiasmic dynamic has the potential to be mechanistically 
reproduced, but there is a need to explore chiasmic structures more 
generally and lateralization in the brain. It would be counterproductive to 
completely focus efforts on machine learning models that seek to create a 
system with human level intelligence but fail to fully appreciate 
lateralization—and learner models in which semantics amount to static 
positions in vector space—potentially even if those positions are 
probabilistically and loosely defined. It is beneficial to consider the chiasm, 
not only as the natural structure of the brain, but also as it exists across 
different domains. Merleau-Ponty attempted this in 1964, and yet there is still 










     
 
                                                       Figure 4. A simplified model of the chiasm.  
 
Further Conclusions 
Mechanistic models of the brain will continue to be proposed, and 
machine metaphors are too entrenched in the literature to be immediately 
discarded, but adhering to the idea that the human being is an automaton 
might hinder advancement and the use of some better metaphorization. The 
end result of clinging to mechanistic metaphors is the recycled use of 
terminology associated with machines, computers and computer science—or 
the terms that are related to specific processes and algorithms. These first 
formed a framework for alternate tasks and were later adapted to become 
theories of cognition. Better theories of cognition should also more strongly 
inform efforts in machine learning. Daniel Dennett (1992) once argued that 
the self is a center of gravity in a complicated object, which Ramachandran 
(2011) deems conceptually similar to “many vectors intersecting at a single 









of energies—it is a structure of not only embodied balance and the 
contralateral wiring of limbs, but also the coordinated joint effort between the 
hemispheres. In semiotics, the chiasm represents the human form. 44 As a 
syntactical structure, chiasmus is a diverging point of a thesis and antithesis: 
it brings together two different interpretations, using the same elements in 
different configurations. 45 For cognitive science, the chiasm bequeaths an 
answer to the mind-body dichotomy; it is an attractive descriptor that is not 
only potentially compatible with any theory of cognition proposed, but it also 
may inspire new ways of implementing human level intelligence in artificial 
systems because of the unique dynamics it defines. There are several issues 
at stake here, which makes the study of the chiasm valuable: 1. It recognizes 
the embodied aspect of the perceiver, and the crucial roles of both 
hemispheres interacting and carrying out a cooperative effort to produce 
vision. 2. It moves away from use of terminology associated with some 







                                               
44 Pelkey, Jamin. 2017. The Semiotics of X: Chiasmus, Cognition, and Extreme Body Memory. London & New York: Bloomsbury. 
45 There are several different sub-types of chiasmus (and antimetabole) that in some ways overlap with formal logic and set 
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Embodied X Figures and Forms of Thought 
 
  
For literature scholars, classically trained rhetoricians, and even those 
who might not recognize the term but are still familiar with its elements 
through discourse, poetry and prose, the device chiasmus holds a special 
persuasive and compelling tonality. The term chiasmus derives from the 
Greek X, or “chi,” and when encountered in a sentence, often appears in an 
impactful ABBA design, as in the following quote from John F. Kennedy’s 
1961 Address Before the United Nations General Assembly: “Mankind [A] 
must put an end to War [B], before War [B] puts an end to Mankind [A].” The 
complexities of chiasmus can vary, but a chiastic phrase or a structure will 
always involve a crossing – an “X” forged through the arrangement of signs 
or repeating themes. Lissner (2007) postulates that chiasmus arises from 
embodiment: chiastic phrases tend to be dichotomizing or binarizing, and 
she attributes this to our bipedal existence. In The Semiotics of X: Chiasmus, 
Cognition and Extreme Body Memory, Jamin Pelkey expands on this work, 









outstretched limbs, the “X” figure should be studied more intensively in and 
beyond the field of semiotics. 
The book is a concise but wide-ranging treatment of chiasmus that 
moves the discussion of this rhetorical device  well  into  cross-
disciplinary  domains, and reveals how our corporeal understanding of 
“X”  fundamentally  entwines with our modalities for making sense 
of  the  world.  The  first  chapter focuses on anthropological studies of the 
Sentinelese, a small population that dwells on North Sentinel Island in the 
Indian Ocean. Through the Sentinelese, Pelkey introduces the book’s core 
concept: that extreme felt experiences correspond with the spread eagle 
posture, and that these experiences percolate through many aspects of our 
lives, manifesting in ways that reflect those bodily extremes. For the 
Sentinelese, the embodied “X” is a prelinguistic means of communication. As 
a central part of both aposematic displays and shows of celebration, it 
signifies two vastly different states of being. What is so noteworthy 
about  this  posture in the Sentinelese can also be found in nonverbal 
exchange cross-culturally, as an exhibition of both threat and triumph. 
Embodied chiasmus, or embodied “X,” can indicate any number of 
extreme and opposite conditions. The posture can convey life or death, and 
pain or pleasure; it encapsulates either or, while in some situations calling to 
notice that these are not absolutes. As Pelkey describes it, embodied 
chiasmus results in broad “chiastic modeling” that appears in iconography 









sports, philosophy of mind and psychology. In his introduction, Pelkey 
examines chiastic modeling in the mural found at Cueva de la Serpiente in 
Baja California, Mexico (Bradshaw Foundation 2011). The “Serpent Cave” 
mural does not “simply [show] life and death, abundance and scarcity, but 
the transition phase itself: the point of confrontation and reversal between 
two extremes” (p. 9). The Vitruvian man is another figure that captures the 
essence of embodied chiasmus, and Pelkey uses Vitruvius as the primary 
means of developing the argument that humans have an “inborn conception 
of space” that underlies Euclidean geometry (p. 18). 
Pelkey concentrates on transverse, or horizontal symmetry, and this 
sets him apart from Turner (1991), Norrman (1998, 1999), and Lissner 
(2007) who all prioritize vertical symmetry. According to Pelkey, the “X” that 
we compose with our bodies is likely the first comparison we generate, as we 
ascertain the difference between feet and hands, thighs and arms. The 
embodied  “X”  may  also tacitly affect human cognition and influence 
communication. Chiastic body- memories issue forth through our forms of 
self-expression and signing. From the Vitruvian man to where it appears in 
modern graphics, the “X” has a forceful presence. The viewer who discerns 
the substance of “X” does so in a highly visceral way, through a multitude of 
extreme bodily associations. “X” is not only  a message, but also a rendering 
of the self, or the body. In its varying chiastic types, it can also be a depiction 
of other. Another type of chiasmus naturally emerges between two people 









bodies, perhaps over an object of common interest. Pelkey delineates four 
types of chiasmus. This is reminiscent of the fourfold syntactic typology of 
Paul (2014): (a) the “X,” (b) the hourglass, (c) the diamond, and (d) argyle 
patterning. Although Pelkey acknowledges that the scope of his volume 
cannot allow for a complete consideration of all the complexities of the 
typology, he endeavors to gather and assess prominent models that fit within 
his four major categories. He begins the second chapter with the “X” figure. 
In Pelkey’s interpretation, the “X” is the “spread eagle leap,” which in sports 
can be viewed as a risk-taking move that manages to be both freeing and 
imperiling for the performer. In addition to commenting on athletes who 
execute these hazardous but impressive moves, Pelkey also investigates 
this idea through an analysis of Wallace Stevens’ poem “The Motive for 
Metaphor” (1947). As Pelkey notes, the final line spotlights “the vital, 
arrogant, fatal, dominant X” – the elements that create the daring, spread 
eagle leap – the vigor of vitality, presented alongside the possibility of fatal 
error. 
His discussion of sports, torture, and poetry provides a sampling of 
chiastic iconography. He delves into the “spread eagle” as an icon, which he 
traces back to the likeness of an eagle with spread wings that was 
embossed on leather coins from the Roman Empire. The term “spread eagle” 
underwent several significant developments, and Pelkey notates these on a 
timeline, along with giving an account of how “spread eagle” has been 









defeat in sporting events, and titles of high honor, among other things (p. 53–
54). Another poignant example of “X” that Pelkey highlights is the saltire on 
the Scottish flag, which stands as a symbol of national pride. The cross 
honors St Andrew, who in the oral tradition is reported to have died through 
the torture of crucifixion. This would have been an opportunity for Pelkey to 
elaborate on religious iconography, and include the cross and the Chi Rho, 
but such additions would perhaps require another book. 
The third chapter continues the treatment of “X” iconography by 
compiling brand logos that visually impart a range of experiences of the 
embodied agent. Pelkey identifies several corporate and product brand 
marks in which the “X” denotes a single person, specifically a “spread eagle 
human form, with identifiable head, arm and leg representations, such that 
arms are raised and legs parted at obtuse angles relative to the sagittal 
midline of the torso” (p. 67). Among the diverse companies that have 
implemented the “X” in their logos are many that offer health, fitness and 
insurance services, and others that promote technology, connectivity 
between peoples, or specific events like the Burning Man festival in the 
Nevada desert. These designs hint at optimal physical conditions, while 
other logos contrast drastically with these images and tell a story of pain, like 
the one for Crohns and Colitis Canada. Some companies and organizations 
also incorporate the “X” into their names and logos to create blended icons 
with text and pictures, as in many “eXtreme” sport logos (p 76). The blended 









mentions the iconic skull and crossbones of the Jolly Roger. This historical 
example further underpins the purpose of “X” as “evoking primal dialectics of 
survival: life and death, flight or fight; the chance of success, the risk of 
failure” (p. 83). 
The “X” type produces a strong sense of life and death, and pain and 
pleasure—but the hourglass chiastic type also accomplishes this, as it arises 
out of and factors into concepts of time and torture. For Pelkey, our bodily 
associations with the hourglass are subtly different from those we hold for 
“X.” The hourglass is a reminder of mortality, the beginning and end of 
all  things – but its “dihedral symmetry” also creates a “double mirror.” Pelkey 
suggests that the hourglass stands as a representation of self 
and  other.  He homes in on Lacan’s L-Schema (Lacan 2006 [1960]) as a 
chiastic model that fits  within the hourglass category, because it is the “ego 
constantly projecting its self-image and assumptions with confidence onto 
others and  having  this image reflected back with little change” (p. 89). 
Access to  otherness  is  partially obstructed in the hourglass model, and 
Pelkey even goes so far as to say that in many cases, the “Other is off-limits” 
(p. 86). Drawing on Hegel (1977 [1807]) and Heidegger (1969), Pelkey 
progresses to the subject  of  dialectic  –  the thesis, antithesis, and the 
synthesis. Likening Heidegger’s approach to dialectic to the Lacanian L-
Schema, he argues that, “Both diagrams model the infinite perpetuation of 
self-reinforcing, self-referential relationships between contrasting pairs that 









92). The hourglass type restricts instead of opening up the relationships 
between One and Other. The meeting point between the two is narrow and 
weak. This results in instability – continual loops in a closed system “on the 
verge of collapse” (p. 93). 
In Dylan Thomas’ poetry (1971 [1953]), Pelkey locates hourglass X-
stanzas that contain a “litany of despair” (p. 101). The poem “Vision and 
Prayer”  seeks to bring about harmony between opposites such as life and 
death, but Pelkey ultimately identifies the theme of the poem as “crisis 
incarnate” (p. 102). To further reinforce his perspectives on the hourglass 
type in poetry, Pelkey might have critiqued other poets who work with the 
hourglass structure to address the same themes. Instead, he moves on to 
the multimodal exhibition entitled “The  End of Money” (Gaitán 2011), which 
took place at the Witte de With Center for Contemporary Art in Rotterdam 
from May 22 to 7 August 2011 and utilized the hourglass symbol as its 
design. Pelkey concludes that, as it appears in  this  exhibit, and on the 
covers of books, or as a focal piece for movie posters, the hourglass type 
points to “impending doom” (p. 111). The Bhavacakra is the final symbol that 
Pelkey classifies as belonging to the hourglass type, as it comprises several 
hourglasses and illustrates the cycle of life and inevitable death. The tension 
and binarism that come to the fore with the hourglass type can also be 
considered through application of the semiotic square, or Greimas square. 
This tool aids in the assessment of truth-functional logic, or a proposition and 









instances in which an exception must be made for the proposition to hold 
true. Pelkey explains that in the “traditional semiotic square, the center is 
eviscerated in favor of an exclusive focus on the extremities, or margins” (p. 
121). Within the center of the square, it is possible to behold the hourglass 
type. The upper half of the diagram that lays out the “contrary relations” 
occupies a privileged position over the bottom half, or the “subcontrary 
relations.” Pelkey asserts that the semiotic square is “a developmental given 
of human tacit cognition, proceeding from salient features of human 
evolution” (p. 118). 
If the semiotic square is indeed an appropriate model of cognition, 
and also an exemplar of the hourglass type, this may be an especially 
promising area for further research. The problem with ideation that conforms 
to such a model is how it demands hierarchizing and clear categorization, 
tends to admit no mediating ground (through the law of excluded middle, or 
tertium non datur), may ensnares thinkers within its confined template. This 
may be an unavoidable consequence of embodiment, as Pelkey suspects, 
and he believes using the semiotic square as a tool might at least aid us in 
making harmful dichotomies explicit. The body can be mapped onto the 
semiotic square, with the right hand as the proposition, the left as the 
negation, and the legs as subcontrary relations. Across many languages 
worldwide, “there are few exceptions” to the tendency to associate “right” 
with positive attributes, such as goodness and honesty, and “left” with 









The right hand establishes primacy over the left; the proposition 
establishes primacy over its negation. Building on his remarks about the 
hourglass type and embodiment,  Pelkey takes on the topic of movement 
–  and Sheets-Johnstone’s theory that “our ability to think  relies  on the 
movement  of our whole body to find or create spatial regularities” (p. 129). 
Sheets-Johnstone designates the term “kinetic melody” as a descriptor for 
the spatiality and temporality of bodily dynamics. Although Pelkey does not 
cite many other theorists in this section where further evidence could have 
been beneficial, he draws on Sheets- Johnstone’s (2012a: 129–130) 
research to assert that, “complex dynamics underlie posture,” and “felt 
movement” engenders “kinetic analogy” and “imagination.” What Pelkey calls 
“imagination” might also appropriately be referred to as “simulation” or the 
mental rehearsal of activity. The  outcome is that through movement and 
embodiment, we compare or analogize our extremities and this affects how 
we conceptualize other matters. Binaries, or what are often described as 
“double-binds,” are common in our systems for making sense of the world, 
yet these double-binds are often “hidden” or go unnoticed by those who 
compose and use them (p. 135). As  already  mentioned, Pelkey champions 
the semiotic square as an instrument for laying out and grappling with 
double-binds. Through a critical reading of the 2013 country hit “Follow Your 
Arrow” (Musgrave et al. 2013), Pelkey demonstrates how to engage with the 









In Chapter Six, Pelkey provides an example of a product that appeals 
to our inclination to analogize with our bodies. Vibram’s FiveFinger® 
Footwear is a brand of shoe fashioned  like a glove, with  spaces for each 
toe. The  popularity of such a product depends on the customer’s application 
of conceptual blending to perceive relationships that exist between 
experiences, “frames” or “mental spaces” (p. 140). Pelkey concentrates on 
four types of blending networks, taken from Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 
119–135): “(1) simplex, (2) mirror, (3) single- scope, and (4) double-scope” 
(p. 140). Since Vibram’s FiveFinger® Footwear invites a comparison 
between hands and feet, fingers and toes, and gloves and shoes, it can be 
classified as belonging to a double-scope network. A double- scope network 
“involves the imaginative blending of two frames” (p. 141). 
The “double-scope” network lies at the center of Pelkey’s discussion, 
as these networks “emerged late in human revolution and are thought to 
underlie the singularity known as the human language facility” (p. 140). 
Pelkey goes on to say that, “the blend is only a single token of an embedded 
type that belongs to a broader cross-linguistic paradigm set so robust that it 
might reasonably be identified as a universal feature of human tacit 
cognition” (p. 142). This further reinforces Pelkey’s chief argument that 
blending and analogic modeling derive from our ability to note the relations 
between the upper and lower parts of the body. To bring the matter into the 
linguistic domain, he surveys languages that have “systematic congruences” 









“syncretic experiential paradigm” of “arm-leg partonomy” typified in “the 
undifferentiated arm-hand and leg-foot continua featured in languages like 
Hlepho and Savosavo” (p. 155). Hlepho Phowa is an aboriginal language 
from southeastern Yunnan Province, China, and Savosavo is a Papuan 
language of the Soloman Islands. In addition to these and other linguistic 
examples, Pelkey ties in the research of Comrie (2011), who surveyed 196 
world languages and found that “63% are either ‘decimal’ systems, based on 
the number 10, or ‘quinary’ systems, based on the number 5” (p 158). 
Comrie’s findings lead Pelkey to conclude that “fingers and hands” are of 
“profound importance” in “establishing mathematical concepts” (p. 158). He 
explains that, “Another 21% of world languages are either based on the 
number 20 (“vigesimal”) or some hybrid of 20 and 10. This latter fact points 
to the intrafield relations of hands and feet” (p. 158). These data strengthen 
the main points of Pelkey’s thesis, before he advances to the last of the last 
of his types, the diamond type and the argyle pattern. He segues into these 
with a discussion of solipsism, the philosophical position that a person’s 
experiences are all that is true and knowable for that person. The “X” type 
and solipsism are in consonance, insofar as they both elucidate or model 
solitary existence. But “X”s can also be found in company. The “XX” shows 
the interrelationship between two individuals, although this symbol bears 
similarities to the hourglass type, and yields the same problematic dynamic, 
in which the two are locked in perpetual contention. With the “XX,” as in the 









Other, resulting in narcissism and further ensuring solipsistic behavior. The 
“XXX” is a symbol of three that are also in competition. “XXX” adorns famous 
pirate flags in the shape of skulls and crossbones, and it is the title of a 
popular film starring Vin Diesel (p. 156–157). Pelkey declares that “XXX” 
figures are “not merely communicating to an audience, they are also in 
communication with each other” (p. 187). “XXX” presents the “social striving 
for mastery over other selves” (p. 187). This can be substantiated in the 
example of piracy, and by the aggression and violence in the Vin Diesel film, 
but also through other examples like “XXX” adult films. In an “XXX” 
configuration, the middle “X” occasionally outsizes the surrounding two, as in 
the title xXx (Cohen 2002). The dominance of the center “X” is at once 
apparent – yet, in spite of how complex and even threatening we might 
assume these X- marks to be, Pelkey proceeds to offer up “X” types that 
have a more equalizing and unifying visual impact. 
The diamond type is an arrangement of the double-X with two 
intersecting perspectives that form a “rhomb” at the center, or a place of 
common middle ground. Pelkey’s diamond type bears some similarities to 
Paul's circle type. Based on a reading of poems with chiastic structures, Paul 
(2014) concludes that his circle type can be associated with melancholy and 
weariness. Pelkey revisits Petrarch’s Sonnet LXXIV, one of the sources from 
which Paul extrapolated the tone of his circle type. Pelkey notes that in this 
sonnet, “the poet is … reflecting on the nature of love” – and thus concludes 









suggests (p. 213). Pelkey distinguishes himself from Paul in insisting that the 
diamond develops around a third other, and consists in a shared awe or 
wonderment for the two observers. This shared wonderment is particularly 
evident in spread-eagle lattice logos, such as the one for the company Doing 
Family Right, which offers many services, including resources for parents 
who want to form better connections with their children (p. 202). Another 
brand mark that Pelkey chooses to highlight is for Dos Equís beer, which 
depicts a prominent interlocking double-X around a graphic of Aztec ruler 
Moctezuma II. In this instance, the visual story may be more complex, as it 
seems to convey a reverence for the historical figure, though the enclosure 
of the double-X has an oppressive and imperious quality. Pelkey 
acknowledges these conflicting elements, and interprets the double-X to be a 
symbol of Germany and Spain – due to Spain’s colonial influence on Mexico, 
and because a German entrepreneur helped establish the Moctezuma 
Brewery, where the beer originated (p. 204). In his analysis of the logo, 
Pelkey goes on to claim that, “In the Cuauhtémoc Moctezuma Brewery and 
the Dos Equís brand, Germany meets Spain in the colonized territory of the 
Aztecs (and other indigenous peoples of Mexico)” (p. 205). 
From the diamond type, Pelkey progresses onto argyle – a pattern 
that might evoke thoughts of socks and stuffy middle-aged golfers. Pelkey 
sees it differently: for him, the argyle pattern graphically achieves the effect 
of bringing together the diverse views of the collective. Both this and the 









territory of complex integration and the self-forgetful fields of creative 
analogy” (p. 194). Overlapping lattice patterns like argyle are common across 
cultures, and Pelkey briefly traces them through the literature on Turing 
patterns and “form constants” that can be experienced during altered states 
of consciousness. These altered states might temporarily affect a person’s 
sense of separation between self and other. The argyle pattern could be an 
abstraction of the self, surrounded by the masses. Pelkey states that the 
“general mode” of the argyle pattern is “inquiry” and the mood is “growth.” 
Toward the end, Pelkey refers to Merleau-Ponty (1968 [1960]), who 
treats chiasm as an “intertwining” that Pelkey says “is itself the 
beginnings of an escape route from the endless oscillation between self and 
other.” Yet he also contrasts Merleau-Ponty with Sartre, in whose play No 
Exit (1989 [1944]) the character Garcin famously says that “hell is other 
people.” Finishing with these two outlooks helps to underpin the significance 
of Pelkey’s work in general,  even if the comparison might not be wholly 
tenable, as it risks falling into the   trap of dichotomization that the book 
seems to warn against. Attaining a deeper understanding of chiasmus may 
also give us a better understanding of  ourselves, and our predilection for 
comparing and contrasting. 
Pelkey envisages chiasmus as an important tool for “grappling with 
and feasting on” binaries, yet he questions whether or not “binary pairs are 
con- genial to human thought,” as Lohmann (2010: 1) supposed (p. 223). 









believes they can only be considered “congenial” when they can be 
identified, problematized and depolarized. He applies this notion to inquiry in 
anthropology, where he says, “one must decide between anthropology as 
humanity and anthropology as science” – yet this attitude and dichotomy are 
prevalent across disciplines, and we could easily replace “anthropology” with 
any other field. In Pelkey’s reckoning, each of these forms of inquiry is 
necessary, and through recognizing how we can be hindered in pursuing one 
or other, it might be possible to allocate a place for both. If embodied agents 
are predisposed to divide up the world, then we need to be vigilant about 
how and why we make these partitions, and to become better at making 
adjustments. 
Conceiving of chiasmus as a “fundamental mode of human modeling,” 
Pelkey also reminds us of what more is at stake and of interest in studying 
such a model: it not only changes how we undertake analytic and 
metacognitive processes, but also transforms our awareness as embodied 
agents who constantly navigate by perceiving spatial relationships. Though 
Pelkey gravitates towards the supposition that “X” markings tend to express 
a singular type of message or its dialectical opposite, the purpose of chiastic 
structures might also be to affirm the competition between the messages – 
not merely for the sake of revealing that they are at odds, and that this 
relationship cannot be sustained – but instead to confound any such fixed 
perception of the pair. Chiasmus can construct and deconstruct a 









syntactical level, chiasmus brings to light the interchangeability of things, the 
fluctuation and the drastic reversals that make up the ephemeral moments of 
life, and our reality. As embodied agents, we miss much through inattention, 
and there is robust evidence to show that we cannot attend to two objects, 
as in the phenomenon of inattentional blindness – but language in general, 
and chiasmus in particular, permits a workaround to this limitation. 
Syntactical chiasmus moves the subject and object, while also preserving an 
initial state and producing a convergence. 
Pelkey’s pioneering approach to chiasmus should engage anyone 
pondering our capabilities or limitations as thinkers and embodied observers. 
His elaborated typology stands as a useful grounding point around which rich 
dialogues can emerge to further our understanding of the symbology and 
signs we use. Finally, as Pelkey briefly remarks, coming to terms with the 
chiastic model might open new paths of inquiry into other possible worlds – 
which should be of interest not only for logicians and philosophers, but 
perhaps also theoretical physicists, neuroscientists, and designers of android 
AI systems. 
It is notable that in thought experiments on this subject, we often think 
of other worlds as being composed of opposites – that whatever transpires 
here should not have transpired in another world. Pursuing further research 
on chiasmus could allow us to make strides in determining why we are as we 
are, and to confront the roots of our biases. Furthermore, recognizing the 









to constructing alternatives. It may enable us to expand our outlook and 
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